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Chapter 1
General introduction
Context and motivations
In comparison with the globalized markets of goods and services, technology production has
been often described as “far from globalized” and mainly concentrated in the home countries
of multinational enterprises (Patel and Pavitt, 1991). However, academics and international
organizations put forward that research and development (R&D) activities are increasingly
performed at the international level (OECD, 2008; UNCTAD, 2005; UNESCO, 2010). In partic-
ular, the globalization of innovation is a major trend at the crossroads of the rising importance
of knowledge economy and the increasing international slicing of firms’ value chains. In
an increasingly multipolar and competitive world economy, the growing complexity of R&D
activities has stimulated firms to access resources and competences from beyond their own
boundaries (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006) and beyond their home country. Indeed, innova-
tion requires specific technological knowledge and multidisciplinary competences which are
often available in remote locations, preventing firms from developing new products and new
processes in complete isolation.
The globalization of innovation encompasses a wide range of facets beyond the worldwide
diffusion of innovative products (Archibugi and Iammarino, 2002; Narula and Zanfei, 2005).
In fact, innovative firms may decide to cross borders to exploit technological assets already
developed at home (Patel and Vega, 1999). These demand-oriented foreign activities con-
sist in adapting products to the local conditions and supporting entry into new markets. By
contrast, supply factors may drive international R&D activities. Firms may innovate across
borders to track new technology development overseas, to tap into foreign expertise, and to
augment their knowledge base, combining their own abilities with new technological capabil-
ities (Kuemmerle, 1999). Globalization has especially affected the way firms undertake their
innovative activities. A successful internationalization strategy consists not only in ensur-
ing the diffusion of innovation across national borders, but also in developing a worldwide
production of innovative products based on a global network of dispersed locations.
In this context, the main motivations of this thesis are to investigate the extent to which in-
novation takes place across national borders and to analyze the drivers of this phenomenon
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across countries and across industries. For this purpose, this dissertation provides new evi-
dence on the globalization of innovation in four empirical essays using patent-based indica-
tors. More precisely, Chapter 2 aims at decomposing the relationships between expenditures
in R&D activities and patenting efforts at the industry level to shed light on the origins of
the worldwide surge in patent applications. Beyond analyzing the patterns of globalization
of innovation production, Chapter 3 aims at evaluating the links between the specialization of
countries across industrial sectors and the degree of globalization of their innovative activi-
ties. Chapter 4 aims at investigating the role of technological distance in order to explain who
collaborates with whom in international innovation. Finally, Chapter 5 aims at examining the
consequences of the creation a new globalized unitary patent in Europe.
Methodology
From a methodological point of view, the use of patent-based indicators is the central theme of
this research. To improve our understanding of innovation and technology dynamics, patent
data have been used extensively since they have many advantages which make them at the
core of empirical research on innovation1:
2 Patent data are widely and publicly available for most countries across the world at a
lower cost than conducting surveys of firms on their innovative activities. The develop-
ment of large databases (e.g. EPO worldwide patent statistical database, PATSTAT) and
high-quality computers and softwares have facilitated the treatment of the large quantity
of information contained in patents, which has stimulated the use of patent data.
2 Patents have intrinsic links to inventions and concern a broad range of technologies.
2 Patents are defined by homogeneous standards across countries, although they are af-
fected by the characteristics of each patent system regulation.
2 Patent documents contain rich and uniquely detailed information on the technological
content of the invention, the geographical location and the organization of the inventive
process, and the history of the patent application.
Nevertheless, patent statistics are known to present also limitations as economic indicator of
innovation:
2 Not all inventions are patentable since not all inventions meet the patentability criteria
of patent offices.
2 Not all patentable inventions are actually patented due to the differences in the use of
patents across firms, industries, countries, and over time. There are also strategic con-
siderations which can lead firms to patent more or less intensively their inventions and
thus make aggregate patent data difficult to interpret (see Chapter 2 for more details).
1For discussions on the use of patent as economic indicator, see Griliches (1990); Dernis et al. (2001); Archam-
bault (2002); OECD (2009); Nagaoka et al. (2010); de Rassenfosse et al. (2013).
32 There are differences in terms of technical and economic significance of patented inven-
tions. The value of patents is known as being highly skewed.
2 The interpretation of patent data is complex due to the complexity of patent system and
the various dimensions which influence the patenting behavior of firms. It is therefore
important to take into account all these factors and interpreting patent data with care.
To mitigate these limitations as much as possible and to benefit from the advantages of patent
statistics, a significant effort has been made in developing high-quality indicators based on
reliable patent data in order to perform rigorous empirical analyses of the research questions
addressed in this dissertation. First, the relevance of patent statistics as indicators of innova-
tion is evaluated in Chapter 2 by studying the R&D-patent relationship at the industry level.
In particular, this empirical investigation is based on five broad patent indicators to further
understand the nature of the worldwide patent explosion. Second, although patent data do
not capture all innovative activities, it remains the most accessible and internationally compa-
rable source of information to analyze the globalization of innovation, since systematic good
quality data on foreign R&D location are not collected. In this respect, the internationaliza-
tion patent-based indicators of Chapters 3 and 4 provide new insights into the dynamics of
international innovative activities across countries and across industries. Third, the treatment
of large patent databases (e.g. PATSTAT) enables the development of aggregate patent-based
indicators in order to obtain a more exhaustive picture of the innovation globalization in com-
parison with the restricted firm-level evidence usually found in the literature. Fourth, the
richness of information contained in patents allows us to develop two new indicators to mea-
sure: (i) the multidisciplinarity of innovation performed by country-industry pair (Chapters 3
and 4), and (ii) the diversity in technological knowledge among collaborative partners (Chap-
ter 4). Fifth, the analysis of the European patent system, performed in Chapter 5, relies on
original data on the maintenance rates of patents in several countries.
A second methodological choice of this dissertation has been to investigate the globalization
of innovation at the aggregate level rather than at the micro level of the firm. While it does
not take the heterogeneity among firms into account, it has the advantage of offering a more
exhaustive picture of the internationalization of technology. Indeed, aggregate patent-based
indicators provide comprehensive information on all patented inventions, whoever the owner.
On the contrary, collecting micro-level data – i.e. surveying companies about their innovative
activities – is feasible only for a limited sample of firms. This aggregated approach highlights
the common dynamics behind all patented inventions, although it prevents us to treat the
drivers that are firm-specific. Both approaches – macro and micro – should not be seen as
opposite but more as complement to each other. One aim of this thesis is thus to deepen
results and concepts which have been introduced previously at a more micro-level (e.g. the
‘home-base augmenting and exploiting’ strategies of internationalization in Chapter 3, the
‘relative absorptive capacity’ in Chapter 4) by investigating them at the country-industry level.
Unlike most of the literature at aggregate level which focuses on cross-country differences, this
thesis takes an industry perspective in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. However, patent data cannot be
directly associated to industries since the classification of patents is primarily technological.
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Indeed, patent examiners classify patents into technological classes to facilitate their search
for prior art and the identification of novelty in the disclosed invention. Several methods
have been used to accommodate this classification problem in order to allocate patents to
industries. Most of them consist in creating a concordance between technological classes and
industrial sectors. For instance, the “Yale concordance” developed by Evenson et al. (1991)2
was based on the data of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office which required – between
1972 and 1995 – from their examiners to assign the technological class along with the industry
of manufacture and the sector of use of the invention. This was updated by Johnson (2002)
and also at the basis of the table provided by Brian Silvermann3. Verspagen et al. (1994)
introduced the “MERIT concordance table” which links classes of the international patent
classification (IPC) with different weights to different industrial sectors. More recently, Meijers
and Verspagen (2010) built concordance matrices to measure knowledge spillovers based on
patent citations and Lybbert and Zolas (2012) introduced new algorithm approach with text
analysis software and keyword extraction programs.
In my research, I have used the concordance table introduced by Schmoch et al. (2003) that
provides a one-to-one matching between IPC classes and manufacturing industries (classified
according to the international standard industry classification, ISIC Revision 3). This concor-
dance table has a strong empirical basis since it relies on the association by technical experts
of IPC subclasses to industrial categories and on the investigation of the patenting activities
in technology-based fields of a large sample of firms classified by industrial sector. It was also
chosen because it allows us to investigate the links between innovation – measured by patent-
based indicators – and other economic variables (e.g. research & development, international
trade) which share the same industrial classification. Moreover, it is used by the OECD to
create the patent segment of the Structural Analysis (STAN) database. Note that the coverage
of industries offered by the concordance table of Schmoch et al. (2003) is nearly completed,
although this table is limited to manufacturing industries. Own calculations have shown that
only 4% of the patent applications at European Patent Office (less than 3% in terms of world-
wide priority filings) contained in PATSTAT have a IPC technological class which is not taken
into consideration by this concordance table.
In addition to account for differences in patenting across industrial sectors, the main objec-
tives of this industrial approach are: to reshape the R&D-patent relationships and to better
understand strong variability in the propensity to patent (Chapter 2); to deepen – with a large
panel of country-industry pairs – firm-level evidence on the motives explaining the glob-
alization of innovation (Chapter 3); to underline the dual role of technological distance in
international collaborative innovation by distinguishing between industry-specific and non-
industry-specific technological knowledge (Chapter 4).
The remainder of the introduction provides an overview of this dissertation, focusing espe-
cially on the main objectives and the contributions of each chapter to the literature.
2See also Kortum and Putnam (1997).
3See http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/~silverman/ipcsic/documentation_IPC-SIC_concordance.htm
5The R&D-patent relationship
Although patent-based indicators are widely used to study the economics of innovation (Na-
gaoka et al., 2010), there are concerns about the economic significance of patent data (Griliches,
1990) due to differences in the use of patents across firms, industries and countries. The main
objectives of Chapter 2, jointly written with Gaétan de Rassenfosse and Bruno van Pottels-
berghe, are to evaluate the significance of patent series as economic indicators by decompos-
ing the R&D-patent ratio into its many components and to shed light on the sources of growth
in patenting activity.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is both conceptual and empirical. First, we
claim that patent numbers reflect not only research productivity, but also two main compo-
nents of the propensity to patent which are firms’ strategic considerations: the decision to pro-
tect an invention with a patent (the “appropriability strategy”) and the number of patents filed
to protect an innovation (the “filing strategy”). Second, the empirical contribution consists in
evaluating the R&D-patent relationship using a unique panel dataset covering 18 industries in
19 countries from 1987 to 2005, whereas most studies on the determinants of patenting are per-
formed at the firm, regional, or country levels. Moreover, this study relies on five patent-based
indicators (from the all-encompassing national priority filings to more high-value regional or
international patent applications) to provide new insights into the surge in patenting observed
in regional patent offices.
The econometric analysis is conducted in two stages. The first stage estimates, in an error-
correction model, the determinants of the patent production function at the country-industry
level. Extending the study of de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009), it
consists in modeling the factors that affect the productivity of research efforts and those that
are related to the two strategic components of the propensity to patent. The estimation results
confirm that the long-term elasticity of patents with respect to R&D stock is positive and
significant, providing evidence that patents are valid indicators of innovation. In the second
stage, the origins of growth in patenting activity are decomposed between country, industry
and time variations. The comparison between the results for various patent indicators suggests
that firms are not producing more patents, but they are rather extending them abroad more
frequently, illustrating a greater globalization of intellectual property rights.
Globalization of innovation production
The first objective of Chapter 3 is to present aggregate patent-based indicators in order to
provide an overview of the globalization of innovation production over time, across countries
and across manufacturing industrial sectors. In particular, this global analysis is – to the best
of my knowledge – the first one that integrates a systematic industry perspective (extending
previous cross-country patent-based analysis of the internationalization of technology, e.g.
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001). Moreover, rich patent data allow us to
distinguish between several types of globalization of innovation. Comparing inventor and
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applicant country information helps to identify, on the one hand, pure international techno-
logical collaborations (e.g. co-invention) and, on the other hand, cross-border ownership of
innovation. This descriptive analysis confirms a strong growth in the globalization of innova-
tion, since, at the top of patent explosion, the intensity of internationalization has constantly
increased in most of the countries and in all industries.
Secondly, Chapter 3 aims at investigating empirically two main opposing motives driving the
internationalization of innovation: home-base augmenting and home-base exploiting strate-
gies (Kuemmerle, 1997). The main empirical contribution of this chapter comes from the test
of this set of dichotomous motives at the industry level. The econometric findings indicate
that countries tend to be more technologically globalized in industrial sectors in which they
are less technologically specialized. This suggests that the globalization of innovation is a
means to alleviate domestic weaknesses by augmenting home knowledge base rather than a
way to exploit home-base technological advantage. Furthermore, this chapter confirms that
international R&D activities are not purely market-driven.
Who collaborates with whom
While the previous chapter studies the globalization of innovation of a country with the rest
of the world, Chapter 4 aims at explaining who collaborates with whom in the international
production of technology. This empirical investigation is based on a unique panel dataset cov-
ering international co-inventions between 29 countries across 21 industries between 1988 and
2005. First, dyadic international collaborative innovation data allow us to further disentangle
the patterns presented in Chapter 3. The strong growth in the intensity of internationaliza-
tion of innovation is due both to the increasing number of country-industry pairs which have
innovative activities across borders, and to the higher average intensity of collaboration.
Second, this chapter claims that the impact of technological distance on bilateral innovative
collaborations is dual at the industry level. On the one hand, low technological distance
within the industry eases international collaborative innovation between partners by sharing
similar industry-specific technological knowledge. In fact, relative absorptive capacity (Lane
and Lubatkin, 1998) between partners guarantees mutual understanding and enables inter-
actions in innovative activities. On the other hand, high technological distance outside the
scope of the industry – diversity among partners’ non-industry-specific technological knowl-
edge (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005) – stimulates cross-border innovation in order to acquire
novel and multidisciplinary competences. The main contribution of Chapter 4 is to recon-
cile the dual forces related to technological distance – ‘similarity vs. diversity‘ – by using
aggregate patent-based indicators at the industry level. Moreover, the empirical findings con-
firm the additional effect of non-technological distance factors (geographical proximity, ease
of communication, institutional proximity and overall economic ties) in explaining dyadic
international innovation.
7The EU Patent
Chapter 5 provides a cost-benefit analysis of the creation of a new ‘globalized’ patent: the EU
patent (formerly known as the Community Patent) which consists in a single unitary patent
covering the entire EU territory for both the application procedure and legal enforcement
after grant. Although the implementation of the EU patent has been subject to negotiations
for decades, this policy issue remains a highly relevant question (as pointed out recently
by the Advisory Board of the European Patent Office, see ESAB, 2013). In particular, the
determination of an appropriate level of renewal fees and the distribution of related income
among patent offices remain at the core of the debate (see Battistelli, 2013).
The objective of this chapter, jointly written with Bruno van Pottelsberghe, is threefold: (i)
to simulate the budgetary consequences in terms of renewal fees’ income for the European
and national patent offices; (ii) to evaluate the implications for the business sector in terms
of absolute and relative fees; (iii) to assess the total economic impact for the most important
stakeholders of the European patent system. In addition to feed policy discussion, Chapter 5
puts forward an econometric model to explain the maintenance rates of patents. The results
of the simulations suggest that – with a sound renewal fee structure – the EU patent could
generate more income for nearly all patent offices than under the current status quo. It would,
at the same time, substantially reduce the relative patenting costs for applicants. Finally, the
loss of economic rents by patent attorneys, translators and lawyers, and the drop of controlling
power by national patent offices further explain the persistence of a fragmented European
patent system.
The last chapter concludes with the main findings of this thesis and puts forward policy
implications and avenues for further research.
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Chapter 2
On the origins of the worldwide surge
in patenting: an industry perspective
on the R&D-patent relationship
This chapter is based on a article co-authored with Gaétan de Rassenfosse (University of
Melbourne) and Bruno van Pottelsberghe that is published as follows:
2 Danguy, J., G. de Rassenfosse, and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2013). On the
origins of the worldwide surge in patenting: An industry perspective on the R&D-patent
relationship. Industrial and Corporate Change, forthcoming.∗
Abstract
This chapter decomposes the R&D-patent relationship at the industry level to shed light on
the sources of the worldwide surge in patent applications. The empirical analysis is based
on a unique dataset that includes 5 patent indicators computed for 18 industries in 19 coun-
tries covering the period from 1987 to 2005. The analysis shows that variations in patent
applications reflect not only variations in research productivity but also variations in the ap-
propriability and filing strategies adopted by firms. The results also suggest that the patent
explosion observed in several patent offices can be attributed to the greater globalization of
intellectual property rights rather than to a surge in research productivity.
∗The authors are indebted to Bronwyn Hall, Hubert Strauss, Eric Perée, and two anonymous referees for very
useful comments on an earlier version of the paper. The paper has benefited from comments made by participants
at various seminars and conferences, including the 2009 EIB Conference in Economics & Finance (Luxembourg),
the 2010 Competition and Innovation Summer School (Turunç), the 2010 IPTS Patent Workshop (Seville), and the
2011 Second Asia-Pacific Innovation Conference (Singapore). The authors also gratefully acknowledge financial
support from the European Investment Bank. An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “The
R&D-patent relationship: An industry perspective”.
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2.1 Introduction
Patent-based indicators are increasingly used to assess the rate of technological change, to
gauge firms’ competitive positions, or to study knowledge spillovers. The success of patent
statistics is rooted in their wide availability, their intrinsic links to inventions, and their rela-
tively homogeneous standards across countries. International treaties, such as the Paris Con-
vention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 or the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT) signed in 1978, have set some legal and quality standards across patent offices world-
wide. Empirical studies on the R&D-patent relationship performed on cross-sectional or panel
data unambiguously lead to the conclusion that there is a significant correlation between R&D
inputs and patent counts, although the estimated elasticity varies greatly with the econometric
specifications adopted.
The idea that patents are relevant indicators of technological change is not without its detrac-
tors. It is well known that not all inventions are patentable and that not all patentable inven-
tions are actually patented. There are noticeable differences in the use of patents across firms,
industries, and countries, which make patent data rather difficult to interpret. In addition,
patented inventions differ in terms of their quality, or “inventive step,” and their economic
significance. Concerns about the use of patents as economic indicators have been further rein-
forced by the greater emphasis on strategic patenting in the literature (e.g. Hall and Ziedonis,
2001; Blind et al., 2006). Surely the significant increase in the number of patent filings ob-
served worldwide over the last two decades is not entirely explained by an increase in R&D
expenditures (Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Hall, 2005; WIPO, 2011).
This chapter aims to decompose the R&D-patent ratio into its many components in order to
shed light on the sources of growth in patenting activity. Its contribution to the literature is
both conceptual and empirical. On the conceptual level, we acknowledge that patent numbers
reflect not only research productivity but also strategic considerations, such as the proportion
of inventions patented (the “appropriability strategy”) and the number of patents filed to pro-
tect an innovation (the “filing strategy”). For instance, firms in the telecommunications indus-
try patent many inventions and typically have a myriad of patents for any one product (e.g.,
the mobile phone). In contrast, firms in the pharmaceutical industry patent many inventions,
but drugs are generally protected by a small number of key patents. While many surveys
measure the appropriability strategy (e.g., Levin et al., 1987; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Cohen
et al., 2000), the filing strategy has rarely been considered thus far. Furthermore, although the
filing strategies of firms have been studied by several authors (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis, 2001;
Reitzig, 2004), their effect on the R&D-patent relationship has been largely neglected.
The empirical contribution of the chapter is twofold. First, this chapter evaluates the R&D-
patent relationship using a unique panel dataset covering 18 industries in 19 countries over
19 years (1987–2005). Most studies on the determinants of patenting activity are performed
at the firm, regional, or country levels. Only rarely do such studies cover the industry level.1
1To the best of our knowledge, Meliciani (2000) offers the only panel-based econometric analysis at the industry
level. The sample covers 15 industries in 12 countries over 20 years. The lack of studies at the industry level can
partly be explained by the difficulty faced by researchers in matching patents with industry-level data: patents are
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While intellectual property strategies differ across firms, especially across firms of different
sizes, they also vary widely across industries. Second, this study relies on five patent-based
indicators – some of which are new – to further understand the nature of the patent explosion:
priority filings, EPO filings, USPTO filings, “regional” filings (a combination of EPO and
USPTO filings), and triadic filings.2 A priority filing is the first patent application protecting
an invention. A subsequent patent application can then be filed at regional offices (such as
the European patent office (EPO) for European applicants or the US Patent Office (USPTO)
for North American applicants) or simultaneously at the three offices (the USPTO, the EPO
and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), or the so-called triadic patents) and covers a broader
geographical area. The average quality or value of patent indicators is low for priority filings
and higher for triadic applications, because of the higher legal and attorney fees, as well as
translation costs arising from the broader geographic protection.
The econometric analysis is conducted in two stages. The first stage involves estimating the
determinants of the patent production function. The results confirm that the research produc-
tivity dimension matters and that it explains part of the variation in the patent-to-R&D ratio
at the industry level. This finding serves as additional evidence that patents are valid eco-
nomic indicators that can be used to measure technological progress. The long-term elasticity
of patents with respect to R&D is about 0.12. The results also confirm that the inclusion of the
two components of the propensity to patent – appropriability and filing strategies – helps to
refine the link between R&D and patents. This finding sheds light on the strong variability in
the patent-to-R&D ratio across industries and suggests that patent indicators are affected by
‘strategic’ considerations.
In the second stage, we use the regression results to decompose the sources of growth in
patenting activity. We find that R&D expenditures account for a modest share of the vari-
ance in patenting (from 1 to 5 per cent depending on model specifications) compared to
the variables which control for research productivity and propensity to patent. Moreover,
our analysis of the fixed effects related to the three dimensions of our panel dataset, which
capture a large share of the variance in patent growth, provides additional insights into the
sources of growth. While some industries (computers and communication technologies) and
countries (South Korea, Spain, and Poland) have experienced a drastic increase in patent ap-
plications, the ratio of priority patent applications to R&D expenditure has been generally
constant. This result suggests that there has been no spurt in innovation productivity. In con-
trast, regional applications (filings at the USPTO or at the EPO) have been increasing since the
early 1990s, suggesting that the patent explosion observed in large regional patent offices is
due to the greater globalization of intellectual property rights rather than a surge in research
productivity.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section surveys key empirical studies on the
R&D-patent relationship and introduces the conceptual approach. Section 2.3 presents the
not classified by economic sectors, and the correspondence between technological and economic nomenclatures is
not straightforward (see discussion in Chapter 1).
2“Regional” filings are those made at either the EPO or the USPTO, or a mix of both, as explained in section
2.3.2. These two patent offices attract a large number of applications from non-domestic applicants – about half of
the total number of filings in the two offices.
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empirical model, the five patent indicators and the explanatory variables. The empirical re-
sults are presented and interpreted in section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the conclusions, as well
as a discussion of research and policy implications.
2.2 The components of the R&D-patent relationship
Many empirical studies have investigated the relationship between R&D and patents using the
methodology first proposed by Pakes and Griliches (1980) as illustrated in Appendix Table
2.A.1. Pakes and Griliches estimated a knowledge production function that models patent
count as a function of current and past research expenditures. The estimated elasticity of
patents with respect to R&D is generally found to be positive and significant, but its amplitude
varies greatly depending on the econometric specifications adopted. The wide variation is
striking with firm-level analyses (see, for example, Hausman et al., 1984; Hall et al., 1986;
Jaffe, 1986; Cincera, 1997; Duguet and Kabla, 1998; Crépon et al., 1998; Blundell et al., 2002;
Czarnitzki et al., 2009) as well as in more aggregate levels of analyses (see, for instance,
de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2009, at the country level, and Bottazzi
and Peri, 2003, at the regional level).
Few scholars have studied the R&D-patent relationship at the industry level. An exception
is Meliciani (2000), who studied variations in USPTO patents across countries, industries,
and over time. The author showed a quite low – but positive and significant – elasticity of
R&D. She also pointed out that patterns of innovation are sector-specific rather than country-
specific: the variability of relative measures of R&D and of patenting performance is larger
across sectors than across countries. Other studies have also illustrated the strong variations
in patents-to-R&D ratio across industries.3 Kim and Marschke (2004) have shown for instance
that the pharmaceutical industry presents a low patent-R&D ratio (with 166 patents per billion
R&D dollar in 1992) compared to other industries, especially cumulative technology industries
(e.g. electronic instrument and communication equipment, computers and computational
equipment). In addition to yielding a large number of patents per dollar of R&D, the latter
industries have experienced a stronger growth of their patents-to-R&D ratio.
Five potential explanations may account for the fluctuation in the estimated elasticity. First,
R&D indicators encompass much more than the activity of generating new ideas and inven-
tions. Therefore, R&D might not be a good indicator of innovative effort. Second, R&D
expenditures represent only a fraction of the total resources a firm devotes to innovative ac-
tivities. On the basis of detailed data for the Netherlands in 1992, Brouwer and Kleinknecht
(1997) estimated that R&D expenditure represented about one-quarter of total innovation ex-
penditure. Sirilli and Evangelista (1998) reported that R&D expenditure accounted for 36%
of total innovation expenditure in Italian manufacturing firms. Investments in fixed assets,
market research, and trial production are as many expenses that are not accounted for in of-
ficial statistics. See also Cincera (1998) for similar figures. Third, patent series are, by their
very nature, subject to a substantial bias, as most patents generate low or no value and only a
3See also Table 2.3 in the next section.
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few patents are associated with a high economic value. Fourth, more generally, the estimates
could also be affected by the patent count methodology that is used (see de Rassenfosse et al.,
2013 for a recent detailed explanation of existing patent counts).
A fifth concern relates to the strong influence of the propensity to patent in the R&D-patent
relationship (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). The R&D-patent relationship can be decomposed
in two main dimensions: the productivity of the research efforts which can potentially lead
to inventions and the propensity to patent in order to protect a given innovation. Scholars
have long argued that patent counts reflect more the latter dimension than the former one.
For instance, Scherer (1983, p 116) explicitly assumed that research productivity was con-
stant for the sake of simplicity. While admitting the possibility of “differential creativity of
an organization’s R&D scientists and engineers,” the author did not consider this element.
Instead, Scherer chose to concentrate on other, “more systematic” factors. In Scherer’s study,
the more “systematic” factors that drove the patenting performance of firms were related to
the propensity to patent.
In this chapter, we explicitly model the two dimensions of the R&D-patent relationship: the
productivity of research on the one hand, and the propensity to patent, defined as the number
of patents per innovation, on the other hand. The propensity to patent is itself composed
of two dimensions: the decision to protect an invention with a patent and the number of
patented inventions per innovation. We refer to the former as the “appropriability strategy”
and to the latter as the “filing strategy.” It is important to emphasize the distinction between
invention and innovation. While the former relates to an improvement in knowledge, the latter
refers to a final product and is usually composed of a set of inventions and, thus, potentially
encompasses several patent filings.
A decision to patent an invention (appropriability strategy) is largely determined by the ef-
ficacy of patent protection to appropriate innovation rents. Companies rely on numerous
mechanisms of rent appropriation, such as secrecy, lead time, complementary sales and ser-
vices, complementary manufacturing facilities, barriers to entry, and tacit knowledge (e.g.,
Teece, 1986). These mechanisms may coexist with patent protection and are often paired with
it. In the Carnegie Mellon Survey undertaken by Cohen et al. (2000), secrecy and lead time
were found to be the two most effective appropriability mechanisms, and were top ranked
in 17 and 13 industries, respectively. Patent protection generally appears to be the least ef-
fective mechanism, although its importance varies significantly across industries (see Table
2.1). Patent protection is particularly important for pharmaceutical, chemical, and precision
instrument firms. Based on survey data gathered from R&D executives in Switzerland, Harabi
(1995) reported that the ability of competitors to invent around patents and the perception that
patent documents disclose too much information were the most important factors that limited
the use of patents.
Nevertheless, an application for a patent is not always only driven by a desire to protect
innovation rents; other motivations, related to the alternative roles of patents, encourage firms
to seek patent protection. Patents can be used as a tool for technology negotiations with
competitors or potential collaborators, to exclude rivals from a particular technology area, for
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communication and marketing purposes, to increase revenues through license agreements,
to ensure the freedom to operate, or to attract investors. These considerations all influence
the observed patenting performance of firms (see, for instance, Cohen et al., 2000; Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001; Blind et al., 2006; or de Rassenfosse, 2012, for detailed investigations in this
field).
Once a decision is made to protect an invention, the applicant chooses the number of patents
that are to be filed. We refer to this step as the “filing strategy.” Reitzig (2004) provided early
evidence that this dimension matters. On the basis of survey data for 614 patents filed at
the EPO, Reitzig found that innovations were protected by a coherent group of around five
patents on average. In addition to the decision on how many patents to file, the applicant
must also consider the necessary geographical scope of protection, i.e., in which countries
patent protection should be sought.
To summarize, we identify two key milestones when analyzing the R&D-patent relationship.
The first milestone is the distinction between research productivity and patent propensity. The
second milestone is the distinction between appropriability and filing strategies.
Table 2.1: Share of inventions that are patented (in percentages)
Arundel and Kabla (1998) Cohen et al. (2000)
Mining 28 -
Food, beverages and tobacco 26 15
Textiles, clothing 8 9
Petroleum refining 23 38
Chemicals 57 51
Pharmaceuticals 79 95
Rubber and plastic products 34 40
Glass, clay, ceramics 29 43
Basic metals 15 4
Fabricated metal products 39 49
Machinery 52 38
Office and computing equipment 57 39
Electrical equipment 44 44
Communication equipment 47 51
Precision instruments 56 52
Automobiles 30 51
Other transport equipment 31 -
Power utilities 29 -
Transport and telecom services 20 -
Notes: The industry classification corresponds to that presented in Arundel and Kabla (1998). Figures
from Cohen et al. (2000) were averaged across sub-industries when Cohen et al.’s industry classification
system did not match Arundel and Kabla’s system.
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2.3 Empirical implementation
The aim of the empirical analysis is to decompose the R&D-patent relationship taking the
factors that affect the productivity of research efforts and the propensity to patent into account.
In an ideal set-up, one would be able to observe both the number of inventions and the number
of patents. However, as the only observable measure of inventive output is the patent count,
one should be cautious when interpreting the parameters of the patent-production function
because differences in patent numbers reflect both productivity and propensity effects.
2.3.1 The model
The dataset has three dimensions: time (t = 1, . . . , 19), industry (i = 1, . . . , 18), and country
(j = 1, . . . , 19). Each “individual” thus reflects an industry–country pair.4 As research efforts
(R) lead to inventions (I), which, in turn, may lead to patent applications (P), the R&D-patent
relationship for the N individuals in the sample can be expressed as follows (temporarily
excluding the time dimension):
I = ΩRγand P = ΦI (2.1)
where the parameter g is a scalar measuring the average return to R&D across individuals,
and W and F are diagonal matrices of size N capturing the productivity and the propensity
effects for each individual, respectively.5 In this framework, the matrix F captures both the
appropriability strategy and the filing strategy. It can also be expressed as a function of the
two propensity components, but this would unnecessarily clutter the notation. If we let X and
Z, respectively, denote the matrices of variables that affect W (productivity) and F (propensity),
and if we let a and b, respectively, reflect the column vectors of coefficients, then equation (2.1)
can be written as:
i = c1 + α x + γ r and p = c2 + β z + i (2.2)
where the lower-case Roman letters denote the logs of the variables. If we expand the patent-
production function, we arrive at:
p = c + γ r + β z + α x (2.3)
where c = c1 + c2 is a scale parameter capturing the rate at which research efforts lead to
patent applications (c1 reflects the average productivity of research across individuals and c2
4An alternative approach would be to estimate the parameters of a patent-production function for each industry,
thereby allowing for differentiated impacts across industries. Nevertheless, the “pooled” approach was chosen
because it is based on a larger number of observations and provides averages across industries and countries. It is
the purpose of this chapter to grasp cross-industry determinants of patent-to-R&D variation.
5The expression Rg indicates that each of the N elements rij of R is taken to the power of g.
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reflects the average propensity to file patents). As suggested in the literature (see the intro-
duction and section 2.2), the propensity to patent has most probably increased since the 1980s
due to an unobservable greater reliance on the patent system for various strategic reasons. In
other words, c2 may have increased over time even after accounting for the observable charac-
teristics Z. Along a similar vein, research productivity has probably improved over the years
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999). Therefore, the extent to which the scale variable c can capture the
average growth rate of the productivity of research or of the two propensity effects is unclear.
At this stage, we remain agnostic as to what the variable c captures. However, we analyze its
various dimensions (country, industry, and year) in greater detail in section 2.4.2 in order to
shed light on the sources of the patent explosion.
The patent-production function for a given industry-country pair at a single point in time (ijt)
can be written as:
pijt = cijt + γ rijt + β zijt + α xijt + ε ijt (2.4)
where ε ijt is the error term. It is good practice to estimate panel data using first differences to
avoid potential spurious-regression problems. If we let ∆ denote the first-difference operator,
equation (2.4) can be transformed as follows:
∆pijt = ∆cijt + γ∆rijt + β∆zijt + α∆xijt + υijt (2.5)
with υijt = ∆ε ijt. As the variables are expressed in logs, equation (2.5) is an approximation
of the growth rate of patenting. The term ∆cijt is the growth rate of patent filings that is not
accounted for by the explanatory variables. Equation (2.5) implies that a change in any of
the explanatory variables has a contemporaneous impact on the number of patent applica-
tions. In other words, the parameters of the first-differenced variables capture the short-term
elasticities.
Given that the R&D-patent process is co-integrated, the patent-production function is esti-
mated by means of an error correction model (ECM) with a one-year lag structure.6 The
ECM provides a rich econometric framework that allows for the estimation of both short-term
and long-term elasticities. The choice of a one-year lag is motivated by Hall et al. (1986).7
These authors estimated several panel data models at the microeconomic level and obtained
evidence of a strong contemporaneous relationship between R&D expenditure and patenting,
and of a small effect of R&D history on patent applications. This is consistent with the practice
of starting to file patents early in the life of a research project, although the lag between initial
R&D expenditures and patent applications can admittedly be much longer8. This justifies the
use of R&D stock rather than R&D flow in our empirical implementation (see section 2.3.3).
6The tests on unit roots and co-integration for our panel data suggest that the series are non-stationary and
co-integrated (see 2.B Appendix).
7Kondo (1999) has analyzed the dynamic mechanism of the R&D-patent relationship of Japanese industry and
has shown that R&D effort leads to patent applications with a time-lag of about one and a half years.
8For instance, Cincera (1997) has highlighted that the coefficients of current and lagged levels of R&D expendi-
tures present a ’U-shaped’ structure.
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The ECM involves estimating the model in first differences together with the previous year’s
deviation from equilibrium (in parentheses), which leads to the following equation:
∆pijt = ψi + ψj + ψt + γs ∆rijt + βs ∆zijt + αs ∆xijt
−λ(pijt−1 − c− γl rijt−1 + βl zijt−1 + αl xijt−1) + νijt (2.6)
Remember that the individual is defined as a country-industry pair. The term ∆cijt in equation
(2.5) is decomposed into a fixed industry effect (yi), a fixed country effect (yj), and a common
time effect (yt) in equation (2.6).
The term in the parentheses in equation (2.6) is usually referred to as the error correction term.
It can be interpreted as the deviation from equilibrium in the previous period. The variables
expressed in first difference – those preceded by the operator ∆ – capture the short-term im-
pact on the number of patents. In other words, they indicate how a change in any explanatory
variable contemporaneously affects the number of patents. The parameter l usually fluctu-
ates between 0 and 1, and measures the speed of adjustment to the long-term equilibrium
(the closer to 1, the quicker the adjustment process). The long-run elasticities are calculated
by dividing each estimated parameter associated with the lagged variables by the adjustment
parameter λ (for a discussion, see Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991).
2.3.2 The dependent variable: patent indicators
Many ways of counting patents exist, each with its own strengths and weaknesses (see, for
example, Dernis et al., 2001, and OECD, 2009, for a discussion). It is therefore particularly
important to carefully select the patent indicators to be used to monitor innovation perfor-
mance so as to reduce the potential biases as much as possible. Five alternative indicators are
used in this empirical analysis in order to gauge the robustness of the results to the chosen
dependent variable. These indicators are: the number of national priority filings, the number
of patents filed at the EPO, the number of patents filed at the USPTO, a measure combining
EPO and USPTO patents, and the number of patents filed simultaneously in Japan, the US,
and Europe (“triadic” patents). Whereas the first indicator is composed of many patents with
a highly skewed distribution of value, triadic filings are less numerous but are of a much
higher economic value. Note that we focus on patent filings rather than on granted patents,
so that the patent count is not affected by varying grant rates across patent offices or over
time. The patent counts are assigned to the country of inventor(s) and are also expressed by
priority year so that they better reflect the date of invention.
The patent indicators are computed from the EPO worldwide patent statistical database (PAT-
STAT, April 2009) for each manufacturing industry following the International Standard In-
dustry Classification scheme (ISIC, Revision 3), as indicated in Appendix Table 2.A.2. How-
ever, patents are not classified using the ISIC scheme but rather using the codes of the Inter-
national Patent Classification (IPC) scheme, which represent the different areas of technology
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to which they pertain. Patents have therefore been assigned to the appropriate industries
using the concordance table between IPC and ISIC codes provided by Schmoch et al. (2003).
Schmoch et al. estimated the empirical concordance table by investigating the patenting ac-
tivity in technology-based fields (IPC) of more than 3,000 firms classified by industrial sector
(ISIC). When a patent contains more than one IPC code, the industry allocation was performed
on a fractional basis.9
The first indicator is the corrected count of national priority filings (NPFCORR), which was
recently introduced by de Rassenfosse et al. (2013). This indicator captures all of the patents
“invented” in a country, regardless of the patent office of application. For example, the count
for Austria is equal to the number of priority filings made by inventors based in Austria
and filed at the Austrian patent office plus the priority filings made by inventors based in
Austria but filed directly at other patent offices, such as the EPO, the USPTO, or the German
patent office. This methodology assures the best match between R&D expenditure and patent
applications at the country level. The inclusion of priority filings made abroad also reduces the
bias against small countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, which file a higher share
of their patents abroad than larger countries, such as France or Germany. This worldwide
count of priority filings is a broad measure of patenting that encompasses both low-value
and high-value patents. It is biased in favor of Japan and South Korea, as the share of these
countries in the total number of national priority filings is much higher than their share of
R&D expenditures. The patent systems in these countries favor patents that are much smaller
in scope but more numerous. On average, patents filed at the Japanese and the Korean patent
offices have one-third the number of claims than patents filed at the USPTO or the EPO. For
this reason, the count for Japanese and Korean priority filings has been divided by three (for
a discussion, see Kotabe, 1992, and Archontopoulos et al., 2007).10
The second indicator is the count of patent applications filed at the EPO. This indicator is
composed of the patents that were filed directly at the EPO and those that were extended to
the EPO as second filings. As the EPO patenting procedure is expensive, EPO patents are
generally of a higher value. This indicator is biased for two main reasons. The first is related
to home bias, as companies in Europe tend to file a higher proportion of their patents at the
EPO than companies from non-European countries (see Figure 2.1). de Rassenfosse, Schoen,
and Wastyn (2013) presented firm-level evidence that a count of EPO patents provided biased
estimates of patent production functions. Second, the reliance on the EPO has increased over
time for all countries, especially those in Europe. In this respect, de Rassenfosse and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) showed the presence of a systematic bias in statistics based
on European patents: the share of priority filings transferred to the EPO increases with the
country’s age of membership in the European Patent Convention. This calls for a cautious
interpretation of the evolution of the number of EPO patents over time.
The third indicator is similar to the second except that the patent office of reference is the
USPTO. For this indicator, long-term statistics are available for granted patents only. Given
9Some patents had no IPC codes and some IPC codes were not in the concordance table. All “unassigned”
patents were allocated to industries according to the observed share of successfully allocated patents.
10As the dependent variable is the growth rate of patent applications, the econometric estimates are not affected
by the normalization.
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that many countries in the sample are European, this indicator probably reflects the value of
patents better (a European applicant will find it easier to file at the EPO than at the USPTO
and will seek a US patent only for the most valuable inventions).11 However, this indicator is
subject to an important, and logical, home bias for North American applicants, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Research effort and patenting activity
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Source: Own calculations based on data for the year 2005.
Note: The count for Japanese and Korean priority filings (NPFCORR) has been divided by three.
The fourth indicator (REGIONAL) is a mix of EPO and USPTO patents. As European appli-
cants are more likely to file at the EPO and as other countries preferably file at the USPTO, the
indicator is composed of EPO patents for European countries and USPTO patents for other
countries. This mitigates the home biases that characterize the EPO and the USPTO indicators
and allows for a geographical distribution that is closer to the actual distribution of research
efforts.
The count of triadic patent families is the fifth indicator (TRIADIC). It was developed by the
OECD to select patents of high quality that were comparable across countries. According to
the OECD definition, the triadic patent family is “a set of patent applications filed simulta-
neously at the EPO, the JPO, and granted by the USPTO” that share one or more priority
applications (OECD, 2009, p 71). This indicator is more robust to differences in patent reg-
ulations across countries and changes in patent laws over time. Triadic patents are of high
value given the high cost associated with applying for patents in the three patent offices. On
average, only between 10% and 15% of priority filings ultimately become triadic patents. In
11To mitigate the effect of the grant lag in US patent statistics, which was especially strong in 2004 and 2005, the
data are adjusted for each country-industry pair using the ratio of EPO patents to US patents for the year 2003.
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2005, the 19 countries included in the sample had a total of 368,436 priority filings for 49,670
triadic patent applications.
The absolute number of patents, their relative shares across countries and industries, and their
compound annual growth rates over the period from 1987 to 2005 are presented in Appendix
Tables 2.A.3 and 2.A.4. These tables show that the so-called patent explosion has taken place
in most countries, in all industries, and for all patent indicators. More interestingly, Tables
2.2 and 2.3 offer an overview of the patent-R&D ratio across countries and industries in order
to illustrate some stylized facts about the R&D-patent relationship. First, the variability of
the ratio – and of its growth rate between 1987 and 2005 – across countries (Table 2.2) and
industries (Table 2.3) indicates that variations in patents are not only driven by change in R&D
expenditures. Second, our panel dataset validates and generalizes the industry-level analysis
of Kim and Marschke (2004) on USPTO patents by US firms over the period 1983–1992. While
a few industries, such as computing machinery (COMP), exhibit both a high patent-R&D ratio
and a strong increase in this ratio, other industries have experienced a strong decrease of their
relative number of patents. For instance, the patent-R&D ratio in pharmaceuticals decreased
at approximately 5% per annum. As pointed out by Kim and Marschke (2004), such decrease
is probably explained by the fact that the cost of developing new drugs has been increasing
strongly rather than by a lower propensity to patent new drugs.
Table 2.2: Patent per R&D expenditures (in millions of 2000 USD) by country
NPFCORR EPO TRIADIC USPTO REGIONAL
Y05 CAGR Y05 CAGR Y05 CAGR Y05 CAGR Y05 CAGR
AT 0.88 -2.0% 0.48 0.1% 0.18 -1.5% 0.31 2.2% 0.48 0.1%
BE 0.60 2.1% 0.43 3.9% 0.13 2.6% 0.31 4.5% 0.43 3.9%
CA 0.91 0.1% 0.18 0.0% 0.06 -3.5% 0.59 0.5% 0.59 0.5%
DE 1.40 3.1% 0.70 5.1% 0.20 3.4% 0.49 5.8% 0.70 5.1%
DK 0.89 -2.7% 0.59 3.0% 0.18 1.3% 0.53 3.4% 0.59 3.0%
ES 0.65 -2.7% 0.24 4.6% 0.05 2.3% 0.14 2.7% 0.24 4.6%
FI 0.86 -4.9% 0.36 0.6% 0.10 -1.8% 0.36 0.2% 0.36 0.6%
FR 0.79 -0.5% 0.42 1.3% 0.14 0.4% 0.30 1.7% 0.42 1.3%
GB 1.30 -0.7% 0.36 0.8% 0.13 0.1% 0.40 2.6% 0.36 0.8%
IE 0.78 -12.2% 0.33 -0.9% 0.11 -0.9% 0.37 0.4% 0.33 -0.9%
IT 1.80 4.0% 0.75 7.0% 0.13 2.7% 0.41 6.5% 0.75 7.0%
JP* 1.43 -2.7% 0.30 -0.4% 0.23 1.5% 0.67 0.3% 0.67 0.3%
KR* 1.84 6.1% 0.28 17.8% 0.17 16.8% 1.00 10.3% 1.00 10.3%
NL 1.41 4.3% 0.92 4.8% 0.55 5.2% 0.80 5.5% 0.92 4.8%
NO 1.78 1.4% 0.60 7.1% 0.21 5.4% 0.69 6.9% 0.60 7.1%
PL 1.65 -7.9% 0.23 15.8% 0.02 12.0% 0.17 20.3% 0.23 15.8%
SE 0.51 -4.8% 0.33 0.8% 0.12 -0.1% 0.27 0.4% 0.33 0.8%
US 0.70 3.4% 0.12 0.4% 0.07 -1.8% 0.71 3.8% 0.71 3.8%
Source: Own calculations
Notes: * The number of priority fillings for Japan and Korea has been divided by 3. The columns
labeled ‘Y05’ report the patent-R&D ratio in the year 2005 while the columns labeled ‘CAGR’ report
the compound annual growth rate of the patent-R&D ratio over the largest available period. CH was
excluded because of lack of R&D data.
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Table 2.3: Patent per R&D expenditures (in millions of 2000 USD) by industry
NPFCORR EPO TRIADIC USPTO REGIONAL
Y05 CAGR Y05 CAGR Y05 CAGR Y05 CAGR Y05 CAGR
FOOD 1.00 -3.7% 0.27 -3.5% 0.12 -4.3% 0.52 -2.6% 0.53 -3.1%
TEXT 1.28 0.2% 0.32 1.8% 0.14 0.2% 0.66 1.3% 0.72 1.6%
WPAP 0.82 -2.6% 0.23 -1.0% 0.10 -2.4% 0.42 -1.4% 0.47 -1.2%
PETR 1.61 4.7% 0.53 5.4% 0.26 4.2% 0.90 5.4% 0.96 5.5%
CHEM 1.61 1.8% 0.54 2.6% 0.27 1.9% 0.90 2.8% 0.97 2.8%
PHAR 0.36 -5.3% 0.15 -4.8% 0.08 -6.0% 0.24 -4.4% 0.25 -4.2%
RUBB 1.15 -1.6% 0.32 0.0% 0.13 -1.6% 0.54 -1.0% 0.61 -0.6%
MINE 2.27 2.9% 0.62 4.7% 0.28 3.4% 1.22 4.9% 1.33 5.0%
META 1.71 2.0% 0.48 4.1% 0.22 2.9% 0.90 3.9% 0.98 4.1%
FABM 2.72 0.8% 0.70 3.3% 0.25 1.3% 1.21 1.4% 1.40 1.9%
MACH 1.66 -2.6% 0.44 0.1% 0.18 -1.5% 0.84 -1.0% 0.93 -0.7%
COMP 2.81 5.1% 0.65 6.1% 0.35 5.3% 1.90 8.5% 1.92 8.3%
ELEC 1.03 1.8% 0.27 4.3% 0.13 3.0% 0.63 4.4% 0.67 4.5%
COMM 1.32 -0.4% 0.35 2.0% 0.18 0.7% 0.90 1.1% 0.92 1.1%
INST 0.53 -1.5% 0.14 0.3% 0.07 -0.8% 0.32 0.5% 0.34 0.6%
AUTO 0.64 -0.6% 0.17 2.3% 0.08 0.6% 0.32 0.3% 0.36 0.7%
TRAN 0.35 -0.1% 0.10 3.8% 0.04 2.6% 0.19 1.7% 0.21 1.8%
MISC 3.21 -1.6% 0.52 -0.1% 0.19 -0.3% 1.48 3.2% 1.60 3.1%
Source: Own calculations
Notes: The columns labeled ‘Y05’ report the patent-R&D ratio in the year 2005 while the columns
labeled ‘CAGR’ report the compound annual growth rate of the patent-R&D ratio over the largest
available period.
2.3.3 Explanatory variables
The most important explanatory variable is the amount of R&D expenditure by country-
industry pair (R&D), which measures the research efforts. This variable is taken from the
OECD’s ANBERD database and is expressed in constant 2000 US dollars (USD) at purchasing
power parity (PPP). We use R&D stocks computed using the perpetual inventory method
with a depreciation rate of 15%12. The use of R&D stocks is motivated by the fact that the
patent outcome is the result of an accumulated stock of knowledge over time and not simply
the result of recent R&D activities. Estimations undertaken with R&D flows lead to similar
results13.
The estimated elasticity of patents with respect to R&D provides an incomplete evaluation
of research productivity. A more complete picture could be derived if inventions (rather
than patents) could be accurately measured or if the two types of propensity to patent were
12This methodology is largely used in the literature (see for instance the Appendix A of Guellec and van Pot-
telsberghe de la Potterie, 2004a). In our case, the initial R&D stock was computed by assuming a constant growth
rate of the past R&D expenditures per country-industry pair.
13For the basic R&D-patent model, see Table 2.5 which concerns R&D stock in comparison with R&D flow in
Table 2.A.5; for the model including productivity and propensity variables, see Table 2.6 which concerns R&D
stock in comparison with R&D flow in Table 2.A.6
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properly measured across countries and over time. As no such indicators are available, an
indirect approach is necessary. Extending the empirical model put forward by de Rassenfosse
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009), it consists of finding variables that arguably induce
(or reflect) differences in the productivity of research activities and variables that are correlated
with the two dimensions of the propensity to patent.
Explanatory variables that could affect the propensity and the productivity components for
a large group of countries are hard to find, especially variables that vary over industries and
that are available over a long period of time. Moreover, it is also difficult to find indicators
that impact only one component and not the other. Despite these limitations, three candidates
that might affect the productivity of research and four that could affect the propensity to
patent were identified. Some vary over time and across countries and industries, whereas
some others vary only across one dimension, as indicated in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Overview of the explanatory variables
Component Variation
Productivity (x) Propensity (z) Country Industry Year
R&D STOCK x x x
SHARE HIGHER EDU x x x
SHARE BASIC x x x
RCA x x x x
APPROPRIABILITY x x
COMPLEXITY x x x
IP INDEX x x x
QUALITY x x
Sources: Own computations of the stocks based on OECD STAN R&D Expenditure in Industry (ISIC
Rev. 3), ANBERD ed2009 for R&D STOCK; and OECD Main Science & Technology Indicators for
SHARE HIGHER EDU and SHARE BASIC. Own computation based on OECD STAN Bilateral Trade
Database for RCA; Arundel and Kabla (1998) for APPROPRIABILITY; von Graevenitz et al. (2011) for
COMPLEXITY; Park (2008) for IP INDEX, with yearly data computed on the basis of a compound
annual growth rate between two available data points; de Saint-Georges and van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie (2012) for QUALITY.
The three variables that are assumed to affect – or correlate with – research productivity are
defined and measured as follows. The variable “SHARE HIGHER EDU” is defined as the
percentage of gross domestic expenditure on R&D that is undertaken by the higher education
sector (OECD Main Science & Technology Indicators (MSTI) 2009). The expected impact on
the number of patents is ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher education sector develops
and utilizes frontier knowledge that private companies can use, suggesting a positive rela-
tionship. On the other hand, the propensity to patent is lower among universities, such that a
negative impact is also possible. The second productivity variable, “SHARE BASIC,” reflects
basic-research expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic expenditure on R&D (OECD
MSTI). A higher value for this variable is expected to lead to greater productivity in research
efforts, as basic research typically pushes the knowledge frontier and generates opportunities
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for further development. The third productivity variable is “RCA,” which measures the “re-
vealed comparative advantage” of each country across different industries. It is defined for
each country j – industry i pair as the ratio of the share of industry i in the export of country
j to the share of industry i in world exports (own computation based on the OECD STAN
Bilateral Trade Database). A ratio higher than one reveals a comparative advantage, as the
country exports relatively more in that particular industry, suggesting that it is internation-
ally competitive. A positive correlation is expected, as internationally competitive industries
must be innovative in terms of new product performance or reduced production costs. In
analyzing the determinants of patenting across a set of OECD countries, Furman et al. (2002,
p 899) found that “an extremely important role is played by factors associated with differences
in R&D productivity [such as] openness to international trade.” Note that the RCA variable
could be endogenous to the patenting activity because innovations increase export opportu-
nities. This concern is addressed in the empirical analysis by estimating an ECM with lagged
values of explanatory variables.
Four proxies are used to measure the propensity effects. The first variable, “APPROPRI-
ABILITY,” captures the appropriability strategy by industry and is based on a survey of the
proportion of inventions that were patented in the French manufacturing sector (Arundel and
Kabla, 1998). This observation reduces the noise in the R&D-patent relationship by directly
correcting for a fundamental link between inventions and patents. This data source is pre-
ferred over Cohen et al. (2000) because it is the closest to the industry classification found in
the ANBERD database. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no systematic industry-level
data on the filing strategies of firms – the number of patent applications per innovation. A
closely related concept is the discrete versus the complex nature of technologies. Complex
technologies embed many different patented inventions in one final product, such that firms
in complex industries adopt an aggressive filing strategy. A recent paper by von Graevenitz
et al. (2011) has provided a measure of complexity by industry. The authors constructed a
measure of patent thickets by technology area based on “triples” of firms that mutually block
some of each others’ patents. They defined the most complex technology areas as those with
the highest density of triples, as estimated from European patent citations data. We use the
variable “COMPLEXITY” to capture differences in filing strategies across industries.14
As there might be important differences in the propensity to patent across countries, the
econometric analysis also controls for two country-level variables. “IP INDEX” is a measure
of the strength of the intellectual property (IP) system. It was developed by Ginarte and Park
(1997) and updated by Park (2008). Countries with stronger IP regimes are expected to have
a higher propensity to patent, as a strong protection increases the value of patent rights and
signals a more advanced patent system.15 However, the variable is an imperfect proxy, as
it is only computed every five years and is relatively stable over time.16 “QUALITY” is a
14We thank von Graevenitz et al. for providing a time series of the variable.
15van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2011) argues that Ginarte and Park’s index is not so much an index of the
strength of patent rights as a measure of the applicant-friendliness of the patent system. Both of these dimensions
are likely to increase the strategic propensity.
16To avoid losing too many data points, we computed annual data on the basis of the compound annual growth
rate.
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cross-country index of the quality of patent systems calculated by de Saint-Georges and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2012). It measures the stringency and transparency of patent
selection mechanisms. High-quality patent systems, defined as patent systems that prevent
strategic games and abusive behaviors, should have a lower number of patents. These two
variables might affect not only the filing strategy but also the appropriability strategy. For
instance, a high-quality patent system may simultaneously discourage the strategic filing of
minor improvements in existing technologies and increase the economic returns of patent
protection, thereby increasing the incentives to apply for patents.
2.4 Empirical results
The empirical results are presented and interpreted in two stages. In the first stage, we present
the results of the econometric regression. We start by estimating a basic R&D-patent model
with the five patent indicators. We then introduce the productivity and the propensity vari-
ables to the regression model. In the second stage, we decompose the sources of growth in
patenting activity. We perform a semi-partial R² decomposition of the regression results and
we provide an in-depth analysis of the fixed effects (industry, country, and time dummies).
2.4.1 Econometric estimates
The basic R&D-patent model
The estimated parameters of the error correction model described in equation (2.6) are pre-
sented in Table 2.5 for the five patent indicators. The only explanatory variable taken into
account is the stock of R&D expenditure.
The short-term elasticity of patents with respect to R&D stock is about 0.10, while the long-
term elasticity of R&D stock is around 0.12, as indicated in the bottom rows of Table 2.5. Two
remarks must be made regarding these estimated long-term elasticities. First, although the
various point estimates are strikingly low, they are compatible with estimates performed at
the industry level by Meliciani (2000).17 Second, the elasticity is stable across patent counts,
suggesting some degree of comparability between studies that use different patent indica-
tors. This stability is all the more remarkable given the notable variations in the adjustment
parameters (coefficients associated with the variable ‘log(R&D STOCK) (t-1)’) and the strong
variations in patent counts illustrated in Figure 2.1.
17The low elasticity is also robust to changes in model specifications: ECM with R&D flows; IV estimation using
past values of R&D as instruments; and within transformation of equation (2.4). The results are available upon
request.
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Table 2.5: Results of the error-correction model of the R&D-patent relationship
∆log(#patents)
NPFCORR TRIADIC EPO USPTO REGIONAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆log(R&D STOCK)
0.100*** 0.111 0.095** 0.022 0.092**
(0.026) (0.070) (0.040) (0.060) (0.040)
log(#patents) (t-1)
-0.118*** -0.293*** -0.157*** -0.144*** -0.151***
(0.013) (0.031) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
log(R&D STOCK) (t-1)
0.015*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Countries dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Industry dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Time dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Number of observations 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143
Adjusted R-Squared 0.187 0.188 0.155 0.174 0.129
Long-run impact of R&D
0.126*** 0.123*** 0.133*** 0.127*** 0.142***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.017)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country dummies,” “industry dummies,” and “time dummies” report
the significance levels of the joint effect of these dummies. See Table 2.A.5 for the same specifications
in terms of R&D flows.
Depending on the patent indicator used, the regression model explains between 12% and 14%
of the growth in patent applications. The explanatory power is fairly high despite the nature
of the data and the simplicity of the patent production function. Country, industry, and time
effects are all jointly significant. They are described and analyzed in the second stage of the
empirical analysis. Note that the tests for autocorrelation of residuals reject the presence of
correlated errors.
Productivity and propensity variables
The low estimated elasticity of patents with respect to R&D raises the question of whether
other factors may help to explain variations in patent applications. This issue is investigated
in Table 2.6, where the productivity and propensity components are both included in the
model. For the sake of readability, the estimations are presented only with the NPFCORR,
TRIADIC, and REGIONAL patent indicators as dependent variables. Regressions based on
EPO and USPTO lead to similar results.
Productivity variables – The three indicators that are likely to be correlated with research
productivity are higher education’s share of total R&D expenditure, basic research’s share of
total R&D expenditure, and an indicator of international comparative advantage. The first two
indicators vary across countries and over time, while the third fluctuates in all three dimen-
sions. The share of total R&D performed by the higher education sector (SHARE HIGHER
EDU) only has a positive and significant impact on the regional patent indicator, suggesting
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Table 2.6: Results of the full error-correction model
∆log(#patents)
NPFCORR TRIADIC REGIONAL
(1) (2) (3)
∆log(R&D STOCK)
0.036 0.010 -0.016
(0.035) (0.086) (0.045)
∆SHARE HIGHER EDU
-0.009*** -0.001 -0.008***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
∆RCA
-0.022 0.039 -0.044
(0.021) (0.060) (0.037)
log(#patents) (t-1)
-0.149*** -0.286*** -0.145***
(0.019) (0.035) (0.022)
log(R&D STOCK) (t-1)
0.013*** 0.016*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
SHARE HIGHER EDU (t-1)
0.0001 -0.002 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
RCA (t-1)
0.020*** 0.043*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
APPROPRIABILITY
0.004*** 0.012*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
∆COMPLEXITY
-0.0004 -0.001 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0004)
COMPLEXITY (t-1)
0.0001 0.001* 0.001**
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
IP INDEX
0.031** 0.056** 0.075***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.019)
QUALITY
-0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Countries dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Industry dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Time dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Number of observations 3,704 3,704 3,704
Adjusted R-Squared 0.235 0.190 0.143
Long-run impact of R&D
0.088*** 0.055*** 0.063***
(0.018) (0.02) (0.02)
Long-run impact of SHARE HIGHER EDU
0.001 -0.008 0.036***
(0.005) (-0.006) (0.009)
Long-run impact of RCA
0.135*** 0.151*** 0.18***
(0.03) (0.029) (0.032)
Long-run impact of COMPLEXITY
0.001 0.002* 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country dummies,” “industry dummies,” and “time dummies” report
the significance levels of the joint effect of these dummies. See Table 2.A.6 for the same specifications
in terms of R&D flows. See Table 2.4 for more details on the explanatory variables.
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that university-performed R&D leads to more valuable patents in the long run.18 The negative
short-term impact of this variable is probably due to a transitional effect caused by the diver-
sion of resources towards institutions that are less patent minded. It can also be explained
by the likelihood that R&D processes are more drawn out in universities than in the private
sector.
The share of basic research, which serves as an indicator of the relative efforts directed at
potential breakthrough inventions, is tested separately. It is not included in the main specifi-
cation due to the high amount of missing information. The results are presented in Appendix
Table 2.A.7. The share of basic research has a strong productivity effect on all patent indica-
tors, with long-term elasticity of 0.08 to 0.17. In other words, the higher the share of basic
research in total R&D expenditure, the higher the number of patent applications induced by
an increase in research productivity. This confirms that the allocation of more resources to
basic research can be adopted as a long-term policy aimed at securing future innovation.
Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) has a positive and significant impact on the number
of patent filings in the long run. This result confirms the impact on research productivity that
Furman et al. (2002) estimate with their variable OPENNESS. Note that the effect is higher
with international patents than with priority filings, which indicates a correlation between
international competitiveness and international patenting activity. Interestingly, the long-term
elasticity of patents with respect to R&D drops substantially when productivity variables are
added to the model. The decline is most severe for high-value patents, which underscores the
importance of productivity effects for these patents.
Propensity variables – Empirically implementing the distinction between appropriability strate-
gies and filing strategies made in the present chapter is not straightforward. The four proxies
that are used to gauge these effects are imperfect measures because they vary only across
countries or across industries, and because they are quite stable over time. Despite these lim-
itations, the share of inventions patented (APPROPRIABILITY) is highly significant, which
provides evidence that the appropriability strategy plays a key role in the R&D-patent rela-
tionship, especially for high-value triadic patents.
The variable that aims to capture the filing strategy is the measure of complexity (COMPLEX-
ITY). Industries in which complexity has increased have seen a rise in patent filings. The
fact that the variable correlates with the regional and triadic indicators suggests that filing
strategies are office specific (indeed, the complexity measure is built using “regional” EPO
data). This result illustrates the need to collect such data on a more systematic basis. The
variables IP INDEX and QUALITY measure various dimensions of the design of patent sys-
tems. Both variables are significant determinants of the number of patents. Countries with
a high IP index are applicant friendly and, hence, likely to have a high number of patent
filings per unit of R&D. For instance, the US has a very high IP index because there are many
patentable subject matters (as opposed to Europe, where many restrictions apply), and be-
cause the enforcement system is well developed and historically supportive of patent holders.
18A positive effect was also expected with triadic filings. However, this is not observed, probably due to the
budgetary constraints for higher education institutions, which are not endowed to file simultaneously at the three
main regional patent offices.
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The opposite holds for the quality variable: countries which score high on QUALITY – those
that prevent strategic patenting through a higher degree of transparency and more stringency
– tend to have a lower number of patent applications, suggesting that the design of patent
systems significantly influences filing strategies.
2.4.2 Decomposition of the sources of growth in patenting activity
The second stage of the empirical analysis involves decomposing the sources of growth in
patenting activity. We provide a variance decomposition of the patent growth as well as an
in-depth analysis of the fixed effects included in the ECM.
Variance decomposition: semi-partial R² analysis
A semi-partial R² analysis measures to extent to which a regressor uniquely contributes to ex-
plaining the variance in the dependent variable. It involves computing the difference between
the R² of the model estimated with all the variables of interest (henceforth, R² full) and the
R² of the model excluding the focal regressor(s). The decomposition of R² full is presented
in Table 2.7, for the three patent indicators. Note that the semi-partial R² are expressed as a
percentage of R² full for ease of comparability.
Table 2.7: Semi-partial R² analysis of the ECM
Specification R² full
Semi-Partial R² (% of R² full)
R&D Control Country Industry Year
stock variables dummies dummies dummies
NPFCORR
Full model 0.2474 1.36 5.68 49.48 18.80 23.80
Average country 0.7121 1.85 2.49 - 14.86 37.54
Average industry 0.3553 3.08 7.87 49.44 - 22.01
Average year 0.6320 0.86 2.53 44.42 9.78 -
TRIADIC
Full model 0.2030 0.71 5.11 56.25 37.28 17.95
Average country 0.7243 1.72 3.07 - 24.19 32.55
Average industry 0.3707 4.90 8.60 54.00 - 20.02
Average year 0.5448 1.98 2.91 41.11 17.10 -
REGIONAL
Full model 0.1566 0.98 14.69 41.25 24.92 18.81
Average country 0.6780 1.57 3.81 - 25.57 32.89
Average industry 0.3234 4.79 19.27 47.46 - 23.07
Average year 0.4774 1.68 5.71 37.22 15.52 -
Notes: R² and semi-partial R² are computed based on the econometric results of Table 2.6. The rows
‘Average country’, ‘Average industry’ and ‘Average year’ present the average of the estimations per-
formed for each individual country, each industry and each year, respectively.
Four observations are particularly noteworthy. First, R&D stock only accounts for a small
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share of variance explained (from 1 to 5 per cent according to the model specifications). This
result illustrates that patent indicators do not merely reflect research intensity but also other
aspects of the innovation process such as the productivity and the propensity dimensions.
The low contribution of R&D must nevertheless be tempered by the very constraining econo-
metric approach adopted. The study of the growth rates of patent numbers, as opposed to
their levels, reduces the contribution of R&D to patenting activity. This observation applies to
all the variables though. Second, although the productivity and the propensity variables im-
perfectly capture the productivity and the propensity components, the control variables taken
together explain more than R&D stock. Third, country, industry, and year effects account for
the largest proportion of variance explained. In particular, it is shown that country dummies
capture more variance in patenting activities than industry dummies. This observation is
particularly true for priority filings (NPFCORR) but also for triadic and regional patents to a
lesser extent, highlighting the importance of national innovation systems in explaining inno-
vation performances. Finally, a large share of the variance remains unexplained, indicating
the importance of idiosyncratic components in the R&D-patent relationship.
Time, country, and industry effects
Since the fixed effects included in our econometric model capture a large share of variance in
patent growth, it is particularly interesting to analyze them in greater detail. Indeed, the time,
country, and industry effects from the full model can be used to assess the average evolution
of patent numbers along the three dimensions (see 2.C Appendix for methodological details).
As the model explains the growth rate of patent filings, the dummies capture the increase
in patents net of the impact of all other observable characteristics. As explained in section
2.3, the fixed effects capture unobserved changes in productivity and in the propensity to
patent. Looking at each effect separately provides a deeper understanding of the nature of
the increase in patenting activity. In particular, the variation of the fixed effects across patent
indicators is particularly worth looking at.
Figure 2.2 depicts the growth of patents over time for the main patent indicators. It represents
the cumulative time effects, net of the average industry and country effects. The most striking
observation is that the propensity to file priority filings has been roughly constant over time,
whereas the propensity to file international/regional applications has steadily increased. This
result leads to two important conclusions. First, there has been no particular “spurt” in un-
derlying inventiveness (beyond the increase in R&D efforts and the improvement in research
productivity captured in the empirical analysis). Second, the “patent warming” observed at
major patent offices is driven by a globalization phenomenon – companies are not producing
more patents, but they are extending them abroad more frequently.
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Figure 2.2: Time effects
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Source: Own calculations (see 2.C Appendix for more details)
Figure 2.3 shows the normalized parameters associated with the country dummies. The rank-
ings for the international indicators (TRIADIC, EPO, and USPTO) are roughly similar and
clearly underline a strong catch-up effect for South Korea, Poland, Norway, Ireland, and
Spain. Countries such as France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the US rank last on tri-
adic and regional patent statistics (EPO and USPTO), suggesting that they have lost some
ground in their patenting performance as measured by international indicators. Interestingly,
the ranking for NPFCORR is almost the reverse, with Poland ranking among the lowest and
the US among the highest (Korea being a notable exception). This suggests that catch-up
countries have not necessarily improved their research productivity bur rather increased their
presence on the international patent scene.
The industry-specific growth in patents also exhibits strong variability, as illustrated in Figure
2.4. The industries related to communication, computers, and instruments are associated with
the strongest increase in the propensity to patent, whereas fabricated metals, and rubber and
plastics products have the lowest increase. There is a clear ICT (information and communi-
cation technologies) effect at play. Industries in this area scored high in at least one of the
two propensity components and they have apparently further increased their willingness to
patent. This observation is true for all patent indicators. Contrary to the country dummies,
which illustrate a catch-up effect among newcomers, the increase in patent filings is visible in
industries that make great use of strategic patenting, suggesting that most of the growth in
these industries is driven by an increase in the propensity to patent.
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Figure 2.3: Country effects
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Notes: The values are coefficients of country dummies taken from the full model and are normalized
from 0 to 1. See 2.C Appendix for more details.
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Figure 2.4: Industry effects
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Notes: The values are coefficients of industry dummies taken from the full model and are normalized
from 0 to 1. See 2.C Appendix for more details.
2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 33
2.5 Concluding remarks and policy implications
This chapter sheds light on the origins of the worldwide growth in patenting activity. The
empirical investigation relies on a unique panel dataset composed of 18 manufacturing in-
dustries in 19 countries covering the period from 1987 to 2005, for which five broad patent
indicators are developed. The chapter has six main methodological and policy implications.
The first contribution is conceptual. The literature has implicitly or explicitly assumed that the
patent-to-R&D ratio is driven by a research productivity effect (the extent to which additional
units of R&D generate additional inventions) and a propensity-to-patent effect. The variance
decomposition confirms the importance of these effects, which account for a significant share
of the variance in the growth in patenting activity. This chapter claims that a distinction be-
tween two main components of the propensity to patent improves our understanding of the
R&D-patent relationship. These two components are the “appropriability strategy,” which
indicates whether an invention is protected by a patent, and the “filing strategy,” which mea-
sures the number of patents used to protect an innovation. While the former component can
be proxied by existing survey data on the share of inventions that are patented in each in-
dustrial sector (e.g., Arundel and Kabla, 1998), the latter can, thus far, only be gauged using
measures of complexity. This theoretical insight has a major implication: large-scale surveys,
such as the Community Innovation Survey in Europe, should assess the two propensity com-
ponents on a regular basis. Data on the evolution of the share of inventions that are patented
as well as on the average number of patents that are used to protect an innovation would
drastically improve our understanding of patent indicators.
Second, the econometric analysis of patenting activity across industries and countries, and
over time confirms that the long-term elasticity of patents with respect to R&D stock is positive
and significant, but small. It fluctuates at around 12% and is remarkably stable across patent
indicators (from the all-encompassing national priority filings to the more restrictive, high-
value triadic patents). However, the elasticity is much smaller than “hoped” for (Griliches,
1990) and R&D explains only a small share of the variance in patent filings.
Third, the empirical analysis confirms the presence of a significant productivity effect, which
explains part of the variance in the R&D-patent ratio, as demonstrated by the positive and
significant premium associated with basic research and academic research, or by the noticeable
impact of the revealed comparative advantage variable, which is an indicator of ultimate
innovation performance. The positive impact of basic and academic research also suggests
that allocating more resources to university-performed research and to basic projects can form
the basis for a long-term policy aimed at securing future innovation.
Fourth, the appropriability variable plays a positive, highly significant, role in the patent pro-
duction function, even though it only varies across industries. The filing strategy is assessed
using a measure of the complexity of industries. The variable has a positive and significant
impact on the propensity to patent, but probably captures only one facet of the filing strat-
egy. The design of the patent system also plays a notable role in patent strategies; both the
strength – or the applicant friendliness – of the patent system and its quality (stringency and
transparency) affect the number of patent applications.
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Fifth, the country and industry dummies allow for some in-depth identification of the ori-
gins of the patent explosion. Two manufacturing industries that were already characterized
by a high patent-to-R&D ratio – communications and computers – are associated with the
sharpest increase in patenting activity. This is precisely the technological area in which a
“patent paradox” was identified by Hall and Ziedonis (2001). In this respect, our results shed
some additional light on the R&D-patent relationship and its industry dimension. The phar-
maceutical industry has a high appropriability strategy but the associated industry dummy
suggests a relatively stable propensity to patent. The countries that are associated with the
sharpest increase in patenting activities are South Korea, Poland, and Spain, which suggests
a clear catch-up effect. These results exemplify the pitfalls and advantages associated with
patent data. Whereas such data highlight fundamental economic changes, such as catch-up
effects, they are also greatly impacted by national industrial structures. This finding, therefore,
stresses the need to improve our understanding of the “propensity” components.
Finally, the time dummies provide a broad measure of the increase in patenting activity, net
of country and industry specificities, and net of R&D expenditure and other control variables.
Here the results depend on the patent indicators that are used. The sharpest increases are
associated with regional patent filings (at the EPO or at the USPTO) followed by triadic appli-
cations. As far as national priority filings are concerned, hardly any increase is observed. In
other words, the “global patent warming” that is currently underway is essentially the result
of the internationalization of patent applications and not a consequence of increased research
productivity. Innovative firms are increasingly targeting global markets and hence have a
higher tendency to seek protection in key markets worldwide. This tendency would justify
the closer coordination of patent offices at the global level, provided that their views on patent
system design converge19.
19See Chapter 5 for a discussion about the harmonization of the European patent system.
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2.A Appendix: Additional tables
Table 2.A.1: Literature on the R&D-patent relationship
Reference Sample Model Results Specifications
Firm Level
Pakes and Griliches
(1980)
121 US firms 1968-1875
(USPTO)
Panel (within dimension) 0.61*** Sum of log R&D
(contemporaneous + 5 lags)
Bound et al. (1984) 2,582 US firms 1976
(USPTO)
Cross section; OLS 0.32-0.38***
Cross section; poisson, negative
binomial, and non-linear least
squares
0.58-2.18***
Hausman et al. (1984) 128 US firms 1968-1974
(USPTO)
OLS, poisson, and negative
binomial
0.57-0.88*** Sum of log R&D
(contemporaneous + 5 lags)
Poisson and negative binomial
with firm effects
0.35-0.6*** Sum of log R&D
(contemporaneous + 5 lags)
Poisson and negative binomial
“between” firms
0.75-1.29*** Contemporaneous log R&D
Hall et al. (1986) 642 US manufacturing
firms 1972-1979 (USPTO)
Non-linear least squares,
poisson, negative binomial and
GMT
0.39-0.66*** Sum of log R&D
(contemporaneous + 3-7 lags)
Conditional negative binomial
and GMT with firm effects
0.29-0.38*** Sum of log R&D
(contemporaneous + 3-5 lags)
Jaffe (1986) 432 US firms 1973 and
1979 (USPTO)
Cross section; pooled OLS 0.74*** Contemporaneous log R&D
First differences 0.4*
3SLS 0.88***
Cincera (1997) 181 international
manufacturing firms
1983-1991 (EPO)
Panel; GEC, QGPML-gamma,
conditional poisson and GMM
0.35-0.9*** Sum of log of R&D
(contemporaneous + 4 lags)
Crépon et al. (1998) 4164 FR manufacturing
firms 1986-1990 (EPO)
Cross-section; negative
binomial
0.88-1.08*** Patents per employee and R&D
capital per employee
Duguet and Kabla (1998) 299 FR firms 1990-1992
(EPO)
Cross-section; poisson model
estimated by asymptotic least
squares
0.34-0.67*** Log R&D
Blundell et al. (2002) 407 US firms 1972-1979
(USPTO)
Linear feedback model 0.9*** Level (without individual
effects)
0.34*** Within-group mean scaling
Arora et al. (2008) 790 US manufacturing
R&D Units 1991-1993
Cross section; 2SLS 0.61***
Czarnitzki et al. (2009) 122 BE firms 1993-2003
(EPO)
Pooled cross sectional 0.52-0.6*** Log(R&D/employment)
Fixed effect panel 0.28-0.3*** Log(R&D/employment)
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Reference Sample Model Results Specifications
Aggregate (industry, region or country level)
Acs and Audretsch
(1988)
247 US manufacturing
industries
Cross section 0.36*** Log (innovations)1982 and
log(total R&D)1977
0.41*** Log (innovations)1982 and
log(company R&D)1977
Meliciani (2000) Panel of 15 industrial
sectors, 12 OECD
countries, 1973-1993
(USPTO)
Negative binomial 0.18*** With country and sector
effects
0-0.56*** Regressions by sector (with
country effects)
Bottazzi and Peri
(2003)
86 European regions
1977-1995 (EPO)
Cross section of long
run-averages
0.76-0.95** Patent and R&D per square
kilometer
Bottazzi and Peri
(2007)
15 OECD countries
1973-1999 (USPTO)
Long-run cointegration
relation; DOLS
0.30-0.79*** International patent
applications
de Rassenfosse and
van Pottelsberghe de
la Potterie (2009)
34 countries 2003
(USPTO, EPO, TRIAD,
PF)
Cross section 0.33-1.56*** Log researchers
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.A.2: Abbreviations of countries and industries
Abbr. Country Abbr. ISIC Rev.3 Industry definition Technological
classification*
Complexity**
AT Austria FOOD 15-16 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products LOTE 0
BE Belgium TEXT 17-19 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of
fur; Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
LOTE 4
CA Canada WPAP 20-22 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials;
manufacture of paper and paper products; publishing, printing and
reproduction of recorded media
LOTE 13
CH Switzerland PETR 23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear MLTE 6
DE Germany CHEM 24 less 2423 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products MHTE 6
DK Denmark PHAR 2423 Pharmaceuticals and medicinal chemicals HTE 4
ES Spain RUBB 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products MLTE 15
FI Finland MINE 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products MLTE 2
FR France META 27 Manufacture of basic metals MLTE 2
GB United Kingdom FABM 28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and
equipment
MLTE 2
IE Ireland MACH 29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. MHTE 2
IT Italy COMP 30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery HTE 55
JP Japan ELEC 31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. MHTE 24
KR Korea COMM 32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment
and apparatus
HTE 99
NL Netherlands INST 33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches
and clocks
HTE 22
NO Norway AUTO 34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers MHTE 21
PL Poland TRAN 35 Manufacture of other transport equipment MHTE 21
SE Sweden MISC 36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. LOTE
US United States
Notes: * Based on the OECD technological classifications. LOTE, MLTE, MHTE, and HTE stand for low technology, medium-low technology, medium-high
technology, and high technology, respectively. ** Own industry matching based on the average of “triples” data across time, as presented by von Graevenitz
et al. (2011).
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Table 2.A.3: Absolute and relative number of patents by country
COUNTRY
NPFCORR EPO TRIADIC USPTO REGIONAL
Y05 % CAGR Y05 % CAGR Y05 % CAGR Y05 % CAGR Y05 % CAGR
AT 2485 0.7 2.9% 1345 1.3 4.6% 304 0.6 2.9% 886 0.4 5.2% 1345 0.6 4.6%
BE 1803 0.5 3.5% 1283 1.2 5.4% 398 0.8 3.9% 939 0.4 5.9% 1283 0.6 5.4%
CA 6040 1.6 4.2% 1198 1.2 4.1% 384 0.8 0.5% 3909 1.8 4.7% 3909 1.7 4.7%
CH 3599 1.0 0.8% 2738 2.6 2.5% 1029 2.1 0.7% 1938 0.9 2.1% 2738 1.2 2.5%
DE 49150 13.3 3.4% 24529 23.6 4.9% 6994 14.1 2.7% 17422 8.0 4.8% 24529 10.6 4.9%
DK 1545 0.4 2.1% 1021 1.0 8.3% 319 0.6 6.5% 920 0.4 8.6% 1021 0.4 8.3%
ES 2657 0.7 2.8% 988 1.0 10.6% 198 0.4 8.2% 581 0.3 8.6% 988 0.4 10.6%
FI 2535 0.7 1.8% 1069 1.0 7.7% 291 0.6 5.2% 1078 0.5 7.4% 1069 0.5 7.7%
FR 14789 4.0 1.4% 7904 7.6 3.3% 2677 5.4 2.3% 5577 2.6 3.6% 7904 3.4 3.3%
GB 18708 5.1 0.2% 5159 5.0 1.6% 1937 3.9 1.0% 5768 2.7 3.5% 5159 2.2 1.6%
IE 610 0.2 -5.1% 255 0.2 7.1% 88 0.2 7.1% 291 0.1 8.5% 255 0.1 7.1%
IT 10334 2.8 1.9% 4279 4.1 5.1% 754 1.5 1.4% 2373 1.1 3.7% 4279 1.9 5.1%
JP* 112715 30.6 0.6% 23693 22.8 3.0% 18554 37.4 5.0% 52932 24.3 3.7% 52932 22.9 3.7%
KR* 33980 9.2 22.0% 5255 5.1 37.0% 3145 6.3 38.2% 18424 8.5 28.9% 18424 8.0 28.9%
NL 5560 1.5 5.0% 3631 3.5 5.5% 2149 4.3 6.0% 3139 1.4 6.3% 3631 1.6 5.5%
NO 1295 0.4 2.2% 436 0.4 8.0% 157 0.3 6.2% 501 0.2 7.8% 436 0.2 8.0%
PL 866 0.2 -9.8% 122 0.1 9.2% 12 0.0 6.4% 91 0.0 11.5% 122 0.1 9.2%
SE 2831 0.8 -1.7% 1825 1.8 4.1% 694 1.4 3.2% 1500 0.7 3.7% 1825 0.8 4.1%
US 96935 26.3 4.4% 17292 16.6 1.5% 9587 19.3 -0.8% 99274 45.6 4.8% 99274 43.0 4.8%
TOTAL 368436 100.0 2.5% 104021 100.0 3.7% 49670 100.0 2.8% 217543 100.0 4.9% 231123 100.0 4.8%
Source: Own calculations
Notes: * The number of priority fillings for Japan and Korea has been divided by 3. The columns labeled ‘Y05’ report the total patent count per country in
the year 2005, the columns labeled ‘%’ report the share of each country in the total of each patent count for the year 2005, expressed as percentages, and the
columns labeled ‘CAGR’ report the compound annual growth rate of each patent count indicator over the largest available period.
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Table 2.A.4: Absolute and relative number of patents by industry
INDUSTRY
NPFCORR EPO TRIADIC USPTO REGIONAL
Y05 % CAGR Y05 % CAGR Y05 % CAGR Y05 % CAGR Y05 % CAGR
FOOD 7625 2.1 2.0% 2131 2.0 2.5% 955 1.9 1.0% 3995 1.8 3.2% 4108 1.8 3.0%
TEXT 2441 0.7 2.3% 622 0.6 3.2% 269 0.5 2.1% 1269 0.6 4.0% 1383 0.6 4.0%
WPAP 4550 1.2 1.7% 1325 1.3 2.9% 594 1.2 1.9% 2366 1.1 3.4% 2606 1.1 3.5%
PETR 4476 1.2 0.6% 1499 1.4 1.1% 737 1.5 0.2% 2502 1.2 1.9% 2678 1.2 1.9%
CHEM 36016 9.8 1.1% 12317 11.8 1.7% 6253 12.6 0.8% 20196 9.3 2.6% 21895 9.5 2.6%
PHAR 20427 5.5 1.7% 8779 8.4 2.3% 4858 9.8 1.2% 13425 6.2 3.3% 14357 6.2 3.2%
RUBB 7058 1.9 1.8% 2021 1.9 2.9% 822 1.7 1.8% 3300 1.5 3.0% 3781 1.6 3.2%
MINE 6537 1.8 1.5% 1824 1.8 2.7% 825 1.7 1.9% 3517 1.6 3.9% 3846 1.7 3.8%
META 7565 2.1 0.7% 2154 2.1 2.2% 993 2.0 1.5% 3962 1.8 3.0% 4342 1.9 3.1%
FABM 9794 2.7 1.9% 2576 2.5 3.6% 904 1.8 2.5% 4352 2.0 3.3% 5078 2.2 3.5%
MACH 43844 11.9 1.5% 11991 11.5 3.6% 4692 9.4 2.5% 22165 10.2 3.8% 24630 10.7 3.9%
COMP 53685 14.6 3.5% 12589 12.1 4.7% 6698 13.5 4.1% 36124 16.6 7.1% 36745 15.9 6.9%
ELEC 14118 3.8 2.9% 3774 3.6 4.7% 1790 3.6 4.0% 8640 4.0 6.0% 9143 4.0 5.9%
COMM 82057 22.3 3.8% 21827 21.0 5.6% 11330 22.8 4.9% 55830 25.7 7.3% 57167 24.7 7.1%
INST 15047 4.1 2.4% 4152 4.0 3.8% 2082 4.2 3.1% 9202 4.2 4.9% 9633 4.2 4.9%
AUTO 33411 9.1 2.7% 9832 9.5 5.0% 4010 8.1 3.9% 16580 7.6 4.4% 18712 8.1 4.7%
TRAN 10551 2.9 1.8% 3084 3.0 3.7% 1308 2.6 2.8% 5861 2.7 4.0% 6410 2.8 4.1%
MISC 9235 2.5 3.3% 1523 1.5 3.8% 551 1.1 3.3% 4256 2.0 4.1% 4607 2.0 4.1%
TOTAL 368436 100.0 2.5% 104021 100.0 3.7% 49670 100.0 2.8% 217543 100.0 4.9% 231123 100.0 4.8%
Source: Own calculations
Notes: The columns labeled ‘Y05’ report the total patent count per industry in the year 2005, the columns labeled ‘%’ report the share of each industry in
the total of each patent count for the year 2005, expressed as percentages, and the columns labeled ‘CAGR’ report the compound annual growth rate of each
patent count indicator over the largest available period.
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Table 2.A.5: Results for the ECM of the R&D-patent relationship with R&D flows
∆log(#patents)
NPFCORR TRIADIC EPO USPTO REGIONAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆log(R&D FLOW)
0.011 0.017 0.013 -0.011 0.018*
(0.007) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011)
log(#patents) (t-1)
-0.119*** -0.291*** -0.155*** -0.143*** -0.149***
(0.013) (0.030) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
log(R&D FLOW) (t-1)
0.014*** 0.032*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Countries dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Industry dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Time dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Number of observations 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143
Adjusted R-Squared 0.188 0.187 0.154 0.175 0.127
Long-run impact of R&D
0.119*** 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.123*** 0.123***
(0.019) (0.02) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country dummies,” “industry dummies,” and “time dummies” report
the significance levels of the joint effect of these dummies.
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Table 2.A.6: Results for the full ECM with R&D flows
∆log(#patents)
NPFCORR TRIADIC REGIONAL
(1) (2) (3)
∆log(R&D FLOW)
-0.004 -0.012 -0.008
(0.008) (0.021) (0.012)
∆SHARE HIGHER EDU
-0.010*** -0.002 -0.008***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
∆RCA
-0.021 0.041 -0.043
(0.021) (0.059) (0.036)
log(#patents) (t-1)
-0.149*** -0.285*** -0.143***
(0.019) (0.035) (0.021)
log(R&D FLOW) (t-1)
0.012*** 0.012* 0.007**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
SHARE HIGHER EDU (t-1)
0.0002 -0.002 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
RCA (t-1)
0.019*** 0.045*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
APPROPRIABILITY
0.004*** 0.013*** 0.005***
(0.0005) (0.002) (0.001)
∆COMPLEXITY
-0.0004 -0.001 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0004)
COMPLEXITY (t-1)
0.0001 0.001 0.001**
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
IP INDEX
0.033** 0.062*** 0.078***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.019)
QUALITY
-0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Countries dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Industry dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Time dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Number of observations 3,704 3,704 3,704
Adjusted R-Squared 0.239 0.190 0.142
Long-run impact of R&D
0.083*** 0.041* 0.046**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Long-run impact of SHARE HIGHER EDU
0.001 -0.008 0.037***
(0.005) (-0.006) (0.009)
Long-run impact of RCA
0.127*** 0.158*** 0.18***
(0.029) (0.03) (0.032)
Long-run impact of COMPLEXITY
0.001 0.002 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country dummies,” “industry dummies,” and “time dummies” report
the significance levels of the joint effect of these dummies.
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Table 2.A.7: Partial model with share of basic research in total R&D
∆log(#patents)
NPFCORR TRIADIC REGIONAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆log(R&D STOCK)
0.110** 0.132*** 0.045 0.085 0.074 0.108
(0.048) (0.048) (0.131) (0.138) (0.084) (0.086)
∆SHARE BASIC
0.016*** -0.0001 -0.005
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
log(#patents) (t-1)
-0.135*** -0.111*** -0.364*** -0.368*** -0.180*** -0.193***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.050) (0.050) (0.037) (0.038)
log(R&D STOCK) (t-1)
0.020*** 0.014*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
SHARE BASIC (t-1)
0.019*** 0.028*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Countries dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Industry dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Time dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812
Adjusted R-Squared 0.303 0.327 0.231 0.241 0.149 0.171
Long-run impact of R&D
0.147*** 0.129*** 0.11*** 0.101*** 0.144*** 0.13***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027)
Long-run impact of 0.171*** 0.076*** 0.119***
SHARE BASIC (0.029) (0.015) (0.019)
Notes: Robust standard are errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. The rows “country dummies,” “industry dummies,” and “time dummies”
report the significance levels of the joint effect of theses dummies.
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2.B Appendix: Panel unit root and co-integration tests
In order to analyze the dynamics of the R&D-patent relationship within an ECM framework,
one must test whether the variables have a unit root and are co-integrated. Three tests on unit
roots in panel data are implemented. They are the test developed by Levin et al. (2002); the
test developed by Im et al. (2003), and a Fisher-type test (Choi, 2001), denoted LLC, IPS, and
Fisher, respectively, in Table 2.B.1.
The three tests are devised under the null hypothesis that all of the variables in the panel
have a unit root. LLC assumes that all individuals have the same autoregressive parameter,
whereas IPS and Fisher allow for heterogeneous roots and for a heterogeneous presence of a
unit root. As some of these tests require a strongly balanced panel, they were performed on
a restricted sample of our initial panel dataset (this restriction was based on the availability
of data that would allow us to obtain the largest possible balanced panel; the number of
observations therefore fell from 3,704 to 2,516).
Table 2.B.1: Panel unit root tests
P-values NPFCORR TRIADIC REGIONAL EPO USPTO R&D STOCK
LLC 1 1 1 1 1 0.79
IPS 0.79 0.63 1 1 0.28 1
Fisher 0.87 0.81 1 1 0.37 1
Notes: We include a one-year lag structure in the regressions performed in computing the test statistics.
LLC: no panel-specific mean included. IPS: panel-specific mean included; cross-sectional averages
subtracted from the series. Fisher: statistic based on individual Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics
with associated p-values using the inverse normal transformation; panel-specific mean included; cross-
sectional averages subtracted from the series.
Most of these tests do not allow for a rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root. Therefore,
the series are non-stationary. With regard to co-integration, the four panel data tests devel-
oped by Westerlund (2007) are performed for the “basic” R&D-patent model (see Table 2.B.2).
Two tests (denoted G) refer to group-mean statistics and are defined under the alternative
hypothesis that there is evidence of co-integration for at least one of the cross-sectional units.
The second pair (denoted P) formulates the alternative, such that a rejection of the null should
be taken as a evidence of co-integration for the panel as a whole.
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Table 2.B.2: Panel co-integration tests
P-values NPFCORR TRIADIC REGIONAL EPO USPTO
Gt 0 0 0 0.01 0
Ga 0 0 0 0.06 0.04
Pt 0 0 0.04 0.76 0.04
Pa 0 0 0 0.01 0
Notes: Replication of the tests presented by Westerlund (2007) on the basic R&D-patent model. They
are implemented with a constant and one lag in the error correction equation.
The null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected for most of the five dependent variables
(patent indicators), indicating that the panel is co-integrated. Thus, these results seem to
confirm that a long-run equilibrium level exists between the number of patents and R&D
effort.
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2.C Appendix: Construction of the time, country, and industry ef-
fects
The variables presented in Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are based on ψt, ψj, and ψi in equation (2.6),
which are the time, country, and industry effects, respectively. As the dependent variable is
the first difference in the log of patent filings, the fixed effects can be interpreted as the growth
rate in patenting when all of the potential explanatory variables are taken into account.
Note that the fixed effects cannot be immediately recovered from equation (2.6). Indeed,
the fact that the error correction term is left open in equation (2.6) means that the estimated
fixed effects also include the parameter c (recall from equation (2.3) that c captures the rate at
which research efforts lead to patent applications). For this reason, the fixed effects presented
in Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 have been recovered in the following way. We first estimated
the residuals from equation (2.4) and plugged them into equation (2.6) in lieu of the lagged
long-term relationship (the expression in parentheses in equation (2.6)). The fixed effects of
this modified specification (time, country and industry dummies – variables ψt, ψj, and ψi
– in equation (2.6)) can be interpreted as the time, country, and industry components of the
unexplained change in patent counts. Figure 2.2 presents the cumulative effect of the time
dummies on patent counts, including the average industry effect, the average country effect,
and the constant. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present the parameters ψj and ψi , respectively. They are
normalized to lie between 0 and 1 for ease of readability.
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Chapter 3
Globalization of innovation production
a patent-based industry analysis∗
Abstract
Using patent-based indicators, this chapter aims at explaining to what extent the production
of innovation is globalized. Firstly, it provides evidence – over time, across countries and
across industrial sectors – on the patterns in international technological collaboration and in
cross-border ownership of innovation. Secondly, a fractional logit model is estimated for a
unique panel dataset covering patent information of 21 industries in 29 countries from 1980
to 2005. The results show that countries tend to be more globalized in industrial sectors in
which they are less technologically specialized. It suggests that globalization of innovation
is more driven by home-base augmenting determinants than home-base exploiting ones. The
empirical findings also indicate that the intensity of globalization of innovation is higher in
multidisciplinary country-industry pairs and in those which compete internationally in trade.
∗I am grateful to Michele Cincera, Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Julien Gooris, Malwina Mejer, Pierre Mohnen, Carine
Peeters, Lorenzo Ricci, Russell Thomson, Bruno van Pottelsberghe and Nicolas van Zeebroeck for helpful com-
ments and discussions. This chapter has also benefited from the comments of the participants of the 2012 Off-
shoring Research Network International Conference (Milan), the 7th EPIP Annual Conference (Leuven) and the
Third Asia Pacific Innovation Conference (Seoul).
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3.1 Introduction
At the crossroads of the rising importance of knowledge economy and the increasing inter-
national integration of economic activities, the globalization of innovation is a major concern.
Compared to the globalized markets of goods and services, the technology production has
been often described as “far from globalized” (Patel and Pavitt, 1991) and mainly concen-
trated in the home country (Belderbos et al., 2011) of multinational enterprises (MNE). How-
ever, international organizations recognize that research & development (R&D) activities are
increasingly performed across borders (UNCTAD, 2005; OECD, 2008; UNESCO, 2010).
Various evidences illustrate this strong increasing trend in international collaboration in the
innovation production. In a world of science which is becoming multipolar (Veugelers, 2010)
– with the rise of emerging countries such as China and India – the increasing importance
of teams in the production of knowledge is undeniable (Wuchty et al., 2007). In view of
the complexity and interdisciplinarity of research, innovative firms collaborate more to access
complementary resources from beyond their boundaries (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Cassi-
man and Veugelers, 2006). International technological collaborations matter to enhance the
diffusion of relevant knowledge required to innovate in many technological fields but often
available in different locations. These worldwide collaborations are thus a key channel of
knowledge spillovers (Singh, 2005; Montobbio and Sterzi, 2012).
This chapter aims at explaining, using patent-based indicators, to what extent the production
of innovation is globalized. Firstly, it provides evidence – over time, across countries and
across industrial sectors – on the patterns in the internationalization of innovation for two
patent count indicators. Rich patent data allow us to distinguish between several types of
internationalization in the production of innovation1, looking into the trends not only in terms
of international technological collaboration, but also concerning the cross-border ownership
of innovation. Secondly, a fractional logit model is estimated – using a unique panel dataset
covering 21 industries in 29 countries over 25 years – to investigate empirically the importance
of two main opposing motives explaining the internationalization of innovation: home-base
augmenting and home-base exploiting strategies (Kuemmerle, 1997).
Many studies have explored those questions within a firm level approach mainly focusing on a
restricted sample of multinational firms (Patel and Pavitt, 1991; Cantwell, 1995; Patel and Vega,
1999; Cantwell and Janne, 1999; Kumar, 2001; von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; Narula and
Zanfei, 2005; Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005; Fernández-Ribas and Shapira, 2009; Athukorala
and Kohpaiboon, 2010; Schmiele, 2012). In my study, I opt for a more general approach
aggregating information contained in a large patent database. This kind of approach is more
exhaustive, as all patented inventions are treated, whoever the owner. Although it prevents
us to take into consideration drivers of globalization that are firm-specific, it allows us to give
a more complete picture of internationalization of innovation by covering more countries and
more industries.
1As suggested by Archibugi and Iammarino (2002), I consider that internationalization of innovation represents
a “wide-range of forces” which concern not only the cross-border ownership or diffusion of technology but also
the global generation of knowledge.
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While most global approach studies were restricted on differences across countries (Guellec
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001, 2004b; Picci, 2010; Thomson, 2013), this chapter is
– to the best of my knowledge – the first study to take also into account a systematic industry
perspective. The relevance of industry-level analyses has been shown by several results in the
literature indicating that – in addition to the differences in the so-called propensity to patent
across industries2 – the globalization of innovation is industry-specific. For instance, Florida
(1997) and Breschi (1999, 2000) have shown that the geographical concentration and the spatial
organization of the innovative processes may differ remarkably across industrial sectors. In
the same vein, Hagedoorn (2002) and Narula and Duysters (2004) have observed that R&D
partnerships are sector-specific. Furthermore, a recent study by Picci and Savorelli (2012)
has indicated that a strong heterogeneity exists in internationalization across technological
fields. In addition to control for differences across industrial sectors, industry-level data enable
us to investigate empirically the relationship between revealed technological advantages of
countries across industries and globalization of innovation.
The first part of this chapter highlights some stylized facts in the internationalization of inno-
vation. This patent-based analysis confirms a strong growth in the intensity of globalization
of innovation from 1980 to 2005. This worldwide trend is observed not only in terms of
cross-border ownership of innovation, but also in terms of international technological col-
laborations. More interestingly, I show heterogeneity of globalization across countries and
industries. First, more innovative countries (or industries) do not have more a globalized
innovation footprint. Second, although the location of innovation is increasingly dispersed
across the world, its ownership is still strongly concentrated in a few countries.
The estimation results show that the degree of internationalization of innovation is negatively
related to the revealed technological advantage of countries across industries. Countries have
a tendency to be more globalized in industrial sectors in which they are less technologi-
cally specialized. The empirical findings suggest also that countries with multidisciplinary
technological knowledge are more likely to take part in international co-inventions of new
technologies and to be attractive for foreign innovative firms. This aggregated patent-based
analysis provides additional evidence that globalization of innovation is a means of acquiring
competences abroad that are lacking at home, suggesting that home-base augmenting motives
matter in the globalization of innovation production. By contrast, the internationalization of
innovation does not seem to be purely market-driven since large economies are not the tar-
get of foreign innovative firms and international patenting is more related to international
competitiveness of country-industry pairs than to the direction of trade flows.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical
framework, which is based on the dichotomous motives of the globalization of innovation.
Section 3.3 presents the internationalization patent-based indicators used in this chapter. The
extent to which innovation production is globalized is illustrated in section 3.4 – distinguish-
ing the trends over time, across countries and industries. The empirical approach is described
in section 3.5 and the results are presented in section 3.6. Last section concludes and puts
forward ideas for further research.
2See for instance Cohen et al. (2000) and Chapter 2.
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3.2 Theoretical framework
A large body of literature exists on this topic3 and usually highlights several motives behind
the internationalization of R&D. In particular, two main opposing strategies are often com-
pared (Kuemmerle, 1997, 1999; Patel and Vega, 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002; Narula and
Zanfei, 2005).
First, firms set up R&D laboratories abroad in order to exploit their already developed assets.
Their foreign R&D activities mainly support the entry in new markets overseas by adapting
the products or the processes to the local conditions. These demand-oriented innovative ac-
tivities aim at modifying products to make them more appropriate to the local market and to
support manufacturing activities of local subsidiaries. In this context, the main objective of
the globalization of innovation is to exploit their technological advantage created within the
home country. It thus consists mainly in an extension of R&D work already undertaken at
home. This first kind of internationalization strategy was referred to as ‘asset-exploiting’ by
Dunning and Narula (1995) or as ‘home-base exploiting’ by Kuemmerle (1997).
Second, beyond the exploitation of domestic strengths, other motives can explain the global-
ization of innovation. Innovative firms can be motivated to cross borders to track or access
overseas new technology development, to improve existing assets or alleviate technological
weaknesses at home and to tap into knowledge around the world. This second strategy
is reflected in ‘asset-augmenting’ (Dunning and Narula, 1995) or ‘home-base augmenting’
(Kuemmerle, 1997) international R&D activities. According to this strategy, the main objective
of firms is to augment their knowledge base combining their own abilities with new foreign
technological capabilities. They internationalize their innovation production to obtain abroad
strategic assets that are complementary with those already available at home. Their interna-
tional innovative activities aim to serve their global value chain in order to generate entirely
new products from a global network of dispersed locations. As a result, they strengthen their
technological competences and their global innovative performance.
While the home-base exploiting strategy has been initially recognized as dominating (Lall,
1979; Mansfield et al., 1979), the home-base augmenting strategy has received more empirical
confirmation (Florida, 1997; Kuemmerle, 1999; Ambos, 2005)4.
However, empirical papers investigating this set of dichotomous motives were often restricted
to firm-level data. For instance, Kuemmerle (1999) studied the foreign direct investment in
R&D laboratories of 32 MNE in pharmaceutical and electronics industries and confirmed the
key role played by home-base augmenting motives. Patel and Vega (1999) focused on US
patenting activities of a subset of 220 firms. Analyzing the technological profile of countries,
they suggested that adapting products to local market and supporting overseas manufacturing
3See for instance the survey performed by Narula and Zanfei (2005) or Hall (2011).
4In addition to these strategies of internationalization for innovative activities, Lewin et al. (2009) have argued
that the recent R&D offshoring strategies are increasingly ‘home-base replacing’. In particular, this practice con-
cerns companies that tend to locate innovative activities in lower labor-cost countries. However, the aggregate
empirical approach of this chapter enables to test if countries are more globalized in sectors in which they are
strong or weak, which does not inform on the replacement of domestic innovative capabilities by foreign ones.
Therefore, this chapter does not aim to test empirically the home-base replacing strategy.
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are major determinants of the internationalization of technology. Le Bas and Sierra (2002) con-
firmed the main findings of the previous study by considering the patenting activity in Europe
of 245 MNE. Cantwell and Piscitello (2005) examined patents granted in the US to large in-
dustrial firms for inventions performed at the regional level of four European countries. Their
results showed that the location of foreign-owned research is driven by the potential to cap-
ture various sources of spillovers, such as intra-industry, inter-industry or science-technology
spillovers.
The main empirical contribution of this chapter is to test the home-base augmenting and
exploiting motives with aggregate patent-based indicators. It aims to deepen previous firm-
level evidence with a unique panel dataset covering 21 industrial sectors in 29 countries. More
importantly, industry-level data are at the core of the identification of these two strategies. In-
deed, I test the relationship between technological specialization of countries across industries
and their intensity of globalization of innovation. In other words, it is expected that countries
are relatively more globalized in industrial sectors in which they are technologically strong if
home-base exploiting strategy dominates. By contrast, countries which tend to augment their
home knowledge base are expected to be relatively more globalized in industrial sectors in
which they are technologically weak.
Two additional industry-level variables also enable the identification of home-base augment-
ing and exploiting strategies. First, a positive relationship between cross-border innovative
activities and international trade would indicate the predominance of home-base exploiting
motives (Picci and Savorelli, 2012). Indeed, if the internationalization of innovation is mainly
driven by the desire to adapt the product to the local market, the intensity of globalization
of innovation is more likely to be correlated with foreign sales. Second, the home-base aug-
menting strategy reflects a diversification of the home country into new technological areas.
In this context, inter-industry spillovers, diversity externalities and multidisciplinary compe-
tences are key drivers of the internationalization of technology development (Cantwell and
Piscitello, 2005; Narula and Zanfei, 2005; Fernández-Ribas and Shapira, 2009). A positive re-
lationship between the intensity of globalization of innovation and the multidisciplinarity of
country-industry pair – due to patenting activities in a large number of different technologies
– would therefore reflect more the home-base augmenting strategy.
Finally, the large panel dataset used in this chapter distinguishes between several types of
globalization. Beyond the foreign location of R&D activities (at the core of most papers in
the literature, e.g. Kuemmerle, 1999; Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005; Picci and Savorelli, 2012;
Thomson, 2013), this chapter contributes also to the literature by analyzing both the inter-
national technological collaborations (e.g. co-inventions) and the cross-border ownership of
innovation for a large panal dataset of country-industry pairs.
Before investigating this question in an empirical model, the next two sections present the in-
ternationalization patent-based indicators and provide new descriptive evidence on the glob-
alization of innovation over time, across countries and across industries.
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3.3 Data: internationalization patent-based indicators
3.3.1 Patent as indicator of innovation
Patent data are widely used as indicator of innovation (for a discussion, see Griliches, 1990
and the methodological part of Chapter 1) because they are easily available and contain rich
information. In particular, despite some well-known limitations5, patents are extensively used
as an indicator of the location of foreign inventive activities because they offer the most ac-
cessible and internationally comparable information for innovative activities across countries
and technological fields. Moreover, systemic and detailed data on the location of R&D expen-
ditures are neither collected for similar aggregates nor comparable for a large set of countries
and industrial sectors (as pointed out by Hall, 2011).
In order to measure the globalization of innovation production, I have developed patent-
based indicators. These indicators are computed using the EPO worldwide patent statistical
database (PATSTAT, April 2009) which covers records on patent applications filed at more than
70 patent offices around the world. Among the rich information contained in a patent, I use
mainly two of them. Firstly, the country of inventors and applicants provides geographical
information on inventorship and ownership. Even though the PATSTAT database contains a
large number of information, it should be noticed that the coverage of information remains
not perfect. Therefore, I use an algorithm similar to the one described by de Rassenfosse
et al. (2013)6 recovering missing country information in order to obtain more accurate patent
information for a larger sample of countries. Secondly, I express patent indicators not only
by country – of inventor and applicant – but also by industry. Indeed, counts per industrial
sector are derived by matching technological information contained in patents, International
Patent Classification (IPC) codes, and industry, International Standard Industry Classification
(ISIC, Rev 3), using the concordance table provided by Schmoch et al. (2003)7.
This study relies also on two types of patent count indicators. The first indicator is a cor-
rected count of priority filings8 (PF, a worldwide inventiveness indicator recently introduced
by de Rassenfosse et al., 2013). It captures all the patents filed by the inventors (or applicants)
based in a country, regardless of the patent office of application. This methodology assures the
best match between R&D expenditures and patent applications at the country level. For in-
stance, the count for Austria as country of inventor (and similarly for applicant) is thus equal
to the number of priority filings with inventors (applicants) based in Austria and filed at the
Austrian patent office plus the priority filings with inventors (applicants) based in Austria but
directly filed at other patent offices. The inclusion of these priority filings filed abroad allows
5For instance, the so-called patent propensity varies across countries and industries since all inventions cannot
be patented and all patentable inventions are not patented.
6I thank Gaétan de Rassenfosse for helping me on this issue.
7The same methodology is used by the OECD to build the patent segment of their STAN database (for more
details, see OECD, 2009). Unlike the counting methodology used in Chapter 2, the counts per industry in this
chapter are not fractional. A patent related to multiple industries is thus taken into account equally for each
industry. Note that the coverage of industries offered by the concordance table of Schmoch et al. (2003) is nearly
completed. Only 4% of EPO applications (less than 3% in terms of priority filings) contained in PATSTAT have a
IPC technological class which is not taken into consideration by this concordance table.
8A prioirty filing is the first patent application protecting an invention.
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reducing for the bias against small countries which file a high share of their patents abroad.
Moreover, PF does not suffer from geographical bias9 related to single-office-based indicators
(i.e. the home-country bias due to the fact that inventors have a tendency to file relatively
more in their own country), since it is based on all patent offices information. The second
indicator is the number of patent applications filed at the European Patent Office (EPO). More
precisely, this EPO patent count indicator encompasses first and subsequent patent applica-
tions which have been filed directly at EPO and those which have reached EPO during the
regional phase of a PCT application.
Combining these two indicators provides a more global overview on the globalization of
innovation. It also helps to test the robustness of the results since each patent metric has its
own interpretation and drawbacks (see section 2.3.2 for a discussion). Priority filings are first
filings of patents made usually at national patent offices and potentially extended to regional
offices. In particular, they are known to present a skewed distribution with a large number of
low value patents; compared to regional patents which have a larger geographical scope and
are more expensive for applicants10.
3.3.2 Internationalization patent-based indicators
Using patent data, one can gauge the globalization of innovation production11. First of all,
I define an international patent for country i as being a patent with a least one resident of
country i and at least one resident of any other country. Based on the measures of inter-
nationalization presented by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) and on the
country information contained in patents, I now define four types of internationalization in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Four types of internationalization of innovation
(1) co-invention (II):
patent with inventors from different countries
(2) co-ownership (AA):
patent with applicants from different countries
(3) foreign ownership of domestic innovation (IA):
patent with domestic inventors and foreign applicants
(4) domestic ownership of foreign innovation (AI):
patent with domestic applicants and foreign inventors
9See de Rassenfosse et al. (2013) or van Zeebroeck et al. (2006) for discussion on this issue.
10See Chapter 5 for a discussion about the higher costs of patenting in Europe due to higher fees and interme-
diary costs in terms of translation or attorneys for instance.
11Globalization of innovation production means that the analysis focuses on the globalization of the innovation
process itself without looking at determinants of globalization of patent protection (such as the decision to protect
a same invention in several countries). The patent filing strategy, across countries, is out of the scope of this
chapter.
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I measure co-invention when a patent has several inventors residing in different countries,
illustrating that those researchers based in different countries co-operate on the same project
and jointly invent. This kind of international collaboration between researchers can take place
either within a multinational enterprise (research facilities of a same company located in sev-
eral countries), or through a research joint program between several institutions. The co-
ownership measure is similarly defined by considering applicants located in different coun-
tries. The two other types are identified when at least one inventor and at least one applicant
reside in different countries. For most patents, the applicant is an institution (a firm, a uni-
versity or a public institute of research) and the inventor is an individual. For instance, the
patent can protect an invention performed in a research facility abroad of a multinational
firm. These two measures reflect thus the extent to which foreign (domestic) firms control
domestic (foreign) innovation. Within these four types of internationalization, the first two di-
mensions concern more the globalization of innovation in terms of international technological
collaboration, whereas the last two are more closely related to the cross-border ownership of
innovation.
The total count of patents corresponding to each type could be computed to measure the ex-
tent to which and how innovation production is globalized. However, what matters more is
to consider not only the absolute counts, but also the relative measures in order to better un-
derstand the intensity of internationalization. This kind of measures in terms of globalization
intensity was proposed by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001). In this chapter,
I extend their analysis, which was limited to a cross section of countries, with a more general
framework across industrial sectors and over time.
Four patent-based internationalization indicators are computed to evaluate the intensity of
globalization across industries, countries and over time. For each industry k in a country i at
priority year t, these variables of interest are expressed as the share of international patents in
the total number of patents (see equations (3.1) to (3.4)):
2 SHII is the share of patents with a foreign resident as co-inventor in the population of
patents with a domestic inventor:
SHIIi,k,t =
patent I Ii,k,t
patent Ii,k,t
(3.1)
2 SHAA is the share of patents with a foreign resident as co-applicant in the population
of patents with a domestic applicant:
SHAAi,k,t =
patent AAi,k,t
patent Ai,k,t
(3.2)
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2 SHIA is the share of patents with a domestic inventor and a foreign applicant in the
total domestic inventions:
SHIAi,k,t =
patent IAi,k,t
patent Ii,k,t
(3.3)
2 SHAI is the share of patents with a domestic applicant and a foreign inventor in the
total domestic applications:
SHAIi,k,t =
patent AIi,k,t
patent Ai,k,t
(3.4)
In addition to have a simple interpretation, those relative measures have one main advantage.
They allow us to focus on the globalization per se – being relatively independent of the deter-
minants of patenting decision which are out of the scope of this chapter. In particular, it means
that these measures are robust to the strong differences in the propensity to patent observed
across countries and industries (see Chapter 2). This reasoning is based on the assumption
that there is no difference in the propensity to patent within a same industry-country pair
between all patent and international ones.
Nevertheless, one can argue that those patent-based internationalization indicators have lim-
itations and do not reflect all types of international innovation experience which presents
strong variations across firms. For instance, the case of a MNE that prefers to register, as ap-
plicant, the name and the location of its local subsidiary where the invention was developed
– rather than those of its headquarters – would not be counted as international innovation
experience according to previous definitions. We can thus expect that results would be under-
estimates of the true globalization intensity. This underestimation is mainly due to the fact
that the country of residence of a firm is not always its nationality.12 As shown by Cincera
et al. (2006) for the case of Belgium, we can indeed compare the direct foreign ownership
of innovation (as measured by SHIA) and the indirect foreign ownership when we have the
information about the foreign control of applicant (when it is a subsidiary of a foreign firm).
The empirical evidence illustrated by the authors seems to confirm that patent information
under-estimates the real level of globalization of innovation production. However, they have
also indicated that the global trend over time is more explained by the patents that are “di-
rectly owned by foreign applicants” (p 501). Even though all firm level ownership information
– consolidated for the headquarter and its various subsidiaries (which is available only for a
restricted number of cases) – would provide the complete picture, patent information is satis-
factory enough to have a larger view on the globalization of innovation phenomenon.
12In the same vein, OECD (2009) has highlighted that the attribution of a country to a company is a problem for
all indicators of internationalization and is thus not limited to the patent-based indicators used in this research.
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3.4 Patterns in the globalization of innovation production
The first part of this research aims at providing global evidence on internationalization of
innovation production; focusing first on the worldwide trends over time and then on cross-
countries and cross-industries variations. It is based on an unique panel dataset that is com-
posed of 21 manufacturing industries (2-digit ISIC classification from 15 to 36, see Appendix
Table 3.A.1) in 29 countries (OECD economies)13 covering the period (defined by the priority
date of the patent filing) from 1980 to 2005.
3.4.1 Over time
To introduce the topics, it is interesting to examine globally the evolution over time of the
internationalization of innovation. Since making averages across countries or industries would
lead to some bias, this worldwide representation is computed with all information contained
in PATSTAT considering distinct applications – preventing from multiple counting of the same
patent. The international shares indicators are thus equal to the ratio of distinct international
patent applications of each type of internationalization divided by the total number of distinct
patent applications per priority year.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 represent, respectively for PF and EPO, first on the black curve the annual
patent count (see the left axis) and second on the bars the share of international patents (see
the right axis). The white ones are the cross-border ownership, the gray the co-invention and
the black the co-ownership.
Over those 25 years, the number of patents has strongly increased. The increase was even
stronger for international patents since we observe a strong increase in the internationalization
intensity, especially from the beginning of the 90’s. However, the share of internationalization
– compared to all patenting activity – remains quite limited. In 2005, only 2% of PF (8%
for EPO) were subject to international co-invention; less than 5% represented cross-border
ownership of innovation (18% for EPO); and only 1% of PF (2% for EPO) were subject to
international co-ownership. Note that SHIA is larger than SHII because, by construction, II is
a sub-sample of IA.14 As soon as you have two inventors coming from two different countries,
at least one of those will come from a different country than the applicant’s one.
13The sample is mainly restricted to OECD countries to guarantee enough availability of explanatory variables
at the industry level. Own calculation illustrates that this sample of countries represents on average, over our time
period of analysis, about 90% of the worldwide patenting activities. Note that our sample focuses on 29 countries
but considers international collaboration with all the countries in the PATSTAT database.
14This characteristic is valid for the worldwide and industry representations. Note also that SHIA is equal to
SHAI for these two representations.
3.4. PATTERNS IN THE GLOBALIZATION OF INNOVATION PRODUCTION 57
Figure 3.1: Worldwide trends for Priority Filings (PF)
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Note: * SHIA is equal to SHAI in the worldwide representation.
Figure 3.2: Worldwide trends for EPO filings
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Comparing Figure 3.1 with Figure 3.2, we observe that only a restricted fraction of priority
filings are subject to a protection in a regional patent office. In 2005, about 15% of worldwide
priority filings were also applied at EPO. Within this smaller number of patent applications,
however, the share of international patents is largely higher, illustrating that regional filings
are more likely to be subject to international technological collaboration and to cross-border
ownership.15 These first figures seem thus to confirm a strong growth in the intensity of
globalization in innovation (OECD, 2008). This worldwide trend is observed not only in
terms of cross-border ownership of innovation but also in terms of international technological
collaborations. Obviously, a world level analysis is not enough to understand the determinants
of this internationalization of innovation. Yet, it requires looking at the country-level and
industry-level differences.
3.4.2 Country-level
Table 3.2 exhibits the four indicators of internationalization intensity per country in average
over our 25 year time period of analysis. They are expressed in percentage points since they
are simply computed – as expressed in equations (3.1) to (3.4) – by dividing the count of
international applications by the total number of applications for each country.
Beyond the absolute counts of patent applications (see Appendix Table 3.A.2), the relative
internationalization indicators presented in Table 3.2 show three insightful results. First, the
increasing worldwide trend of the globalization of innovation seems to be balanced by a
strong heterogeneity across countries. In particular, it shows that country-size in patenting
does not reflect the degree of internationalization since the largest innovative countries (such
as US and Germany in Appendix Table 3.A.2) are not the most globalized ones (about 5% of
their priority filings are subject to co-invention while less than 8% of their innovation portfolio
reflects cross-border ownership). Indeed, smaller countries such as Belgium or Netherlands
have the highest degree of globalization of their innovations (their shares of international
patents are more than the double of those of largest innovative countries).
15One can also argue that EPO applications correspond to high-value inventions since the total cost of patent
application at EPO is high. The links between the globalization of technology and the value of inventions is an
interesting question to tackle in further research, but this is out of the scope of the current thesis.
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Table 3.2: Internationalization intensity per country (1980-2005) [%]
Country
PF EPO
SHII SHIA SHAI SHAA SHII SHIA SHAI SHAA
Australia* 2.2 3.8 1.8 1.5 16.0 23.3 10.8 3.9
Austria 13.2 25.7 11.5 5.0 20.3 33.1 21.6 13.8
Belgium 19.5 30.4 14.7 6.6 30.0 41.9 27.7 9.4
Canada 9.6 14.5 9.8 3.1 26.3 34.3 26.0 5.3
Czech Republic 9.8 11.4 6.4 3.8 39.9 50.0 27.7 10.0
Denmark* 9.3 12.2 9.3 4.2 17.5 20.9 18.2 5.2
Finland 4.4 4.5 9.2 2.3 11.8 10.5 21.1 1.7
France 5.9 8.7 6.0 2.0 11.9 18.9 14.6 6.0
Germany 5.0 6.3 5.6 1.5 9.6 13.2 10.7 4.0
Greece 2.5 3.3 0.9 0.8 29.5 35.9 9.6 6.8
Hungary 2.4 3.5 1.4 1.1 21.8 31.0 8.1 4.1
Iceland 21.5 28.5 15.0 6.9 39.3 51.6 37.4 8.0
Ireland* 6.8 10.2 8.4 2.6 31.1 38.6 47.3 8.3
Italy 3.1 6.0 2.0 1.2 8.1 16.3 5.4 2.5
Japan 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 2.7 3.8 3.4 1.2
Luxembourg 29.5 33.9 58.6 8.1 46.5 52.3 79.6 6.3
Mexico 7.7 12.2 3.8 2.0 44.7 60.8 16.0 13.2
Netherlands 12.2 20.1 24.9 8.1 13.2 19.5 34.3 16.9
New Zealand 4.9 7.1 3.9 3.2 20.5 26.6 12.6 5.5
Norway 6.5 8.5 6.7 2.9 19.4 23.6 20.4 3.9
Poland 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.5 38.4 47.9 14.5 12.4
Portugal 9.2 12.6 8.7 3.0 31.1 42.7 31.5 7.3
Rep. of Korea 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.3 5.5 5.2 6.3 1.7
Slovakia 12.4 11.9 8.6 5.0 54.2 61.8 31.0 12.3
Spain 6.9 9.6 4.2 1.7 18.7 29.2 8.0 4.2
Sweden 5.5 7.4 10.7 2.7 13.0 17.1 23.6 4.0
Switzerland 17.3 18.3 30.0 5.9 25.8 21.5 43.8 8.2
United Kingdom 5.0 10.3 4.5 2.8 16.6 33.0 18.2 12.4
United States 4.0 4.2 7.5 1.5 9.2 10.7 15.1 2.3
Source: own calculations based on PATSTAT database (April 2009)
Notes: See Appendix Table 3.A.2 for the absolute counts of patents per inventor/applicant country and
for the absolute counts of international patents according to the different types of internationalizaiton
of innovation. * indicates countries that suffer from a coverage problem, concerning the PF indicators,
identified by de Rassenfosse et al. (2013, p 734). Those countries were not taken into account in the
empirical model for PF.
Second, the share of international co-invention (SHII) is always lower than the share of for-
eign ownership of domestic innovation (SHIA). Although it can be partly explained by the
construction of the indicators (see above), note that this difference is sometimes significantly
high. This underlines that countries may have a stronger tendency to participate in cross-
border ownership of innovation than to take part in pure technological collaborations. Third,
a comparison across countries and across both types of cross-border ownership of innovation
highlights that SHIA is higher – for most countries – than SHAI. It means that the percentage
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of patents invented in those countries and assigned abroad is higher than the percentage of
patents owned by those countries and invented abroad. It confirms that most countries are
net exporter of innovation (indicated by negative net R&D offshoring ratio in Thomson, 2013).
Only few countries (such as US, Switzerland or Netherlands) seem to have an “applicant
surplus” (as shown by Picci and Savorelli, 2012), presenting higher number of domestic appli-
cants with foreign inventors than domestic inventions owned by foreigners. Those countries
control relatively more inventions abroad than their own ones are controlled by foreigners.
They are also known to be the headquarters of strong multinational firms.
Even though the production of innovation is increasingly globalized (its location is more
dispersed across the world), its ownership is still strongly concentrated. It thus confirms
the worldwide concentration of ownership of international patents, already pointed out by
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001). Note also that all countries have a more
international footprint in their regional patent application (EPO) than in their priority filings.
3.4.3 Industry-level
Similar indicators were computed per industrial sectors. In addition to present strong differ-
ences in their patenting activities (see Appendix Table 3.A.3), Table 3.3 shows that industries
exhibit differences in the average intensity of globalization of their innovation.
Three findings can be drawn from this table. First, the manufacturing of coke, petroleum
producs and nuclear fuel (PETR16), and the manufacturing of chemicals products (CHEM)
are the industries which are globally the more international ones across the four types of in-
ternationalization and for both patent count indicators. About 2% of PF (10% of EPO) are
co-invented and 4% (17%) are subject to cross-order ownership in both industries. Second,
like for the country case, it confirms that size in patenting is not reflected in the degree of in-
ternationalization. Industries with a large number of patent applications (see machinery and
equipement, MACH; radio, television and communication equipement, COMM in Appendix
Table 3.A.3) present a relatively small share of international patents. By contrast, industries
with a low number of applications (food products and beverages, FOOD; textiles, TEXT) have
a relatively higher degree of internationalization. Third, comparing high-tech with low-tech,
we observe that high-tech industries (in particular the industries related to Information and
Communication Technologies, such as office, accounting and computing machinery, COMP;
COMM; and electrical machinery and apparatus, ELEC) are not, on average, the most global-
ized ones compared to some low-tech industries17 (such as FOOD) – particularly in terms of
EPO filings.
16See Appendix Table 3.A.1 for the description of the industry abbreviations used in the main text and in the
tables.
17Similar evidence has been observed by Dunning (1994) in terms of US registered patents of foreign affiliates
of MNEs.
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Table 3.3: Internationalization intensity per industry (1980-2005) [%]
Industry PF EPO
Tech* SHII SHIA/AI SHAA SHII SHIA/AI SHAA
FOOD LOTE 1.17 2.61 0.44 10.11 21.89 5.43
TOBA LOTE 1.28 2.63 0.60 4.38 12.24 0.66
TEXT LOTE 1.34 3.03 0.42 7.81 16.75 2.19
WEAR LOTE 0.57 1.63 0.21 3.93 10.45 0.66
LEAT LOTE 1.03 3.49 0.40 3.92 15.17 0.98
WOOD LOTE 0.35 0.95 0.15 2.69 7.77 0.68
PAP LOTE 0.74 1.74 0.26 5.30 12.13 1.38
PETR MLTE 2.10 4.11 0.72 7.82 17.44 4.17
CHEM MHTE 1.92 3.61 0.64 9.23 17.65 2.97
RUBB MLTE 0.81 2.39 0.35 4.41 13.67 2.00
MINE MLTE 0.77 1.75 0.30 5.05 12.49 1.90
META MLTE 0.83 1.58 0.31 5.57 11.63 2.06
FABM MLTE 0.65 1.94 0.22 3.21 10.24 1.01
MACH MHTE 0.71 1.91 0.27 3.86 11.07 1.45
COMP HTE 0.76 2.23 0.28 3.87 12.84 1.80
ELEC MHTE 0.69 1.99 0.21 3.43 11.18 1.41
COMM HTE 0.85 2.45 0.36 4.49 14.81 2.11
INST HTE 0.98 2.36 0.36 5.28 13.35 2.07
AUTO MHTE 0.72 2.02 0.23 3.34 10.13 1.52
TRAN MHTE 0.81 1.77 0.28 3.01 6.88 0.91
MISC LOTE 0.45 1.39 0.24 2.64 8.83 1.18
Source: own calculations based on PATSTAT database (April 2009)
Notes: see Appendix Table 3.A.1 for the description of the industries. See also Appendix Table 3.A.3
for the absolute counts of patents per industry and for the absolute counts of international patents
according to the different types of internationalizaiton of innovation. * Based on the OECD technolog-
ical classification. LOTE, MLTE, MHTE, and HTE stand for low technology, medium-low technology,
medium-high technology, and high technology, respectively.
In addition to analyze the differences in the average intensity of globalization across coun-
tries and industries, the trends over time provide interesting insights. Table 3.4 exhibits the
compound annual growth rates (CAGR) per country and per industry. It shows that the
worldwide increasing trends in international patenting activities (observed in Figures 3.1 and
3.2) are shared among most of the countries and all industries. This growth in globalization of
innovation was undeniable with worldwide annual growth rates that were equal, for PF, to 7%
in international co-invention and 5% in cross-border of innovation. Concerning the industries
related to the ICT, while Table 3.3 reports a relatively low average level of internationalization
over the 25 years, Table 3.4 shows that internationalization has more strongly increased in
those particular industries (such as COMP and COMM) than in low-tech industries (such as
FOOD)18.
18Additional descriptive evidence (available upon request) illustrates that the international shares in these ICT
industries have especially increased from the beginning of the 90’s; to reach similar degree of internationalization
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Table 3.4: CAGR of internationalization of innovation (PF)
(a) Per country
Country SHII SHIA SHAI SHAA
Australia* 8% 7% 10% 16%
Austria 6% 5% 8% 11%
Belgium 11% 8% 13% 14%
Canada 8% 6% 8% 11%
Czech Republic 2% 0% -6% -7%
Denmark* 5% 6% 5% 14%
Finland 11% 7% 11% 13%
France 8% 8% 9% 11%
Germany 7% 6% 6% 10%
Greece 12% 11% 16% 15%
Hungary 18% 19% 17% 15%
Iceland 2% 2% 4% -2%
Ireland* 13% 13% 13% 18%
Italy 9% 7% 8% 14%
Japan 10% 8% 8% 14%
Luxembourg 7% 8% 3% 8%
Mexico 4% 3% 1% 9%
Netherlands 7% 2% 5% 9%
New Zealand 9% 8% 8% 8%
Norway 8% 7% 9% 9%
Poland 21% 19% 26% 24%
Portugal 10% 10% 12% 9%
Rep. of Korea 4% 5% 6% 1%
Slovakia 1% 1% -2% -8%
Spain 13% 11% 14% 19%
Sweden 9% 7% 10% 14%
Switzerland 6% 3% 5% 11%
United Kingdom 7% 4% 6% 10%
United States 8% 8% 5% 11%
World 7% 5% 5% 10%
(b) Per industry
Industry SHII SHIA/AI SHAA
FOOD 5% 2% 6%
TOBA 6% 8% 1%
TEXT 7% 5% 11%
WEAR 5% 5% 1%
LEAT 2% 1% 6%
WOOD 7% 4% 7%
PAP 5% 2% 8%
PETR 7% 4% 6%
CHEM 6% 4% 9%
RUBB 9% 5% 13%
MINE 10% 5% 11%
META 5% 4% 6%
FABM 7% 3% 10%
MACH 7% 4% 9%
COMP 11% 7% 10%
ELEC 9% 6% 10%
COMM 9% 7% 10%
INST 7% 6% 8%
AUTO 8% 6% 9%
TRAN 5% 3% 6%
MISC 4% 2% 10%
World 7% 5% 10%
Source: own calculations based on PATSTAT database (April 2009)
Note: The compound annual growth rates were computed over the longest time period available
between 1980 and 2005.
3.5 Empirical approach
3.5.1 Fractional logit model
Beyond these stylized facts, the second objective of this chapter is to better understand the
determinants of the globalization of innovation using an econometric model. To explain the
intensity of globalization of innovation production in our panel dataset, estimating a classical
as CHEM at the end of the time period.
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linear model is not convenient since our dependent variables (SHII, SHIA, SHAI, SHAA) are
shares. These variables of interest vary, by definition, between 0 and 1. As pointed out in the
econometric literature19, using a linear model for such fractional data would suffer from the
same weaknesses as using a linear model for binary choice models. In particular, the predicted
values from a classical OLS regression are not necessarily restricted in the unit interval.
I have prefered to use a fractional response model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996)20
and suited to proportions data:
E(y|x) = G(xβ) (3.5)
where G(.) is a known function satisfying 0 < G(z) < 1 for all z∈ R. It simply consists in
considering a function G(.) in the relation between y and x. This function G(.) is chosen to
satisfy the conditions that guarantee that the predicted y will be restricted to the unit interval
for all values of the regressors. It is typically chosen to be a cumulative distribution function.
In this case, I took the logistic function, G(z) = exp(z)1+exp(z) , and I thus estimated a fractional logit
model. The authors have proposed a particular quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE)
based on the Bernoulli log-likelihood function, given by:
li(β) = yilog[G(xiβ)] + (1− yi)log[1− G(xiβ)] (3.6)
This method takes into account the bounded nature of the dependent variable and the pos-
sibility of observing values at the boundaries. Equation (3.6) corresponds to the familiar
log-likelihood of the Logit model, except that yi is continuous in the unit interval. Estimates
of β are obtained from the maximization problem: maxβ∑Ni=1li(β). As pointed out by the au-
thors, since equation (3.6) is a member of the linear exponential family, the QMLE estimate is
consistent and
√
N-asymptotically normal regardless of the distribution of yi conditional on
xi. In particular, yi could be a continuous variable or a discrete variable.
The following fractional logit model is estimated for our panel dataset composed of country-
industry pairs over time:
E(y|x) = G (αi + αk + αt + β1RTAc + β2TRADE + β3MULTI.+ β4R&D Int.+ β5SIZE)
(3.7)
The dependent variables – y = {SHII, SHIA, SHAI, SHAA} – are the four types of interna-
tionalization indicators based on the two alternative patent counts – PF and EPO. They vary
between 0 (if the patents of a country-industry pair list only domestic residents) and 1 (if all
patents of a country-industry pair reflect international inventive activities).21
19For a discussion, see among others Kieschnick and McCullough (2003) or Ramalho et al. (2011).
20For examples using this estimation technique in applied economics papers, see for instance Wagner (2001,
2003) and Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004).
21See Appendix Table 3.A.5 for descriptive statistics.
64 CHAPTER 3. GLOBALIZATION OF INNOVATION PRODUCTION
3.5.2 Explanatory variables22
To deepen our understanding of the globalization of innovation, five explanatory variables are
taken into account in the main econometric specifications. First, an indicator of the revealed
technological advantage of countries across industrial sectors is defined as in equation (3.8).
RTAci,k,t =
rtai,k,t − 1
rtai,k,t + 1
∈ [−1, 1] where rtai,k,t =
Patenti,k,t/∑k Patenti,k,t
∑i Patenti,k,t/∑i,k Patenti,k,t
(3.8)
where Patenti,k,t is the fractional count of patents of country i in industry k at priorirty year t.
This kind of index was initially built for trade literature to compute the so-called revealed
comparative advantage. Based on patent counts23, it is computed for each country-industry
pair as being the ratio between the share of industry k in the country i patents and the share
of the same industry in all worldwide patents. We thus point out a revealed technological
advantage of country i in a particular industry if the share of this industry is higher in country
i compared to the average in other countries. We point out a revealed disadvantage for the
opposite case. This ratio (rta) is normalized24 to obtain a symmetric measure (RTAc) between
-1 and 1, with positive values representing a revealed technological advantage and negative
values a revealed technological disadvantage. In other words, positive values of RTAc indicate
a technological specialization of a country in a particular industry.
This first variable is the key factor which helps us to distinguish between the home-base aug-
menting and home-base exploiting motives in internationalization of innovation (see discus-
sion in section 3.2). Indeed, it allows us to evaluate if countries are relatively more globalized
in industries in which they are technologically either strong or weak. Positive or negative
effects can be expected according to the prevalence of each strategy. The home-base augment-
ing strategy suggests a negative relationship between RTAc and internationalization intensity.
By contrast, if firms primarly go abroad to exploit the technological strenghts of their home
country, a positive relationship between RTAc and internationalization intensity is more likely.
This last interpretation was highlighted by Patel and Vega (1999) and Le Bas and Sierra (2002)
in their descriptive analysis of patenting activities of samples of MNE’s in US for the former
and in Europe for the latter. They indeed concluded that in a large manjority of cases, firms
tend to locate their technoloigy abroad in their core areas in which they are strong at home.
A second set of variables is taken into account to investigate the relationship between interna-
tional trade in goods and international patenting activities across industrial sectors. A strong
relationship with the absolute series of trade flows would indicate that internationalization of
R&D is demand driven (Lall, 1979; Mansfield et al., 1979). In the same vein, Picci and Savorelli
22See Appendix Table 3.A.4 for more details on the variables, see Appendix Table 3.A.5 for the descriptive
statistics and see Appendix Table 3.A.6 for correlation matrix.
23A similar measure has been introduced by Soete (1987) and then has been largely used (see for instance,
Dunning, 1994; Cantwell, 1995; Patel and Vega, 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002; Frietsch and Jung, 2009; Frietsch and
Schmoch, 2010). Note also that this revealed comparative advantage is evaluated for both patent counts indicators
(PF or EPO) based either on the country of inventor (RTAc inv) or the country of applicant (RTAc app).
24This kind of normalization has been proposed by Laursen (1998) and then has been applied by Dalum et al.
(1999), Begg et al. (1999), Brusoni and Geuna (2003), Schubert and Grupp (2011) or D’Agostino et al. (2013).
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(2012) interpreted the strong relationship between bilateral trade and international collabora-
tions in inventive acitvities as evidence that home-base exploiting motives are relevant. In
addition to the impact of import and export, I also analyze the relationship between the in-
ternationalization of innovation and two relative measures of international competitiveness:
the revealed comparative advantage based on exports series (RCAc) and the net trade ratio
of countries across industries (Net trade). A positive impact is expected since international
competitive innovative countries are more likely to be more effective in performing research
abroad and to be more attractive for international technological collaboration (Kumar, 2001).
Moreover, openness to international trade (Furman et al., 2002) and international competitive-
ness in trade (see Chapter 2) have been recognized as closely related to international patenting
experience.
Third, I estimate the effect of the multidisciplinarity of innovation performed by country-
industry pair. This is evaluated with a new patent-based indicator, which corresponds to
the number of distinct 4-digit IPC classes – outside the scope of the industry defined by the
concordance table of Schmoch et al. (2003) – listed on patents. For instance, consider a country
with two patents: Patenti listing {IPCA, IPCB, IPCC} and Patentj listing {IPCA, IPCB, IPCD}.
For industry k defined by IPCA in the concordance table, the multidisciplinarity indicator is
based on 3 distinct IPC classes – {IPCB, IPCC, IPCD} – for this country-industry pair. Mul-
tidisciplinary innovation is evaluated for each country-industry pair considering either the
country of inventor (Multi. inv) or the country of applicant (Multi. app). Its expected im-
pact is positive, particularly if home-base augmenting strategy dominates. Multidisciplinary
country-industries pairs present strong inter-industry spillovers and can thus be more attrac-
tive for foreign innovative firms that desire to augment and diversify their home knowledge
base (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005; Fernández-Ribas and Shapira, 2009).
While the previous variables were expressed for each country-industry pair, I also include
variables that vary only across countries. Indeed, I control for differences, across countries,
in terms of the intensity of R&D expenditures (R&D Int.) and in terms of the economic
size measured by the GDP (Size). For both variables, positive or negative impact can be
expected. Technological intensity contributes to the absorptive capacity of countries such
that they can benefit more from the sourcing of knowledge abroad but strong technological
capabilities may also mean less incentives to cross borders to find additional knowledge assets
(Song and Shin, 2008). Concerning the size of country, R&D collaboration literature (Guellec
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; Narula and Duysters, 2004) suggests that smaller
countries collaborate more to compensate for the lack of home capabilities; whereas papers
on international R&D location (Kumar, 1996; Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005) demonstrate that
larger countries are more attractive for the location of foreign R&D facilities, especially if
internationalization of innovation is market-oriented (Kuemmerle, 1999). Finally, I control for
unobserved heterogeneity in our panel dataset by including country (αi), industry (αk) and
time (αt) dummies.
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3.6 Results and discussion
The main estimation results of the fractional logit model25 of equation (3.7) are presented in
Table 3.5 for EPO patent applications26; distinguishing between the four types of internation-
alization (see Table 3.1 and equations (3.1)–(3.4) for more details).
Table 3.5: Main fractional logit estimation results for EPO patent applications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. SHII SHII SHIA SHIA SHAI SHAI SHAA SHAA
RTAc inv -1.111*** -1.119*** -0.770*** -0.767***
(0.0791) (0.0793) (0.0738) (0.0737)
RTAc app -0.181** -0.191** -0.750*** -0.761***
(0.0875) (0.0886) (0.139) (0.137)
Net trade 0.257*** 0.195*** 0.172** 0.299**
(0.0676) (0.0657) (0.0695) (0.138)
RCAc 0.260*** 0.172*** 0.179** 0.297**
(0.0660) (0.0646) (0.0704) (0.121)
Multi. inv 0.120*** 0.114*** 0.0866** 0.0826**
(0.0365) (0.0363) (0.0348) (0.0350)
Multi. app 0.00175 -0.00267 0.137** 0.131**
(0.0401) (0.0403) (0.0628) (0.0632)
R&D Int. -0.592*** -0.595*** -0.638*** -0.639*** 0.307** 0.309** 0.314 0.310
(0.132) (0.133) (0.136) (0.136) (0.139) (0.140) (0.249) (0.250)
Size -0.331 -0.306 -0.643** -0.629** -0.00555 0.00821 -0.782 -0.775
(0.211) (0.215) (0.252) (0.253) (0.260) (0.262) (0.595) (0.603)
Country FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Pseudo LL -2955 -2954 -3601 -3602 -2935 -2935 -1566 -1555
Observations 10,043 10,043 10,043 10,043 9,789 9,789 9,789 9,789
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country FE”, “industry FE”, and “year FE” report the significance levels
of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
First, RTAc variables have a strongly significant and negative coefficient over the different
specifications. It means that the intensity of globalization of innovative activities is higher
in industrial sectors in which countries present a revealed technological disadvantage; i.e. in
which they are relatively weak. By contrast, countries which present a revealed technological
advantage seem to keep it relatively more within their national borders and their innovative
firms are less likely to collaborate with foreigners. This effect is observed not only in terms
25The same model was also estimated by OLS and Tobit. Appendix Tables 3.A.7 and 3.A.8 show that these
additional econometric specifications confirm the results of the fractional logit.
26Results for priority filings are in Appendix Table 3.A.9. These results are globally similar although the impact
of multidisciplinarity and size variables are less significant. Note that the samples for PF estimations are smaller
since de Rassenfosse et al. (2013) have noticed a coverage problem for few countries which were not taken into
account in the estimation for PF.
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of international co-invention and co-ownership of patents (SHII and SHAA) but also in terms
of cross-border ownership of innovation (SHIA and SHAI). The negative relationship between
RTAc and the dependent variables suggests that firms do not extend their R&D internation-
ally to replicate research in the industrial sectors in which their country is already strong,
but rather to acquire the knowledge which is lacking at home (as suggested by Archibugi
and Michie, 1997). It thus reflects the dominance of the home-base augmenting strategy, in
comparison with the home-base exploiting strategy.
These results for our panel dataset confirm the conclusions of Almeida (1996) for the semi-
conductors case, the illustrative evidence of Cantwell (1995) for American electrical and Ger-
man chemical firms, and the results of the analysis of the German innovation survey per-
formed by Schmiele (2012). Concerning foreign ownership of domestic innovation (SHIA),
Cantwell and Piscitello (2005) have also suggested that strong domestic specialization27 acts
as an entry barrier against foreign firms. Since foreign and domestic firms compete for a
given pool of resources (e.g. the inventors), foreigners may have more difficulties to access the
market where residents are relatively strong.
Concerning trade variables, the main impact comes from both measures of international com-
petitiveness (Net trade and RCAc, which are illustrated in Table 3.5; whereas results of abso-
lute series of export and import are in Table 3.6). Related estimates show positive values, as
expected, and significant. It illustrates that international competitive country-industry pairs
present higher intensity of internationalization of their innovation. Countries that compete
internationally in trade are more involved in international technological collaboration and
cross-border ownership of patents, underlying the close relationship between the openness to
trade and the globalization of innovation.
However, the internationalization of innovation does not seem to be strongly correlated to
overseas trade. Indeed, results in terms of export and import (see Table 3.6) show less signif-
icant coefficients, suggesting that international patenting does not follow totally the flows of
international trade of goods. If the internationalization of innovation was strongly demand-
driven or market-oriented, one would expect that foreign ownership of domestic innovation
(SHIA) – domestic ownership of foreign innovation (SHAI) – to be particularly more related to
import than export – export than import, respectively. This distinction between the two types
of cross-border ownership of innovation does not take place significantly, which suggests that
international innovative activities are poorly driven by home-base exploiting motives. This
provides also evidence that the international competitiveness of the country-industry pair
matters more than the direction of the trade flows in explaining the internationalization of
innovation.
27In addition to measure this specialization in terms of inventors (see columns concerning SHIA in Table 3.5), I
tested the same model controlling for specialization in terms of applicants (RTAc app). These robustness results
are the same, see Appendix Table 3.A.10. Unlike Cantwell and Piscitello (2005), our database does not allow us to
focus precisely on domestic owned firms.
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Table 3.6: Estimation results for EPO patent applications with trade flows variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. SHII SHII SHIA SHIA SHAI SHAI SHAA SHAA
RTAc inv -1.085*** -1.035*** -0.751*** -0.709***
(0.0803) (0.0783) (0.0748) (0.0738)
RTAc app -0.190** -0.128 -0.729*** -0.659***
(0.0874) (0.0793) (0.136) (0.126)
Export 0.0629** 0.0511* 0.0724*** 0.0864*
(0.0289) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0481)
Import -0.00883 0.00955 0.0654 -0.00286
(0.0606) (0.0528) (0.0564) (0.0957)
Multi. inv 0.120*** 0.130*** 0.0852** 0.0922***
(0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0352) (0.0354)
Multi. app -0.00276 0.00470 0.136** 0.148**
(0.0403) (0.0408) (0.0633) (0.0643)
R&D Int. -0.609*** -0.583*** -0.654*** -0.632*** 0.288** 0.308** 0.290 0.322
(0.135) (0.132) (0.136) (0.135) (0.141) (0.140) (0.250) (0.253)
Size -0.380* -0.328 -0.682*** -0.646** -0.0557 -0.0606 -0.859 -0.788
(0.216) (0.215) (0.255) (0.256) (0.264) (0.267) (0.601) (0.603)
Country FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Pseudo LL -2957 -2958 -3603 -3604 -2935 -2936 -1566 -1567
Observations 10,043 10,043 10,043 10,043 9,789 9,789 9,789 9,789
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country FE”, “industry FE”, and “year FE” report the significance levels
of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
The opposite effect of RTAc and RCAc (see Table 3.5) could be considered as confusing. Never-
theless, these results indicate that specialization in technological innovation is not necessarily
related to export performance. These two set of variables may reflect different phenomena,
particularly as determinants of the globalization of innovation. While RTAc measures the
performance in the development of patentable inventions, exports based indicators are more
related to the business exploitation of patented technologies. The results show in fact that
country-industries which present better performance on the former dimension collaborate
less than those which better perform in the latter one.
The third variable of interest, the multidisciplinarity (Multi. inv and Multi. app), has a
positive and significant coefficient (except for SHAI), confirming the importance of home-base
augmenting strategy. On the one hand, it indicates that multidisciplinary country-industry
pairs are more likely to be involved in international collaboration (SHII and SHAA). On the
other hand, it shows that country-industry pairs with more diverse patenting activities –
across a larger number of different technologies – are more attractive for foreign applicants
(SHIA). It confirms the positive impact of diversity externalities, observed by Cantwell and
Piscitello (2005) (for a sample of MNE across European regions). These multidisciplinary
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country-industry pairs reflect a higher potential for inter-industry spillovers. As shown by
Fernández-Ribas and Shapira (2009) in the case of nanotechnology, it also suggests that the
inter-disciplinary and diversified knowledge in the host country matters for the location of
R&D facilities abroad. Nevertheless, this positive impact is not observed for SHAI, suggesting
that multidisciplinary country-industry pairs do not seem to own more foreign inventions.
The results of the last two variables (R&D Int. and Size), varying only across countries and
over time, confirm mainly the findings of Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001,
2004b) based on a cross-section of countries for EPO, USPTO and triadic patents28.
Concerning the technological intensity of countries, we can distinguish between the different
types of internationalization. First, the R&D intensity has a negative and significant impact
on SHII and SHIA. The more a country is intensive in research and development, the less its
inventors take part in international co-invention. In other words, inventors in countries with
higher technological capacities – i.e. a larger home knowledge base – do not need as much as
others collaboration with foreign researchers. It thus reinforces the results of RTAc and reflects
that researchers cooperate with abroad to fulfill their weak innovative environment. Moreover,
the higher the technological intensity of a country, the lower foreign applicants control its
inventions. Indeed, Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) concluded that leading
innovative countries are not being “techno-sourced, at least not through foreign ownership
of their inventions.” Second, the impact of technological intensity on SHAI is positive and
significant. It illustrates that companies in countries with higher R&D intensity have a higher
tendency to own foreign innovation; it can be explained by a higher absorptive capacity of the
knowledge flows related to these foreign locations of R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Song
and Shin, 2008).
Finally, the size variable has globally a negative impact, although poorly significant. It seems
to reflect that firms in smaller countries do not only collaborate relatively more in patenting
with foreigners but they also “participate relatively more in global sourcing of innovation“ (as
suggested by Thomson, 2013 for home and host country of R&D offshoring). In the same vein,
these empirical findings indicate that internationalization of innovation is not purely market
driven since large economies are not the target of foreign applicants in international patenting
experiences (see columns (3)-(4) for SHIA).
3.7 Conclusions
In a world in which geographical borders are less and less relevant for production, trade and
research, this chapter aims at better understanding the globalization of innovation production.
Using patent-based indicators, I firstly provide evidence on the extent to which the production
of innovation takes place internationally. While most studies in the literature were carried out
on a limited number of firms (mainly MNEs) or at cross-country level only, I prefer to use a
more aggregated approach based on a unique panel dataset composed of 21 industries in 29
countries over 25 years. It allows us not only to better control for differences across industries,
28Patent families applied in Europe, the US and Japan.
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across countries and over time, but also to evaluate the relationship between the specialization
of countries across industrial sectors and their internationalization of technology. Secondly,
a fractional logit model is estimated to highlight main determinants behind the intensity of
four types of globalization of innovation production: (1) co-invention (patent with inventors
from different countries) (2) co-ownership (patent with applicants from different countries);
(3) foreign ownership of domestic innovation (patent with domestic inventors and foreign
applicants) and (4) domestic ownership of foreign innovation (patent with domestic applicants
and foreign inventors).
Although the amplitude of globalization remains quite limited in the production of innova-
tion, the patterns described in the first part of this chapter confirm a strong growth in the
intensity of internationalization of innovation – in addition to the so-called patent explosion.
For instance, between 1980 and 2005, the intensity of co-invention in PF has been multiplied
by 5 while the intensity of cross-border ownership of patents has known a growth rate supe-
rior to 200%. More importantly, the descriptive evidence shows still strong differences across
countries and industries. First, the size of innovative effort of countries (or industries) is not
necessarily reflected in the degree of internationalization of their patents. Second, the owner-
ship of innovation remains still strongly geographically concentrated whereas the location of
innovation is spread across borders.
The empirical findings of this chapter indicate that globalization of innovation production
is driven by home-base augmenting motives. Indeed, taking an industry perspective shows
that the degree of internationalization of innovation is negatively related to the revealed tech-
nological advantage of countries across industries. Countries have a tendency to be more
globalized in industrial sectors in which they are less technologically specialized. Additional
results also provide evidence suggesting that international patenting is a way to compensate
for technological weaknesses at home, rather than to exploit home technological strenghts
in large foreign markets. In fact, the intensity of globalization of innovation is higher for
small economies and for countries with low intensity of R&D expenditures, both indicating a
smaller technological knowledge base. Strong innovative performance reduces the incentives
to collaborate with foreigners in order to co-invent new technology. Countries with stronger
research and development acitvities and large economies have also a lower risk that their do-
mestic inventions are controlled by foreigners. By contrast, higher R&D intensity seems to
stimulate the cross-border ownership of foreign innovation.
Concerning the relationship with international trade of goods, the impact is more ambiguous.
On the one hand, the impact of export and import – particularly concerning the cross-border
ownership of innovation (SHIA and SHAI) – does not seem to confirm that globalization
of R&D is largely market oriented. On the other hand, the international competitiveness
(in terms of trade) of country-industry pairs positively affects the degree of globalization of
innovation.
Finally, I show that the multidisciplinarity of research matters to explain internationalization
of innovation. Again, it reinforces the argument saying that globalization is a mean to find
complementary assets abroad. The more complex and interdisciplinary the technological de-
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velopment, the more likely you would need to collaborate on an international basis to find the
necessary competences. Moreover, this positive impact suggests that country-industry pairs
presenting more diverse patenting efforts – across a larger number of different technologies –
are more attractive for foreign applicants.
However, these conclusions require further research. In particular, similar patent-based indi-
cators can be used not only to measure the globalization of innovation of country with the
rest of the world but also to study more precisely who collaborates with whom in the glob-
alized production of innovation. Focusing on the bilateral relationships (with a same global
approach, across countries, industries and over time) would allow us to control more pre-
cisely about home and host characteristics and especially to investigate the effects of distance
factors (such as geographical distance, institutional differences or technological proximity)
on international patenting experience. This kind of methodology would help to better un-
derstand where country-industry pairs are going to compensate for their weak technological
environment.
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3.A Appendix
Table 3.A.1: Industry definition
ISIC Rev 3. Industry description
FOOD 15 Manuf. of food products and beverages
TOBA 16 Manuf. of tobacco products
TEXT 17 Manuf. of textiles
WEAR 18 Manuf. of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
LEAT 19 Tanning and dressing of leather; Manuf. of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness
and footwear
WOOD 20 Manuf. of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; Manuf. of
articles of straw and plaiting materials
PAP 21 Manuf. of paper and paper products
PETR 23 Manuf. of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
CHEM 24 Manuf. of chemicals and chemical products
RUBB 25 Manuf. of rubber and plastics products
MINE 26 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products
META 27 Manuf. of basic metals
FABM 28 Manuf. of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
MACH 29 Manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
COMP 30 Manuf. of office, accounting and computing machinery
ELEC 31 Manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
COMM 32 Manuf. of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
INST 33 Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
AUTO 34 Manuf. of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
TRAN 35 Manuf. of other transport equipment
MISC 36 Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
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Table 3.A.2: Total count of patent applications per country (1980-2005)
Country PF INV1 PF APP2 PF II PF AA PF IA PF AI EPO INV1 EPO APP2 EPO II EPO AA EPO IA EPO AI
Australia* 163978 160764 3648 2446 6295 2815 15931 13246 2541 522 3714 1436
Austria 49709 40978 6543 2029 12799 4711 23273 19157 4723 2643 7703 4130
Belgium 44002 34869 8563 2307 13363 5137 28096 20702 8419 1937 11781 5744
Canada 113941 105713 10896 3254 16492 10378 27413 21931 7218 1166 9405 5702
Czech Republic 8820 8220 867 309 1002 525 1089 711 434 71 545 197
Denmark* 32967 31168 3072 1308 4034 2898 14564 13157 2542 686 3044 2395
Finland 59310 61129 2632 1392 2689 5609 18511 19368 2192 320 1942 4088
France 327671 314903 19353 6428 28461 19035 148540 139089 17688 8315 28067 20314
Germany 912523 887729 45368 13666 57236 49671 390360 368160 37465 14573 51459 39537
Greece 17770 17354 440 146 579 151 1177 825 347 56 422 79
Hungary 40182 39306 968 419 1417 566 2788 2059 609 85 864 167
Iceland 808 662 174 46 230 99 440 286 173 23 227 107
Ireland* 21808 21183 1476 553 2214 1784 3574 3682 1112 306 1380 1741
Italy 212617 203466 6539 2368 12714 3984 70301 61652 5687 1531 11433 3348
Japan 7908626 7903434 15958 10623 25274 22336 318504 315324 8527 3749 12076 10810
Luxembourg 2940 4105 866 331 998 2404 1594 2720 742 170 833 2165
Mexico 8339 7609 644 150 1016 287 852 394 381 52 518 63
Netherlands 87467 91368 10654 7362 17573 22716 74898 90510 9866 15333 14586 31051
New Zealand 15691 15160 765 488 1111 590 2350 1894 482 104 626 238
Norway 27566 26687 1805 766 2348 1787 6363 5709 1232 223 1500 1166
Poland 87376 86697 1274 463 1252 839 1258 759 483 94 603 110
Portugal 3133 2973 287 89 395 259 721 578 224 42 308 182
Rep. of Korea 774179 776358 5912 2121 3169 9002 22318 22202 1229 387 1155 1393
Slovakia 3504 3288 433 164 417 282 306 155 166 19 189 48
Spain 51323 47772 3553 836 4930 1989 13248 10031 2472 417 3874 806
Sweden 109928 111852 6095 3070 8124 11924 38656 39614 5010 1581 6594 9336
Switzerland 99513 106050 17215 6239 18192 31822 61511 72105 15900 5895 13227 31556
United Kingdom 478639 448436 23833 12496 49520 20316 115950 95246 19204 11793 38309 17322
United States 1666469 1695302 66181 25849 70129 126878 527881 528581 48697 12054 56627 79783
Source: own calculations based on PATSTAT database (April 2009)
Notes: * indicates countries that suffer from a coverage problem, concerning the PF indicators, identified by de Rassenfosse et al. (2013, p 734). Those countries were not taken
into account in the empirical model for PF. 1 Total count of patent applications based on inventor criterion. 2 Total count of patent applications based on applicant criterion.
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Table 3.A.3: Total count of patent applications per industry (1980-2005)
Industry
PF EPO
COUNT II AA IA/AI COUNT II AA IA/AI
FOOD 196275 2295 872 5120 27581 2788 1498 6037
TOBA 9389 120 56 247 1805 79 12 221
TEXT 66233 887 280 2006 15317 1196 336 2566
WEAR 27718 159 57 453 3664 144 24 383
LEAT 19084 196 76 666 3876 152 38 588
WOOD 61622 213 92 586 4838 130 33 376
PAP 141871 1056 365 2470 22169 1174 306 2690
PETR 61213 1288 442 2514 14354 1123 598 2504
CHEM 1649839 31624 10536 59601 465107 42929 13820 82073
RUBB 604055 4871 2084 14411 99997 4414 1999 13674
MINE 531458 4070 1606 9308 69969 3532 1329 8739
META 445355 3715 1371 7036 49652 2766 1023 5776
FABM 502937 3266 1113 9775 73015 2344 734 7477
MACH 3149820 22429 8348 60084 422627 16320 6131 46804
COMP 2086155 15845 5909 46480 218321 8449 3930 28036
ELEC 808823 5573 1728 16066 105438 3615 1483 11789
COMM 2683105 22706 9574 65620 324360 14560 6852 48024
INST 1870777 18394 6720 44074 329007 17367 6799 43933
AUTO 905974 6561 2099 18336 134038 4475 2033 13572
TRAN 180800 1465 511 3202 29745 895 272 2045
MISC 393262 1787 926 5451 39636 1046 466 3498
Source: own calculations based on PATSTAT database (April 2009)
Note: see Appendix Table 3.A.1 for the description of the industries.
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Table 3.A.4: Description of variables
Variable Description
Dependent Variables [i,k,t]
EPO SHII
Share of international patents in the total number of patents, see equations
(3.1) to (3.4) considering counts of patent applications at the European
Patent Office (EPO)
EPO SHIA
EPO SHAI
EPO SHAA
PF SHII
Share of international patents in the total number of patents, see equations
(3.1) to (3.4) considering counts of priority filings (PF)
PF SHIA
PF SHAI
PF SHAA
Explanatory variables
RTAc EPO inv [i,k,t]
Indicator of Revealed Technological Advantage described in equation (3.8)
counting either EPO or PF based on inventor (inv) or applicant (app).
RTAc EPO app [i,k,t]
RTAc PF inv [i,k,t]
RTAc PF app [i,k,t]
Export [i,k,t] export of goods (in log)
Import [i,k,t] import of goods (in log)
RCAc [i,k,t] Same formula as equation (3.8) replacing patent counts by export of goods
Net trade [i,k,t] Exporti,k,t−Importi,k,tExporti,k,t+Importi,k,t
Multi. EPO inv [i,k,t] Number of distinct 4-digit IPC classes (in log) – outside the scope of the
industry k defined by the concordance table of Schmoch et al. (2003) – listed
on patents (EPO or PF) of industry k in country i (inv or app) at priority
year t
Multi. EPO app [i,k,t]
Multi. PF inv [i,k,t]
Multi. PF app [i,k,t]
R&D Int. [i,t] log of the ratio of R&D expenditures divided by the GDP of country i at
year t
Size [i,t] log of the GDP of country i at year t
Sources: own calculation based on PATSTAT April 2009 database for patent-based variables; OECD
STAN Database for Structural Analysis for Trade series; OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators
2011 for R&D. Int.; and OECD National Accounts data files for Size.
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Table 3.A.5: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SE Min Max
Dependent Variables [i,k,t]
EPO SHII 10043 0.165 0.202 0 1
EPO SHIA 10043 0.232 0.238 0 1
EPO SHAI 9789 0.167 0.201 0 1
EPO SHAA 9789 0.057 0.118 0 1
PF SHII 9481 0.082 0.120 0 1
PF SHIA 9481 0.123 0.159 0 1
PF SHAI 9402 0.086 0.134 0 1
PF SHAA 9402 0.027 0.060 0 1
Explanatory variables
RTAc EPO inv [i,k,t] 10043 -0.014 0.321 -0.991 0.984
RTAc EPO app [i,k,t] 9789 -0.012 0.332 -0.986 0.985
RTAc PF inv [i,k,t] 9481 0.018 0.322 -0.928 0.977
RTAc PF app [i,k,t] 9402 0.020 0.329 -0.949 0.977
Export [i,k,t] 10043 21.410 1.756 7.467 25.651
Import [i,k,t] 10043 21.720 1.327 15.970 25.949
RCAc [i,k,t] 10043 -0.118 0.370 -1.000 0.981
Net trade [i,k,t] 10043 -0.118 0.390 -1.000 0.967
Multi. EPO inv [i,k,t] 10043 3.360 1.454 0 6.207
Multi. EPO app [i,k,t] 9789 3.355 1.449 0 6.209
Multi. PF inv [i,k,t] 9481 3.285 1.566 0 6.207
Multi. PF app [i,k,t] 9402 3.250 1.574 0 6.209
R&D Int. [i,t] 10043 0.458 0.533 -1.874 1.418
Size [i,t] 10043 26.593 1.405 22.406 30.042
Note: The number of observations per variable corresponds to the one of the largest sample used in
the empirical approach.
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Table 3.A.6: Correlation matrix
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]
[1] EPO SHII 1
[2] EPO SHIA 0.73 1
[3] EPO SHAI 0.62 0.42 1
[4] EPO SHAA 0.37 0.47 0.47 1
[5] PF SHII 0.59 0.48 0.51 0.22 1
[6] PF SHIA 0.45 0.60 0.40 0.23 0.78 1
[7] PF SHAI 0.41 0.29 0.67 0.21 0.74 0.56 1
[8] PF SHAA 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.57 0.59 0.55 1
[9] RTAc EPO inv -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 1
[10] RTAc EPO app -0.13 -0.25 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.16 -0.01 -0.05 0.93 1
[11] RTAc PF inv -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.17 -0.18 -0.12 -0.09 0.66 0.66 1
[12] RTAc PF app -0.10 -0.17 -0.03 -0.04 -0.17 -0.26 -0.07 -0.11 0.65 0.68 0.97 1
[13] Export -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 1
[14] Import -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 0.81 1
[15] RCAc -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.35 0.55 0.11 1
[16] Net trade -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.61 0.05 0.80 1
[17] Multi. EPO inv -0.19 -0.16 -0.13 -0.06 -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.63 0.67 0.06 0.19 1
[18] Multi. EPO app -0.21 -0.20 -0.11 -0.06 -0.19 -0.19 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.61 0.65 0.05 0.18 0.99 1
[19] Multi. PF inv -0.19 -0.16 -0.13 -0.06 -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.63 0.67 0.06 0.19 1.00 0.99 1
[20] Multi. PF app -0.21 -0.20 -0.11 -0.06 -0.19 -0.19 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.61 0.65 0.05 0.18 0.99 1.00 0.99 1
[21] R&D Int. -0.22 -0.26 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.15 -0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.11 -0.11 0.31 0.26 0.03 0.20 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46 1
[22] Size -0.29 -0.26 -0.23 -0.09 -0.25 -0.23 -0.23 -0.14 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.61 0.71 0.05 0.10 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.39 1
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Table 3.A.7: Main OLS estimation results for EPO patent applications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. SHII SHII SHIA SHIA SHAI SHAI SHAA SHAA
RTAc inv -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.139*** -0.138***
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0127)
RTAc app -0.0198* -0.0200* -0.0384*** -0.0396***
(0.0112) (0.0115) (0.00829) (0.00828)
Net trade 0.0474*** 0.0402*** 0.0258*** 0.0157**
(0.00785) (0.00942) (0.00813) (0.00615)
RCAc 0.0465*** 0.0373*** 0.0251*** 0.0178***
(0.00887) (0.0105) (0.00929) (0.00649)
Multi. inv 0.0159*** 0.0142*** 0.0168*** 0.0154***
(0.00496) (0.00497) (0.00586) (0.00588)
Multi. app -0.00233 -0.00321 0.00800** 0.00736**
(0.00526) (0.00526) (0.00320) (0.00318)
R&D Int. -0.0531*** -0.0525*** -0.0968*** -0.0961*** 0.0334* 0.0338* 0.0148 0.0148
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0131) (0.0132)
Size -0.0154 -0.0137 -0.0892** -0.0879** 0.0380 0.0388 -0.0413* -0.0407*
(0.0332) (0.0340) (0.0433) (0.0435) (0.0463) (0.0467) (0.0242) (0.0244)
Country FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
R-squared 0.398 0.398 0.399 0.399 0.403 0.403 0.163 0.163
Obs. 10,043 10,043 10,043 10,043 9,789 9,789 9,789 9,789
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country FE”, “industry FE”, and “year FE” report the significance levels
of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
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Table 3.A.8: Main Tobit estimation results for EPO patent applications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. SHII SHII SHIA SHIA SHAI SHAI SHAA SHAA
RTAc inv -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.137*** -0.134***
(0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0155)
RTAc app -0.00304 -0.00305 -0.0383*** -0.0404***
(0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0137) (0.0138)
Net trade 0.0613*** 0.0487*** 0.0295*** 0.0302***
(0.0106) (0.0117) (0.0105) (0.0111)
RCAc 0.0564*** 0.0405*** 0.0273** 0.0321***
(0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0113)
Multi. inv 0.0318*** 0.0297*** 0.0273*** 0.0258***
(0.00676) (0.00678) (0.00737) (0.00741)
Multi. app 0.0106 0.00965 0.0316*** 0.0305***
(0.00722) (0.00721) (0.00672) (0.00666)
R&D Int. -0.0346 -0.0333 -0.0872*** -0.0859*** 0.0876*** 0.0886*** 0.0583*** 0.0588***
(0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0222) (0.0222)
Size 0.00869 0.0109 -0.0867* -0.0852* 0.0708 0.0716 -0.0202 -0.0206
(0.0385) (0.0395) (0.0492) (0.0493) (0.0518) (0.0521) (0.0453) (0.0457)
Country FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Pseudo LL 97.06 88.53 -556.8 -564.8 -174.5 -176.4 54.36 55.26
Obs. 10,043 10,043 10,043 10,043 9,789 9,789 9,789 9,789
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country FE”, “industry FE”, and “year FE” report the significance levels
of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
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Table 3.A.9: Main fractional logit estimation results for Priority Filings (PF)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. SHII SHII SHIA SHIA SHAI SHAI SHAA SHAA
RTAc inv -0.786*** -0.794*** -0.640*** -0.638***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105)
RTAc app -0.00155 -0.0159 -0.616*** -0.603***
(0.111) (0.112) (0.146) (0.147)
Net trade 0.266*** 0.318*** 0.125 0.348***
(0.0847) (0.0848) (0.0783) (0.111)
RCAc 0.254*** 0.275*** 0.133* 0.250***
(0.0764) (0.0807) (0.0752) (0.0955)
Multi. inv 0.0336 0.0304 0.0425 0.0399
(0.0424) (0.0421) (0.0446) (0.0446)
Multi. app 0.0618 0.0603 0.0733 0.0736
(0.0457) (0.0458) (0.0672) (0.0670)
R&D Int. -0.428** -0.429** -0.514*** -0.518*** 0.389** 0.391** 0.435* 0.440*
(0.174) (0.174) (0.157) (0.157) (0.191) (0.191) (0.263) (0.262)
Size 0.215 0.143 0.315 0.228 -0.233 -0.270 -0.985 -1.054
(0.392) (0.395) (0.430) (0.433) (0.345) (0.347) (0.642) (0.643)
Country FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Pseudo LL -1762 -1762 -2268 -2268 -1733 -1733 -835.8 -836.2
Observations 9,481 9,481 9,481 9,481 9,402 9,402 9,402 9,402
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. The rows “country FE”, “industry FE”, and “year FE” report the significance
levels of the joint effect of these fixed effects. The additional estimation results (presented for EPO
applications in Table 3.6 and Appendix Tables 3.A.7, 3.A.8 and 3.A.10) are also confirmed for PF and
are available upon request.
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Table 3.A.10: Robustness results on SHIA for EPO patent applications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. SHIA SHIA SHIA SHIA
RTAc app -1.273*** -1.173*** -1.271*** -1.279***
(0.0671) (0.0668) (0.0674) (0.0666)
Export 0.123***
(0.0248)
Import 0.0467
(0.0508)
Net trade 0.321***
(0.0658)
RCAc 0.314***
(0.0638)
Multi. inv 0.169*** 0.186*** 0.177*** 0.168***
(0.0320) (0.0328) (0.0319) (0.0319)
R&D Int. -0.472*** -0.431*** -0.440*** -0.441***
(0.114) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113)
Size -0.360 -0.305 -0.261 -0.238
(0.233) (0.237) (0.229) (0.231)
Country FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Pseudo LL -3282 -3289 -3283 -3283
Observations 9,772 9,772 9,772 9,772
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “country FE”, “industry FE”, and “year FE” report the significance levels
of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
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Chapter 4
Who collaborates with whom: the role
of technological distance in
international innovation∗
Abstract
This chapter aims at investigating the role of technological distance in the globalized produc-
tion of innovation. It uses aggregate patent-based indicators for a unique panel dataset cov-
ering international co-inventions between 29 countries across 21 industries between 1988 and
2005. The empirical findings show a dual impact of technological distance on the intensity of
international collaborative innovation at the industry level. On the one hand, the more similar
the industry-specific knowledge of two countries, the more easily they collaborate by sharing
common industrial knowledge. On the other hand, the more different their non-industry-
specific knowledge, the more they collaborate to gain access to broad and interdisciplinary
expertise. It suggests that the relative absorptive capacity between partner’s economies and
the search for novel and complementary knowledge are key drivers of the globalization of
innovation. Moreover, the results confirm the additional effect of non-technological distance
factors (spatial proximity, ease of communication, institutional proximity, overall economic
ties) in cross-border innovative relationships.
∗I am grateful to Michele Cincera, Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Julien Gooris, Malwina Mejer, Pierre Mohnen, Carine
Peeters, Bruno van Pottelsberghe and Nicolas van Zeebroeck for helpful comments and discussions on this chapter.
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4.1 Introduction
The globalization of economic activities has been highlighted as a major phenomenon char-
acterizing the evolution of the current world economy. Beyond the globalized production of
goods and services, the innovation production is also more and more subject to the interna-
tional slicing of firms’ value chain (UNCTAD, 2005; OECD, 2008; UNESCO, 2010). Whereas
international innovation activities may be driven by the desire to adapt new product to local
market (Patel and Vega, 1999), it has been recognized that international collaboration is re-
quired to face more complex and interdisciplinary research. In that context, several authors
(Florida, 1997; Kuemmerle, 1999; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Narula and Duysters, 2004) have
confirmed that innovative firms do not only collaborate within their national borders but are
also increasingly going abroad to find the necessary competences.
In order to explain who collaborates with whom in the globalized production of innova-
tion, this chapter aims at investigating the impact of technological distance between partner’s
economies on their international collaborative innovation. In particular, I argue that the rela-
tionship between the technological distance and the globalization of innovation is dual at the
industry level.
For this purpose, I have developped patent-based indicators for a unique panel dataset cover-
ing the international patents per couple of countries across industrial sectors and over time. In
particular, I evaluate dyadic international innovations – related to international co-inventions –
with an index of revealed collaboration intensity between countries at the industry level from
1988 to 2005. Although this aggregated approach does not include individual firm character-
istics, it has the advantage of providing a global analysis of the globalization of innovation
(compared to most papers in the literature which used restricted samples based on firm level
information1). More importantly, the industry-level information allows us to distinguish the
dual forces usually associated with the impact of technological distance on collaborative inno-
vations: the similarity of partners’ knowledge to guarantee relative absorptive capacity, and
the diversity in partners’ technological experience to stimulate novel and innovative ideas. The
former suggests that successful collaboration requires common knowledge and thus a lower
technological distance. According to the latter, the larger the technological distance, the more
beneficial is the collaboration since partners gain access to novel and broader knowledge.
While these two arguments could be viewed as “opposing forces” (see for instance, Colombo,
2003 and Nooteboom et al., 2007), I propose to combine them by distinguishing between
industry-specific and non-industry-specific technological knowledge. Empirical findings con-
firm that the two forces are at work. Indeed, the estimation results show that two countries
collaborate more intensively in the globalized production of innovation if, on the one hand,
their industry-specific technological knowledge are closely related and, on the other hand,
their non-industry-specific technological knowledge are different. In other words, the inten-
sity of collaboration between two countries at the industry level is jointly determined by the
1See among others, Patel and Pavitt (1991); Cantwell (1995); Patel and Vega (1999); Cantwell and Janne (1999);
Cantwell and Piscitello (2005); Fernández-Ribas and Shapira (2009).
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overlapping of partners’ knowledge within the industry and the non-overlapping of partners’
expertise outside the scope of the industry.
Moreover, the analysis of non-technological factors confirms the moderating effect of distance
in explaining bilateral innovative relationships between countries. The more countries are
closely located and the more easily they communicate, the more they collaborate in innovative
projects. In the same vein, a stronger intensity of collaborative efforts in innovation is observed
among the 15 “old” member states of the European Union and for pairs of countries with
low institutional distance. Finally, the globalization patterns in terms of innovation are also
positively related to the overall economic relationships between country-industry pairs.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the three main
hypotheses of this research. The patent-based indicators and descriptive evidence about the
international collaboration in innovation are introduced in section 4.3. The dataset and the
empirical approach are described in section 4.4. The results are presented and discussed in
section 4.5 which also provides robustness checks. Last section concludes and puts forward
policy recommendations and ideas for further research.
4.2 Literature review and development of hypotheses
Previous literature has identified the technological proximity between two countries as an
important driver of collaborative innovation (see among many others, Mowery et al., 1998;
Cantwell and Colombo, 2000; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; Rosenkopf
and Almeida, 2003; Lin et al., 2012). Usually, it is recognized that the collaboration between
two partners is facilitated when they are close in terms of technological knowledge. This
effect is often explained by the general concept of absorptive capacity which is defined as the
“the ability of a firm – conferred by prior related knowledge – to recognize the value of new
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; p
128). Indeed, several studies (see for instance, Veugelers, 1997; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006;
Czarnitzki et al., 2011) have shown that a partner benefits from external knowledge related to
collaboration if it has itself enough internal knowledge.
Others – as recognized by Knoben and Oerlemans (2006) – argue that the key driver in tech-
nological collaboration is not only the internal capacity of each partner, but also the concept of
relative absorptive capacity. While the absolute absorptive capacity considers that the ability
to evaluate and use external knowledge depends mainly on the individual partner capacity,
the relative absorptive capacity states that the key is the relationship between the charac-
teristics of both partners. In this respect, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) introduced the concept
of relative absorptive capacity by arguing that “the ability of a firm to learn from another
firm is jointly determined by the relative characteristics of the student firm and the teacher
firm” (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; p 462). In other words, both partners should have similar
knowledge bases to facilitate technological collaboration.
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In my aggregated approach, it means that, if countries share common technological knowl-
edge at the industry level, they can understand more easily each other, assimilate partner’s
knowledge and guarantee mutual learning. They can thus benefit from industry-specific
spillovers and specialization externalities (as pointed out by Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005 in
their regional-level analysis of foreign-owned R&D of multinational corporations in Europe).
To test the impact of technological proximity at the industry level, I therefore formulate the
following hypothesis:
H1: The more similar the industry-specific technological knowledge of two countries, the
more they collaborate at the industry level.
However, too much similarity may also reduce places for novelty between both partners
knowledge experiences. In this respect, previous works have shown an inverted U-shaped
relationship between technological overlap and collaboration (see for instance, Mowery et al.,
1998; Wuyts et al., 2005; Nooteboom et al., 2007 or the review in Table 1 of Schulze and Bro-
jerdi, 2012). The arguments concerning the impact of technological distance on collaboration
are thus twofold. On the one hand, the smaller the distance, the better are mutual under-
standing and the ability to absorb partner’s knowledge. On the other hand, the larger the
distance, the more beneficial is the collaboration since partners would access novel and more
diverse knowledge. Comparing these two arguments, Wuyts et al. (2005) presented optimal
technological distance as being a trade-off between the advantage of increased technological
distance for a higher novelty value of a partner’s knowledge, and the disadvantage of less
mutual understanding.
In addition to the classical U-shaped relationship with technological proximity, it has also been
pointed out that international collaborative innovation is driven by the search for complemen-
tary knowledge. In this respect, several surveys of firms confirmed these complementarity
motives2. Indeed, Brockhoff et al. (1991) showed that the development of synergies from the
exchange of complementary technical knowledge was the most important reason for coopera-
tive R&D arrangements between large industrial firms in Germany. Analyzing information on
technology arrangements from the MERIT-CATI database, Hagedoorn (1993) found that tech-
nology complementarity played a significant role in explaining the motives that led firms to
cooperate in their innovative efforts. The study of Japanese R&D consortia sponsored by gov-
ernmental organizations Sakakibara (1997a,b) confirmed also that sharing of complementary
skills among participants was perceived as the single most important objective of cooperative
R&D projects. Similar results were found by Narula (2004) for both large and SME’s European
technology firms. These survey-based findings illustrated that the access to complementary
technologies remains a primary motivation to undertake R&D collaboration.
In my aggregated approach, one can thus expect that countries collaborate more intensively
with partners which present novel – compared to their own knowledge – technological expe-
rience. Indeed, international collaborative innovations are not only driven by the importance
of intra-industry spillovers (tested by H1) but also by the presence of inter-industry spillovers
and diversity externalities (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005). In order to test this search for nov-
2See also Ennen and Richter (2010) for a review of empirical evidence on complementarities in organizations.
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elty and diversity, I formulate the following hypothesis by considering knowledge experience
of both countries outside the scope of the industry:
H2: The more different the non-industry-specific technological knowledge of two countries,
the more they collaborate at the industry level.
These first two hypotheses illustrate that the industry-level approach allows us to reconcile
the technological proximity argument – within the industry (H1) – with the technological di-
versity argument – outside the scope of the industry (H2). Few recent papers have addressed
these two types of knowledge relatedness together. Makri et al. (2010) examined high technol-
ogy mergers and acquisitions and investigated the role of science and technology similarity
and complementarity as important drivers of invention. In particular, they showed, using
redefined measures of knowledge relatedness, that complementary knowledge was vital to
stimulate higher quality and more novel inventions. Moreover, they suggested that research
should still be done to consider jointly similarities and complementarities. In this respect,
Quintana-garcía and Benavides-velasco (2011) analyzed inter-firm R&D alliances in the phar-
maceutical industry and distinguished the same two components of knowledge relatedness.
In addition to a well-known curvilinear impact of technological similarity, they confirmed
that the technological complementarity among partners contributes to the development of
innovation.
However, the empirical approach of previous studies was often restricted to a limited sample
of firm-level information while a more representative approach would contribute to integrate
information of all patent population for a large sample of countries, industries and over a long
period of time3. This is the uniqueness of the methodology used in the present chapter. To
the best of my knowledge, this study is the first one investigating – with a global approach –
the dual relationship between technological distance and the globalization of innovation.
The impact of technological distance should, however, not be analyzed in isolation from non-
technological proximity measures. For this reason, the following hypothesis is formulated in
order to test the impact of other distance factors on the intensity of collaboration between
countries:
H3: The lower the non-technological distance between two countries, the more they collab-
orate.
Several types of non-technological distance may impact the collaborative innovation. First,
the geographical proximity remains a key moderating factor of international dyadic economic
activities (see among many others, Ghemawat, 2001; Keller, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003; Ambos and Ambos, 2009; which confirmed the significant role of distance and its var-
ious dimensions). Focusing on innovation, several authors (see for instance, Nagpaul, 2003;
Dachs and Pyka, 2010; Picci, 2010; Thomson, 2013)4 have confirmed that limited geographi-
cal distance facilitates direct interactions and the exchange of knowledge between partners.
Second, the ease of communication is crucial to guarantee efficient interactions required in
3See section 4.3 for more details on the sample used in this analysis.
4See also Boschma (2005) for an assessment of the impact of geographical proximity on interactive learning and
innovation.
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the innovation process. In addition to the use of a common language (Guellec and van Pot-
telsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; De Prato and Nepelski, 2012; Montobbio and Sterzi, 2012), the
development of information and communication technologies has stimulated cross-border col-
laborative innovation. Indeed, Forman and van Zeebroeck (2012) have shown that the use of
Internet technology has facilitated collaborative patents from geographically dispersed teams
by reducing the coordination costs of research teams. Third, proximity at institutional level
could also enhance the interaction. Finally, the presence of other commercial relationships
between countries could stimulate collaborations in innovation. In particular, the bilateral
trade or investment flows could reflect not only market-driven motives but also proximity in
terms of commercial ties between countries (as pointed out by Picci and Savorelli, 2012). In
summary, hypothesis 3 states that lower distance would ultimately facilitate coordination and
collaboration between innovative partners.
4.3 Data and descriptive evidence on international collaborative in-
novation
4.3.1 Patent-based indicators of globalization of innovation
Although patent data present drawbacks, it remains a major source of information to inves-
tigate innovation related research questions5. In particular, many authors have examined the
globalization of innovation using patent data (Patel and Pavitt, 1991; Cantwell, 1995; Almeida,
1996; Breschi, 1999; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001, 2004b; Song and Shin,
2008; Picci and Savorelli, 2012; Thomson, 2013). In this context, Chapter 36 has presented
patent-based indicators of globalization of innovation for a unique panel dataset covering 21
industries7 in 29 countries. This previous work analyzed the intensity of globalization of
innovation for each country-industry pair with the rest of the world. Using similar global
approach – across countries, industries and over time – the current chapter extends this study
by focusing on the bilateral relationships between countries at the industry level. In other
words, I investigate the question of who collaborates with whom in the globalized production
of innovation.
Using information contained in EPO worldwide patent statistical database (PATSTAT, April
2009) database, one can identify all international patents – defined in this chapter as patents
with inventors from at least two different countries (II-type collaborations)8. Beyond comput-
5For a discussion on the use of patent indicators, see Griliches (1990) and the methodological part of Chapter
1.
6See also this chapter for a discussion on the limitations of aggregate patent-based internationalization indica-
tors.
7The counts per industry were computed by matching technological information contained in patents, Inter-
national Patent Classification (IPC) codes, and industry, International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC Rev
3), using the concordance table proposed by Schmoch et al. (2003). Note also that the counts per industry are not
fractional. A patent related to multiple industries is thus taken into account equally for each industry.
8This defintion is more restricted than the definition introduced in Chapter 3 which considers different types
of globalization of innovation by comparing inventor and applicant country information. Nevertheless, similar
results (available upon request) were found in terms of dyadic cross-border ownership of innovation (patent with
inventors and applicants from different countries, IA-type collaborations).
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ing the absolute and relative number of international patents per individual country-industry
pair, I computed the count of those patents per couple of countries for each industry. This
count reflects the number of dyadic co-inventions and is at the core of this research. The anal-
ysis relies on a patent count indicator already used in Chapters 2 and 3 : the number of first
and subsequent patent applications which have been filed directly at European Patent Office
(EPO) and those which have reached EPO during the regional phase of a PCT application9.
4.3.2 Patterns in international collaborative innovation
The aggregated approach used in this chapter provides a global overview on the internation-
alization of innovation. In particular, the patterns of bilateral collaboration allow us to deepen
the descriptive evidence of Chapter 3 which has shown a strong growth in the intensity of
internationalization of innovation. Indeed, like the international trade analysis performed by
Helpman et al. (2008), dyadic information helps us to underline if the increasing trends in
globalization of innovation are due either to an increasing number of countries which have in-
novative activities across borders, or simply to a rise in the intensity of collaboration between
few partners.
For that purpose, aggregate patent-based indicators provide interesting insights illustrated in
Figure 4.1 for EPO applications. In my panel dataset, an individual is defined as a couple
of countries in a particular industry. The bars represent the percentage of individuals with a
strictly positive number of international collaborative innovations per year (see the left axis);
while the line illustrates the overall intensity of collaboration (see the right axis). Note that,
among my panel dataset composed of 21 industries and 29 countries10, the maximum number
of individuals with collaboration is equal to 17052 per year – considering that all countries (29)
collaborate with all other countries (28) in all industries (21). The percentages of the following
Figure 4.1 are simply computed as the ratio between the observed number of individuals with
collaboration and the maximum number per year. Concerning the intensity of co-invention,
the matrix of observed collaborations is perfectly symmetric, which requires to use half of the
matrix of all individuals presenting II-type collaborations. The measures of overall intensity
of collaboration are given by:
intensity I It =
Int. patent I It
Individual I It/2
(4.1)
where, for the priority year t, Int. patent I It is the total number of international patent appli-
cations being of II-type and Individual I It is the number of individuals with a strictly positive
number of II-type collaborations. In other words, these measures correspond to the average
number of international patents per collaborative individual (couple of countries in a particu-
lar industry).
9The same analysis was also performed for the worldwide count of priority filings (PF, introduced by de Rassen-
fosse et al., 2013) and provided very similar results (see Appendix Table 4.A.4)
10The sample, composed mainly of OECD countries, is the same as the one of Chapter 3 except for the time
period which is 1988-2005 due to limited availability of some explanatory variables.
90 CHAPTER 4. WHO COLLABORATES WITH WHOM
Figure 4.1: Bilateral collaboration patterns for EPO applications
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This figure shows that that the worldwide surge in the globalization of innovation is twofold.
First, the number of internationally collaborative individuals has constantly increased (being
multiplied by 2 between 1988 and 2005). Second, the average intensity of collaboration has
also strongly increased (from about 4 international priority filings per average collaborative
individual in 1988 to 8 in 2005). The globalized world of innovation is thus composed of a
growing number of partner countries which collaborate together intensively11. Although the
growth of globalization is significant, the amplitude of these phenomena remains quite lim-
ited. Indeed, less than one fifth of the individuals in my sample collaborated internationally
for their innovative activities in 2005.
4.4 Empirical approach
4.4.1 Dependent variable: an index of revealed collaboration intensity
To better understand collaboration patterns in innovation between countries across industrial
sectors, I consider not only the count of international patents per couple of countries, but
also relative measures of bilateral collaborative innovations. The core variable of the em-
pirical methodology is thus an index equivalent to the one introduced by Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001)12 that analyzed the geographical distribution of the inter-
11Both worldwide increasing trends – in the number of collaborations and in their intensity – are also observed
for most of the countries and most of the industries. These additional descriptive results are available upon
request.
12Similar index was also used in terms of co-authorship of scientific articles (see for instance, the index of
international collaboration on Science & Engineering articles presented by National Science Board, 2012; p 5-40).
4.4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 91
nationalization of technology within a cross section of countries. More precisely, an index of
revealed collaboration intensity (rci) is defined – for co-invention II – per couple of countries
(i, j) in an industry (k)13 as follows:
rciI Ii, j, k =
Int. patent I Ii, j, k/Int. patent I Ii, ., k
Int. patent I I., j, k/Int. patent I I., ., k
(4.2)
where Int. patent I Ii, j, k is the number of international patents in industry k with at least one
inventor in country i and at least one in country j, Int. patent I Ii, ., k (Int. patent I I., j, k) is the
total number of international patents in industry k with at least one inventor in country i
(j) and at least one foreign inventor, and Int. patent I I., ., k is the total number of international
patents of II-type in industry k. In other words, it is – for each industry k – the ratio between
the share of country j in the international co-inventions of country i and the share of country
j in all international co-inventions. This rci index takes positive values and is greater than 1
when the intensity of collaboration between two countries is greater than the average of the
industry and is lower than 1 for the opposite case. For instance, if France represents relatively
a higher share in Belgian international co-inventions in chemistry than the share represented
by France in worldwide co-invention in chemistry, the rci index between Belgium and France
in chemistry will be higher than 1. This rci index is computed for all individuals in my
panel dataset. Note that this matrix is perfectly symmetric in terms of co-inventions since
the co-inventions between Belgium and France are also the co-inventions between France and
Belgium.
This kind of index was initially introduced in trade literature to capture the so-called revealed
comparative advantage. Based on patent counts, similar indicators have also been used in the
literature to measure the revealed technological advantage (RTA) of countries across industri-
als sectors (Soete, 1987; Patel and Vega, 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002; Frietsch and Schmoch,
2010; Chapter 3). While the RTA indicators consider all patent applications, the international
collaboration index (rci) focuses on those which are international – with inventors from dif-
ferent countries.
Compared to a traditional count of dyadic patents (used largely in gravity-type models such
as Picci, 2010; Picci and Savorelli, 2012; Thomson, 2013), this index has the advantage to ac-
count for unequal sizes in innovative activities and differences in internationalization patterns
among the country-industry pairs. It helps to guarantee that the analysis focused mainly
on the understanding of the intensity of bilateral innovative relationships within the panel
dataset. This computation is also consistent with the statement made by Luukkonen et al.
(1993) which said that “it is important to relate the relative strength of collaborative relations
between a pair of countries to their relation with other countries” (Luukkonen et al., 1993; p
23) since the bilateral collaboration between two countries does not occur in isolation of their
other collaborations with the rest of the world.
For a discussion on the measurement of international scientific collaboration, see Luukkonen et al. (1993). See also
Zitt et al. (2000); Glänzel and Schubert (2004); Yamashita and Okubo (2006); Chen et al. (2012) for other measures
of collaboration.
13For simplicity, the year t has been omitted from the formula but this rci index has been computed for each
priority year between 1988 and 2005.
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As stated in the previous section, the patent-based indicators used in this chapter were com-
puted using the entire population of patent filings14. It is fair to assume that all international
collaborative patents are thus observed. However, Figure 4.1 has shown that amplitude of
globalization remains limited. It means that many individuals (couple of countries for a par-
ticular industry) do not present a collaborative patent. This leads to the presence of a large
number of potential zeros in my panel dataset. In this respect, I have considered that the ab-
sence of observed collaboration should be seen as informative and should thus be considered
as true zeros. In the same vein, Thomson (2013) considered in his analysis that unobserved
cross-border patents represent true zeros rather than censored values15. Furthermore, like
Lybbert and Zolas (2012), I did not simply put 0 to all individuals for which no bilateral
international patent was observed but I have considered as informative, in terms of global-
ization, only pairs in which each country has at least one patent. More precisely, it means
that the exact definition of rci index is given by conditions (4.3) within my country-industry
framework.
For each industry k :
rciI Ii,j,k

> 0 i f Int. patent I Ii, j, k > 0
= 0 i f Int. patent I Ii, j, k = 0 and Patenti, k 6= 0 and Patentj, k 6= 0
not defined i f Patenti, k = 0 and Patentj, k = 0
(4.3)
where Int. patent I Ii, j, k is the number of international patents in industry k with at least one
inventor in country i and at least one in country j, Patenti, k (Patentj, k) is the number of patents
in industry k with at least one inventor in country i (j). Since the focus of this chapter is on the
intensity of bilateral international collaborations between countries across industries, I have
excluded country-industry pairs that do not have any patent.16
Finally, the rci index is normalized17 in order to obtain a symmetric measure. Therefore, the
dependent variable of the empirical model for the couple of countries (i, j), industry (k) and
priority year (t) – is defined as following:
RCIcI Ii, j, k, t =
rciI Ii, j, k,t
rciI Ii, j, k,t + 1
(4.4)
RCIc variable18 varies between 0 and 1; and are higher than 0.5 for couples of countries which
collaborate strongly and lower than 0.5 for couples of countries which collaborate weakly.
14It correpsonds to the entire population of worldwide priority filings and patent applications at EPO, based on
the assumption that the PATSTAT database contains the entire population of patent filings.
15As it seems to be considered by authors analyzing bilateral flows of patents (see for instance Dachs and Pyka,
2010)
16An alternative specification consists in excluding country-industry pairs that do not have any international
collaborative patent with any foreign resident. Although it restricts the size of the samples for estimation, it
provides similar results which are available upon request.
17This kind of normalization has been proposed by Laursen (1998) in terms of revealed comparative advantage
and then applied for various revealed-type indexes (see among others, Dalum et al., 1999; Schubert and Grupp,
2011; D’Agostino et al., 2013).
18See Appendix Table 4.A.2 for descriptive statistics.
4.4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 93
4.4.2 Model and explanatory variables19
To test the three hypotheses exposed in section 4.2, I regress the RCIc variable on different
sets of explanatory variables. Since this index of revealed collaboration intensity is restricted
on the unit interval, I use a fractional logit estimation proposed by Papke and Wooldridge
(1996).20 The form of the estimated model can thus be expressed as follows:
E(y|x) = G(xβ) (4.5)
where G(z) is the logistic function, G(z) = exp(z)1+exp(z) , satisfying 0 < G(z) < 1 for all z ∈ R in
order to guarantee that the predicted y varies between 0 and 1 for all values of the regressors.
Concerning explanatory variables, the empirical approach is built on two main explanatory
variables to investigate the impact of technological distance between countries – across indus-
trial sectors – on their international collaborative innovations.
First, the similarity of industry-specific technological knowledge (hypothesis 1) is evaluated
using the technological proximity indicator introduced by Jaffe (1986) to measure the degree
of technological overlap. It consists in computing the angular separation or uncentered corre-
lation between the two countries’ vectors of patents across technological fields. This indicator
has been used largely in the literature to proxy the knowledge relatedness between firms or
countries (Jaffe, 1986, 1989; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; Cincera, 2005;
Lee, 2006). In my aggregated framework, this measure focuses on the industry-specific tech-
nological knowledge and is thus computed for each pair of countries across the technological
fields within each industrial sector. More precisely, within my panel dataset, the technology
proximity (TP) between country i and country j for industry K (composed of N 4-digit IPC
classes in the concordance table of Schmoch et al., 2003) is given by the equation (4.6).
TPijt,K =
∑Nk=1 Pit,kPjt,k√
∑Nk=1 P
2
it,k ∑
N
k=1 P
2
jt,k
(4.6)
where Pit,k is the fractional count of patents of country i21 in 4-digit IPC class k at priority year
t. TP varies between 0 and 1 for all individuals. It is equal to one when both countries present
identical shares of patent applications across technological classes and it tends to zero when
both vectors of patents are totally different. Note also that this measure is symmetric within a
pair of countries, like most distance variables. In other words, TPijt,K is equal to TPjit,K.
Second, the diversity in the non-industry-specific technological knowledge (hypothesis 2) is
evaluated by considering 4-digit IPC classes outside the scope of the industry. This dyadic
19See Appendix Table 4.A.1 for more details on the different variables, see Appendix Table 4.A.2 for the descrip-
tive statistics and see Appendix Table 4.A.3 for correlation matrix.
20For a discussion on the econometric methodology used for fractional or proportional series, see among others
Kieschnick and McCullough (2003) or Ramalho et al. (2011). For examples which used this estimation technique
in applied economics papers, see for instance Wagner (2001, 2003), Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) and Chapter 3.
21Since this analysis focuses on international co-inventions, all patent-based measured are based on the country
of inventors.
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indicator is based on the multidisciplinarity indicator (introduced in Chapter 3) which corre-
sponds to the number of distinct 4-digit IPC classes – outside the scope of the industry defined
by the concordance table of Schmoch et al. (2003) – associated with patents of each country-
industry pair. Since the current chapter focuses on bilateral relationships, the empirical test
of hypothesis 2 consists in comparing the multidisciplinarity of both countries at the industry
level. It thus corresponds to the number of distinct 4-digit IPC classes – outside of the scope
of the industry – which are not in common between both partners’ patent applications. For
instance, consider that country i has only one patent listing {IPCA, IPCB, IPCC} and country
j has only one patent listing {IPCA, IPCB, IPCD}. For industry k defined by IPCA in the
concordance table, the diversity indicator is based on 2 distinct IPC classes – {IPCC, IPCD} –
which are not in common between both countries’ patent applications related to this industry.
The technological collaborations are most likely determined not only by the technological
distance but also by non-technological distance between partners. For that purpose, sev-
eral other distance factors are considered to test hypothesis 3. In particular, three variables
from the CEPII database22 are included. The impact of spatial proximity is estimated by the
geographical distance (DIST) that was calculated following the great circle formula using lat-
itudes and longitudes of the most important cities; and a dummy variable that equals to 1
for couple of countries which share a common border (BORDER, 0 otherwise). The ease of
communication between innovative partners is evaluated by another dummy variable that
equals to 1 for couple of countries which share a common official language (COMLANG, 0
otherwise). The use of Internet technology is also considered as faciliting communication be-
tween dispered partners. In that purpose, INTERNET variable wad defined as the minimum
– between both countries – of the percentage of individuals using the Internet. Concerning
the institutional distance, I compute the absolute value of the difference – between both coun-
tries – for the six worldwide governance indicators developed by the World Bank23: voice
and accountability (WGI_VA), political stability and absence of violence (WGI_PV), govern-
ment effectiveness (WGI_GE), regulatory quality (WGI_RQ), rule of law (WGI_RL), control of
corruption (WGI_CC). The membership of both countries to the European Union is also con-
sidered as a proxy of proximity at the institutional level. The empirical model thus includes
a dummy variable (EU) that equals to 1 when both countries are member states of the EU (0
otherwise). This variable varies over time according to the different adhesion phases. Further-
more, the commercial proximity between partners is measured by the bilateral export flows of
goods (EXPORT_BIL). While previous distance measures are country based, this commercial
ties indicator is based on country-industry information.
In addition to dyadic variables related to the three hypotheses of the chapter, two con-
trol variables are included in the empirical model to account for individual characteristics
of each partner country (CTRYi and CTRYj). First, I control for the multidisciplinarity of
innovation performed by each country-industry pair (using the indicator described before,
MULTI_PAT_INV). A positive effect is expected since partners with multidisciplinary knowl-
22See Mayer and Zignago (2011) for more information concerning this database that is extensively used in
gravity-type models.
23See Kaufmann et al. (1999) and Kaufmann et al. (2010) for more details.
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edge (a potential for higher inter-industry spillovers) are more attractive for international
collaborations (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005). In the same vein, international collaboration
may be seen as a mean to combine complex and interdisciplinary research. Second, I control
for the intensity of R&D expenditures of both countries (R&D_INT). It allows us to evaluate if
absolute absorptive capacity of each country plays a significant role in explaining intensity of
bilateral innovative collaborations since Cohen and Levinthal (1989) suggested that R&D ex-
penditures do not only help to generate new innovative products but also to enhance ability to
learn from external sources of knowledge. Nevertheless, the impact of technological capabili-
ties can be seen as paradoxical because high R&D expenditures may constitute a disincentive
to collaborate with others in innovative activities (Song and Shin, 2008). Finally, I control for
unobserved heterogeneity in my panel dataset by including dummies for each country, each
industry and each priority year.
4.5 Results and discussion
The main estimation results are reported in Table 4.1 for patent applications at the EPO24. The
various specifications – testing separately or jointly H1 and H2 – strongly confirm the three
hypotheses.
First, the coefficients of technological proximity variables (TP_PAT_II) are strongly significant
and positive; showing that countries with related industry-specific technological knowledge
tend to collaborate more intensively in innovation production. Beyond the importance of in-
dividual technological capabilities, this finding confirms the key role played by the relative
absorptive capacity (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Knoben and Oerlemans, 2006). Indeed, the
relative technological characteristics of both partner economies – measured by the technologi-
cal proximity at the industry level – remain major determinants of international collaborative
innovations.
Second, the number of non-overlapping – among partners’ innovative activities – technological
classes (NOCOM_PAT_II) has a significant and positive impact on the intensity of collabora-
tion. It highlights that the more different the non-industry-specific technological knowledge
of both countries, the more they collaborate in innovative activities. Hypothesis 2 is also con-
firmed for various specifications, with or without the measure of technological proximity of
industry-specific knowledge. Results for H1 and H2 confirm the dual effect of technologi-
cal distance. On the one hand, the relative absorptive capacity between partners matters since
similarity of industry-specific technological knowledge guarantees mutual understanding and
facilitates innovative collaborations. On the other hand, the diversity in non-industry-specific
knowledge stimulates cross-border innovation and illustrates that international collaboration
is a mean to search for novel and complementary competences.
24The results in terms of priority filings (PF) are very similar and are presented in Appendix Table 4.A.4. The
samples for PF estimations are smaller since de Rassenfosse et al. (2013) have noticed a coverage problem for few
countries which were not taken into account in the estimation for PF.
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Table 4.1: Main estimation results for EPO applications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I
TP_PAT_II [H1] 0.822*** 0.927*** 0.878***
(0.0698) (0.0704) (0.0817)
NOCOM_PAT_II [H2] 0.257*** 0.309*** 0.371***
(0.0347) (0.0342) (0.0390)
DIST [H3] -0.201*** -0.208*** -0.205*** -0.224***
(0.0326) (0.0332) (0.0323) (0.0362)
BORDER [H3] 0.603*** 0.623*** 0.611*** 0.605***
(0.0629) (0.0638) (0.0625) (0.0695)
COMLANG [H3] 0.612*** 0.616*** 0.600*** 0.540***
(0.0534) (0.0523) (0.0521) (0.0559)
INTERNET [H3] 0.00188 0.00141 0.00261* 0.000997
(0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00176)
EU [H3] 0.0960** 0.0793* 0.0753* 0.0461
(0.0441) (0.0444) (0.0439) (0.0605)
WGI_RL [H3] -0.245***
(0.0687)
EXPORT_BIL [H3] 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.132***
(0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0130)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi 0.305*** 0.284*** 0.253*** 0.253***
(0.0308) (0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0349)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj 0.246*** 0.255*** 0.214*** 0.204***
(0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0299) (0.0376)
R&D_INT_CTRYi 0.118 0.194* 0.117 -0.0705
(0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.194)
R&D_INT_CTRYj 0.00203 0.0854 0.0311 0.352**
(0.0963) (0.0962) (0.0961) (0.176)
Countryi FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Countryj FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes
Pseudo LL -19435 -19446 -19369 -13039
Observations 87,624 87,409 87,409 57,148
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “countryi FE”, “countryj FE”, “industry FE” and “year FE” report the
significance levels of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
Third, the non-technological distance variables have the expected coefficients. It thus vali-
dates hypothesis 3 which states that the intensity of collaboration between countries is higher
when the non-technological distance separating both partner economies is lower. Indeed,
the negative sign of the geographical distance (DIST) and the positive coefficient of common
border (BORDER) confirm that spatial proximity between countries facilitates and stimulates
international collaborative innovation. In the same vein, the sharing of a common language
guarantees the ease of communication in the innovation process (as shown by the positive and
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significant coefficient of COMLANG). Moreover, the joint use of Internet technology among
partners seems to facilitate cross-country innovation, as indicated by a positive and signifcant
coefficient of INTERNET in the main specification of Table 4.1 (see column (3)) and in several
robustness checks (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Concerning the impact of joint membership to
the European Union, the EU variable has a positive and significant impact on cross-border
collaborations in columns (1)-(3). However, the EU variable lost his significance when the
indicator of institutional distance is included (see column (4) of Table 4.1 with the ’rule of law’
dimension, which is the most widely used governance indicator25). The negative and signif-
icant coefficient of the WGI_RL variable highlights that the more countries are similar at the
institutional level, the more likely they collaborate in innovative activities. This shows, on the
one hand, that the institutional distance matters in explaning international co-inventions, and
on the other hand that EU membership does not have a additional impact on collaborative
innovation than the one related to the institutional proximity among EU member states. The
last distance factor related to hypothesis 3 is the economic proximity between countries (mea-
sured in Table 4.1 by EXPORT_BIL variable). The positive and significant coefficient shows
that collaboration patterns in terms of innovation are positively related to the trade flows
between countries at the industry level.
The estimation results of the variables which control for individual characteristics of each col-
laborative partner provide also interesting insights. Concerning the multidisciplinarity vari-
ables (MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi and MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj), the coefficients are strongly
significant and positive for each country-industry pair. It reflects that country-industry pairs
which present more diverse technological knowledge are more attractive and more active in
international collaborative innovative efforts. This impact was suggested by Chapter 3 in the
analysis of globalization per country-industry pair with respect to the rest of the world and is
thus confirmed in the current study of bilateral international collaborative innovations. More
importantly, this positive effect is significant in parallel to the positive impact observed for
NOCOM_PAT variables. In other words, the intensity of collaboration is positively related not
only to the multidisciplinary of each partner but also to the fact that these multidisciplinary
technological competences are non-overlapping among partners. Finally, the impact of R&D
intensity (R&D_INT_CTRYi and R&D_INT_CTRYj) is largely not significant for both coun-
tries. It does not seem to confirm that absolute absorptive capacity is required to intensively
collaborate across border in invention process.
25See Appendix Table 4.A.5 for the results concerning the five other dimensions of the worldwide governance
indicators. Most of them provide similar results. Note that the sample size of the specifications which include
WGI variables is smaller due to their limited availibity. I have thus preferred to keep only the EU variable as a
measure of institutional proximity for the rest of the estimations.
98 CHAPTER 4. WHO COLLABORATES WITH WHOM
Robustness checks26
Several alternative specifications are estimated to demonstrate the robustness of the results.
In particular, the validity of hypothesis 1 and 2 is analyzed in Table 4.2 which includes an
additional variable: the squared value of TP_PAT variable (TP_PAT_II_SQ). It aims at testing
the classical inverted U-shaped relationship – largely observed in the literature (see references
cited in section 4.2) – between technological distance and collaborative innovations.
While the positive coefficient of the linear term of technological proximity is confirmed, col-
umn (1) shows a negative and significant coefficient for the quadratic term of technological
proximity. It thus reflects a concave relationship27 between the intensity of collaboration and
the similarity of the technological knowledge of countries at the industry level. These results
are also confirmed in column (2) which includes the indicator of diversity of non-industry-
specific technological knowledge (related to hypothesis 2). It is important to notice that NO-
COM_PAT variables keep their significant and positive coefficients at the top of the curvilinear
relationship with technological proximity. These findings reinforce the argument saying that
beyond the relative absorptive capacity, significant differences in technological competences
– both in terms of industry-specific and non-industry-specific knowledge – between partners
are required to stimulate collaboration in innovation production. In addition to the confirma-
tion of H1 and H2, the interpretations of other variables are maintained across the first two
specifications of Table 4.2.
The robustness of hypothesis 3 is evaluated in two parts. Columns (3)-(6) of Table 4.2 separates
the impact of the joint membership to the EU according to three main adhesion phases. Table
4.3 includes three additional variables to evaluate the relationship between overall economic
ties and international collaborative innovations.
Concerning the EU impact, one can distinguish between three adhesion phases over the time
period analyzed: EU_12 for countries which were member states of the EU in 1986 and af-
terwards, EU_15 for countries which were member states in 1995 and afterwards, and EU_25
for countries which were member states in 2004 and afterwards. Each adhesion phase corre-
sponds to a dummy variable that equals to 1 if both countries were member states of the EU
at the corresponding time period (0 otherwise). This distinction allows us to illustrate that
the global impact of the EU observed in Table 4.1 is mainly due to the significant stronger
intensity of innovative collaboration among the EU_15 member states (see column (5) in Table
4.2). This finding confirms the results of the multivariate analysis of the internationalization
of innovation in Europe, performed by Dachs and Pyka (2010). In particular, they interpreted
the positive coefficient of EU15 dummy variable by claiming that “European Single Market
not only fostered economic, but also scientific integration in Europe” (Dachs and Pyka, 2010,
p 21). Furthermore, in comparison with Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001),
the impact of EU is significant in terms of international co-inventions.
26The robustness checks results are represented only for EPO applications but they are similar in terms of
priority filings and are available upon request.
27Note that we cannot described this relationship as being an inverted U-shaped since its peaks is reached for
values of TP higher than 1 (which is outside of the values range for the technological proximity measure).
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Table 4.2: Robustness results for H1, H2 and H3 (EU membership)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H1 and H2 H3 – EU membership
Dependent variable RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I
TP_PAT_II 2.597*** 2.330*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.928***
(0.245) (0.251) (0.0704) (0.0704) (0.0704) (0.0704)
TP_PAT_II_SQ -1.543*** -1.224***
(0.202) (0.207)
NOCOM_PAT_II 0.282*** 0.309*** 0.310*** 0.310*** 0.311***
(0.0346) (0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0341) (0.0342)
DIST -0.203*** -0.207*** -0.205*** -0.210*** -0.207*** -0.217***
(0.0327) (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0336) (0.0315) (0.0308)
BORDER 0.606*** 0.613*** 0.611*** 0.603*** 0.613*** 0.606***
(0.0629) (0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0618) (0.0626) (0.0621)
COMLANG 0.616*** 0.604*** 0.600*** 0.599*** 0.596*** 0.591***
(0.0527) (0.0517) (0.0521) (0.0528) (0.0522) (0.0522)
INTERNET 0.00224 0.00282** 0.00261* 0.00259* 0.00300** 0.00257*
(0.00140) (0.00139) (0.00140) (0.00141) (0.00142) (0.00140)
EU 0.0954** 0.0766* 0.0753*
(0.0440) (0.0439) (0.0439)
EU_12 0.0427
(0.0675)
EU_15 0.0845**
(0.0410)
EU_25 -0.0525
(0.0451)
EXPORT_BIL 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.146***
(0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi 0.300*** 0.255*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.251*** 0.252***
(0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0311)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj 0.246*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.216*** 0.212***
(0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299)
R&D_INT_CTRYi 0.117 0.116 0.117 0.142 0.131 0.140
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
R&D_INT_CTRYj 0.0273 0.0490 0.0311 0.0570 0.0485 0.0551
(0.0963) (0.0961) (0.0961) (0.0956) (0.0958) (0.0956)
Countryi FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Countryj FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Pseudo LL -19411 -19355 -19369 -19370 -19369 -19370
Observations 87,624 87,409 87,409 87,409 87,409 87,409
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “countryi FE”, “countryj FE”, “industry FE” and “year FE” report the
significance levels of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
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Table 4.3 shows additional results about the relationship between bilateral economic flows and
the collaboration in innovation. In addition to bilateral export flows presented in Table 4.1,
three variables are taken into account: the bilateral import flows (IMPORT_BIL), the inflows
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI_IN) and the outflows of FDI (FDI_OUT). While the bilateral
trade information is expressed by couples of countries at the industry level, the bilateral FDI is
available only by partner country28. All these variables have a significant and positive impact
on the intensity of collaboration. The stronger the commercial relationships between countries,
the stronger are their collaborative innovation efforts. This finding concerns both the bilateral
trade of goods and the cross-border investment decisions. The dual positive impact of in- and
out-flows suggests that the commercial proximity between countries matters more than the
direction of those economic flows. In other words, the international collaborative innovation
does not seem to be strongly market-driven (or driven by the desire to adapt the innovative
product to the local economy) but more related to the commercial ties between countries.
28The sample of observations is smaller for FDI series than for trade ones due to data limited availability.
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Table 4.3: Robustness results for H3 – economic ties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I
TP_PAT_II 0.927*** 0.916*** 0.807*** 0.900***
(0.0704) (0.0703) (0.0811) (0.0825)
NOCOM_PAT_II 0.309*** 0.308*** 0.281*** 0.313***
(0.0342) (0.0344) (0.0388) (0.0375)
DIST -0.205*** -0.187*** -0.235*** -0.280***
(0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0305) (0.0307)
BORDER 0.611*** 0.603*** 0.644*** 0.592***
(0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0646) (0.0638)
COMLANG 0.600*** 0.589*** 0.652*** 0.618***
(0.0521) (0.0522) (0.0570) (0.0584)
INTERNET 0.00261* 0.00238* 0.00250 0.00114
(0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00160) (0.00156)
EU 0.0753* 0.0531 0.0891* 0.0597
(0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0498) (0.0475)
EXPORT_BIL 0.144***
(0.0119)
IMPORT_BIL 0.168***
(0.0124)
FDI_OUT 0.0964***
(0.00958)
FDI_IN 0.0932***
(0.00860)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi 0.253*** 0.269*** 0.300*** 0.262***
(0.0310) (0.0318) (0.0402) (0.0356)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj 0.214*** 0.172*** 0.255*** 0.224***
(0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0329) (0.0359)
R&D_INT_CTRYi 0.117 0.118 0.0794 0.0503
(0.111) (0.113) (0.156) (0.136)
R&D_INT_CTRYj 0.0311 0.0379 -0.0913 -0.0488
(0.0961) (0.0981) (0.109) (0.112)
Countryi FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Countryj FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Pseudo LL -19369 -19262 -12996 -13250
Observations 87,409 87,924 49,744 52,702
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “countryi FE”, “countryj FE”, “industry FE” and “year FE” report the
significance levels of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
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4.6 Conclusions
Using aggregate patent-based indicators, this chapter provides new evidence about the col-
laborative innovative activities performed across borders. The descriptive analysis of patterns
in globalization of innovation – in terms of international co-invention – illustrates that the
overall growth in internationalization of innovation is due to the increase in the number of
international innovative countries and the rise in the average intensity of collaboration. The
amplitude of both dimensions has doubled between 1988 and 2005.
A panel dataset – per couple of countries across industrial sectors and over time – is used to
investigate the impact of the technological distance on the intensity of collaborative innova-
tion. First, the empirical results confirm that technological distance remains a key determinant
explaining bilateral innovative collaborations between countries. Second, this chapter claims
that the two main arguments related to technological distance – ‘similarity versus diversity’
– can be reconciled by taking an industry approach. Indeed, the empirical findings show
that the impact of technological distance is twofold at the industry level. On the one hand,
low technological distance within the industry – similarity of industry-specific knowledge –
reflects the presence of common industrial knowledge which facilitates collaborative interac-
tions between partners. On the other hand, high technological distance outside the scope of
the industry – diversity of non-industry-specific knowledge – stimulates international collab-
orations in order to acquire novel competences and experiences.
This dual impact of technological distance is examined in two main steps. First, the signif-
icant and positive impact of technological proximity between countries across technological
fields of the industry reflects the importance of the relative absorptive capacity. Having strong
technological capabilities (revealing high absolute absorptive capacity) is not enough to par-
ticipate in international co-invention projects as the results for intensity of R&D expenditures
indicate. It matters more to have industry-specific technological knowledge which suits to the
partner’s one. Second, the importance of diversity of the overall technological competences
is also undeniable. The intensity of collaboration is higher not only for country-industry
pairs which present more multidisciplinary patenting activities – across a larger number of
different technologies – but also if these activities are non-overlapping within the couple of
countries. In addition to the curvilinear relationship related to technological proximity, the
differences in non-industry-specific technological knowledge between partner economies are
positively related to the intensity of their innovative collaboration. This result is in line with
firm-level evidence which has shown that collaboration is largely perceived as a mean to find
complementary knowledge.
The additional effects of non-technological distance factors are also confirmed. The spatial
proximity and the ease of communication between countries (common language, use of inter-
net) positively impact their collaborations in innovation. At the institutional level, the positive
effect of the joint membership to the EU suggests a stronger knowledge-based integration
between the 15 “old” member states, that seems to be mainly due to their institutional simili-
raties (as shown by the results based on the worldwide governance indicators). Concerning
the relationship between internationalization of innovation and other economic cross-border
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flows, the robustness checks highlight that the commercial proximity matters more than the
direction of trade or investment flows in order to explain globalization of innovation. The
bilateral patterns in innovation seem thus to be more related to the presence of commercial
ties than to market-driven motives.
Policy recommendations may be drawn from these empirical findings. In particular, gov-
ernments that would like to take part in the globalization of innovation should put in place
policies that stimulate both strong specialized technological knowledge and multidisciplinary
competences. Policy makers should take in consideration not only the development of strong
industrial hubs, but also the diversity of knowledge-based expertise. In other words, this
chapter enlarges at country-industry level the statement made by Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
which said that the ideal structural organization of firms “should reflect only partially overlap-
ping knowledge complemented by non-overlapping diverse knowledge” (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990, p 134).
This chapter calls also for further research on the impact of distance in international collabora-
tive innovation. The measurement of technological distance could be improved. In particular,
other indicators of the multidisciplinary of technological knowledge and its non-overlapping
between countries at the industry level would help to confirm the robustness of the empirical
findings. While this chapter looks into the patent information across IPC classes, it would
be interesting to integrate the distance between each technological field. In addition to illus-
trate clusters of technological fields, this will enhance the accuracy of technological proximity,
multidisciplinarity and diversity patent-based indicators used in this analysis. The challenge
is that multiple IPC classes may be associated with patent applications and distance between
these classes is much more than a simple dyadic relationship. Furthermore, larger defini-
tions of knowledge-based distance can be considered. In addition to technology-relatedness
measures based on patent information, other type of knowledge-relatedness (such as the sci-
entific similarities and complementarities, the commonality of management practices or of
absorptive capacity routines) may also explain the collaborative patterns in the international
production of innovation.
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4.A Appendix
Table 4.A.1: Description of variables
Variables Description
Dependent Variable [i,j,k,t]
RCIcI I Index of Revealed Collaboration Intensity defined by equation (4.4)
Explanatory variables
H1 TP_PAT_II [i,j,k,t] Indicator of Technological Proximity described in equation (4.6)
TP_PAT_II_SQ [i,j,k,t] Squared value of Technological Proximity variable defined above
H2 NOCOM_PAT_II [i,j,k,t] Number of distinct 4-digit IPC classes (in log) – outside the scope of industry
k defined by the concordance table of Scmoch et al. (2003) – which are not in
common between patents of industry k in country i and patents of industry k
in country j at priority year t
H3 DIST [i,j] Geographical distance (in log)
BORDER [i,j] Dummy variable equals to 1 if both countries are contingent
COMLANG [i,j] Dummy variable equals to 1 if both countries share a common official
language
INTERNET[i,j,t] Min (between both countries) of the percentage of individuals using the
Internet
EU [i,j,t] Dummy variable equals to 1 if both countries are members of the EU at year t
EU_12 [i,j,t] Dummy variable equals to 1 if both countries were members of the EU in 1986
EU_15 [i,j,t] Dummy variable equals to 1 if both countries were members of the EU in 1995
EU_25 [i,j,t] Dummy variable equals to 1 if both countries were members of the EU in 2004
WGI_RL [i,j,t] Absolute value of the country scores difference of the world governance
indicator – rule of law
WGI_VA [i,j,t] Absolute value of the country scores difference of the world governance
indicator – voice and accountability
WGI_PV [i,j,t] Absolute value of the country scores difference of the world governance
indicator – political stability and absence of violence
WGI_GE [i,j,t] Absolute value of the country scores difference of the world governance
indicator – governement effectiveness
WGI_RQ [i,j,t] Absolute value of the country scores difference of the world governance
indicator – regulatory quality
WGI_CC [i,j,t] Absolute value of the country scores difference of the world governance
indicator – control of corruption
EXPORT_BIL [i,j,k,t] Export of goods (in log)
IMPORT_BIL [i,j,k,t] Import of goods (in log)
FDI_OUT [i,j,t] FDI flows by partner country (in log), outward
FDI_IN [i,j,t] FDI flows by partner country (in log), inward
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi [i,k,t] Number of distinct 4-digit IPC classes (in log) – outside the scope of industry
k defined by the concordance table of Schmoch et al. (2003) – listed on patents
of industry k in country i or country j at priority year t
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj [j,k,t]
R&D_INT_CTRYi [i,t] log of the ratio of R&D expenditures divided by the GDP of country i at year t
R&D_INT_CTRYj [j,t] log of the ratio of R&D expenditures divided by the GDP of country j at year t
Sources: own calculation based on PATSTAT April 2009 database for patent-based variables and for EU;
CEPII database for DIST, BORDER, COMLANG; world telecommunication/ICT indicators database
of the International Telecommunications Union for INTERNET; OECD STAN Bilateral trade for EX-
PORT_BIL, IMPORT_BIL; OECD International direct investment database for FDI_IN, FDI_OUT; World
Bank worldwide governance indicators for WGI variables; OECD Main Science and Technology Indi-
cators 2011 for R&D_INT.
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Table 4.A.2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean SE Min Max
Dependent Variable [i,j,k,t]
RCIcI I 87409 0.105 0.223 0 0.997
Explanatory variables
H1 TP_PAT_II [i,j,k,t] 87409 0.566 0.286 0 1
TP_PAT_II_SQ [i,j,k,t] 87409 0.402 0.302 0 1
H2 NOCOM_PAT_II [i,j,k,t] 87409 3.832 1.104 0 5.869
H3 DIST [i,j] 87409 7.947 1.229 4.088 9.883
BORDER [i,j] 87409 0.093 0.291 0 1
COMLANG [i,j] 87409 0.112 0.316 0 1
INTERNET[i,j,t] 87409 16.983 20.393 0 83.880
EU [i,j,t] 87409 0.286 0.452 0 1
EU_12 [i,j,t] 87409 0.185 0.388 0 1
EU_15 [i,j,t] 87409 0.202 0.401 0 1
EU_25 [i,j,t] 87409 0.058 0.233 0 1
WGI_RL [i,j,t] 57148 0.533 0.473 0.0007 2.455
WGI_VA [i,j,t] 57148 0.353 0.312 0.0001 1.757
WGI_PV [i,j,t] 57148 0.428 0.376 0 2.129
WGI_GE [i,j,t] 57148 0.586 0.488 0.0003 2.176
WGI_RQ [i,j,t] 57148 0.436 0.327 0.0004 1.644
WGI_CC [i,j,t] 57148 0.788 0.609 0.0005 2.719
EXPORT_BIL [i,j,k,t] 87409 16.670 2.818 0 24.601
IMPORT_BIL [i,j,k,t] 87924 16.780 2.654 1.099 24.913
FDI_OUT [i,j,t] 49744 4.871 2.663 -6.908 12.056
FDI_IN [i,j,t] 52702 4.536 2.678 -6.215 11.595
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi [i,k,t] 87409 3.406 1.525 0 6.207
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj [j,k,t] 87409 3.534 1.318 0 6.207
R&D_INT_CTRYi [i,t] 87409 0.425 0.620 -1.606 1.418
R&D_INT_CTRYj [j,t] 87409 0.498 0.461 -1.606 1.418
Notes: The number of observations per variable corresponds to the largest sample used in the main
specifications of the empirical model (see column (3) of Table 4.1). For few variables introduced in the
robustness checks, the data availability is different. The patent-based variables concern EPO patent
count indicator. The descriptive statistics concerning PF patent count indicator are available upon
request.
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Table 4.A.3: Correlation matrix
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25]
[1] TP_PAT_II 1
[2] TP_PAT_II_SQ 0.97 1
[3] NOCOM_PAT_II 0.15 0.09 1
[4] DIST 0.03 0.02 0.10 1
[5] BORDER 0.08 0.09 0.04 -0.50 1
[6] COMLANG 0.11 0.12 0.06 -0.12 0.38 1
[7] INTERNET 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.12 1
[8] EXPORT_BIL 0.31 0.29 0.40 -0.27 0.34 0.18 0.04 1
[9] IMPORT_BIL 0.30 0.29 0.41 -0.28 0.33 0.14 0.02 0.74 1
[10] FDI_OUT 0.35 0.34 0.23 -0.13 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.51 0.46 1
[11] FDI_IN 0.28 0.28 0.22 -0.27 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.49 0.51 0.59 1
[12] EU 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.56 0.16 -0.09 -0.06 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 1
[13] EU_12 0.06 0.07 0.01 -0.44 0.17 -0.09 -0.11 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.67 1
[14] EU_15 0.09 0.08 -0.03 -0.52 0.16 -0.07 -0.09 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.15 0.93 0.72 1
[15] EU_25 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 -0.24 0.05 -0.06 0.26 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.42 0.15 0.21 1
[16] WGI_RL -0.17 -0.17 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.12 -0.35 -0.22 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.13 1
[17] WGI_VA -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.24 -0.11 -0.21 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.20 -0.22 -0.14 -0.12 -0.19 0.03 0.68 1
[18] WGI_PV -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.13 -0.11 -0.12 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 0.38 0.45 1
[19] WGI_GE -0.17 -0.17 -0.04 0.12 -0.08 -0.26 -0.22 -0.13 -0.11 -0.39 -0.25 -0.12 -0.06 -0.17 0.06 0.82 0.70 0.29 1
[20] WGI_RQ -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 0.14 -0.10 -0.19 -0.22 -0.08 -0.06 -0.18 -0.15 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 0.65 0.67 0.29 0.72 1
[21] WGI_CC -0.13 -0.13 -0.03 0.09 -0.09 -0.23 -0.23 -0.10 -0.10 -0.35 -0.24 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12 0.04 0.87 0.71 0.34 0.84 0.71 1
[22] MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi 0.30 0.25 0.65 0.26 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.18 -0.19 -0.12 -0.13 -0.17 -0.14 0.06 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.07 1
[23] MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj 0.15 0.11 0.63 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.29 0.33 0.04 0.19 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.23 1
[24] R&D_INT_CTRYi 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.02 0.13 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.53 0.21 -0.16 -0.21 -0.07 -0.19 -0.38 -0.02 0.00 -0.34 -0.11 -0.29 0.52 -0.04 1
[25] R&D_INT_CTRYj 0.16 0.16 0.10 -0.10 0.05 0.08 0.31 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.30 -0.04 -0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.31 0.01 1
Notes: The patent-based variables concern EPO patent count indicator. The correlations concerning PF patent count indicator are available upon request.
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Table 4.A.4: Main estimation results for Priority Filings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I
TP_PAT_II [H1] 0.655*** 0.717*** 0.605***
(0.0932) (0.0939) (0.105)
NOCOM_PAT_II [H2] 0.141*** 0.171*** 0.190***
(0.0370) (0.0369) (0.0401)
DIST [H3] -0.289*** -0.296*** -0.289*** -0.309***
(0.0384) (0.0391) (0.0383) (0.0410)
BORDER [H3] 0.723*** 0.732*** 0.722*** 0.725***
(0.0707) (0.0713) (0.0704) (0.0783)
COMLANG [H3] 0.550*** 0.567*** 0.551*** 0.549***
(0.0684) (0.0682) (0.0678) (0.0787)
INTERNET [H3] -0.000942 -0.00121 -0.000802 -0.00145
(0.00150) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00187)
EU [H3] 0.171*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.142**
(0.0484) (0.0489) (0.0487) (0.0639)
WGI_RL [H3] -0.182**
(0.0717)
EXPORT_BIL [H3] 0.137*** 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.128***
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0145)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi 0.434*** 0.415*** 0.396*** 0.369***
(0.0349) (0.0355) (0.0357) (0.0398)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj 0.328*** 0.325*** 0.293*** 0.268***
(0.0366) (0.0372) (0.0371) (0.0430)
R&D_INT_CTRYi 0.0824 0.136 0.103 -0.0142
(0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.194)
R&D_INT_CTRYj 0.0467 0.102 0.0835 0.207
(0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.193)
Countryi FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Countryj FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Pseudo LL -16414 -16428 -16401 -11153
Observations 77,943 77,928 77,928 51,429
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “countryi FE”, “countryj FE”, “industry FE” and “year FE” report the
significance levels of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
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Table 4.A.5: Estimation results for all world governance indicators (WGI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I RCIcI I
TP_PAT_II 0.878*** 0.882*** 0.886*** 0.887*** 0.888*** 0.881***
(0.0817) (0.0815) (0.0818) (0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0816)
NOCOM_PAT_II 0.371*** 0.357*** 0.357*** 0.358*** 0.353*** 0.362***
(0.0390) (0.0394) (0.0399) (0.0391) (0.0397) (0.0388)
DIST -0.224*** -0.216*** -0.225*** -0.222*** -0.225*** -0.224***
(0.0362) (0.0358) (0.0366) (0.0364) (0.0361) (0.0360)
BORDER 0.605*** 0.601*** 0.597*** 0.605*** 0.605*** 0.599***
(0.0695) (0.0694) (0.0700) (0.0703) (0.0698) (0.0696)
COMLANG 0.540*** 0.547*** 0.552*** 0.544*** 0.538*** 0.543***
(0.0559) (0.0560) (0.0560) (0.0562) (0.0564) (0.0559)
INTERNET 0.000997 0.00220 0.00358** 0.00313* 0.00261 0.00145
(0.00176) (0.00171) (0.00170) (0.00170) (0.00176) (0.00177)
EU 0.0461 0.0523 0.0428 0.0388 0.0383 0.0386
(0.0605) (0.0609) (0.0606) (0.0605) (0.0607) (0.0605)
WGI_RL -0.245***
(0.0687)
WGI_VA -0.281***
(0.0953)
WGI_PV -0.138***
(0.0496)
WGI_GE -0.0684
(0.0542)
WGI_RQ -0.106*
(0.0616)
WGI_CC -0.123***
(0.0413)
EXPORT_BIL 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.133***
(0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0130)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYi 0.253*** 0.257*** 0.254*** 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.256***
(0.0349) (0.0348) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349)
MULTI_PAT_INV_CTRYj 0.204*** 0.206*** 0.201*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.206***
(0.0376) (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0376) (0.0375)
R&D_INT_CTRYi -0.0705 -0.0222 -0.118 -0.0683 -0.0547 -0.0751
(0.194) (0.195) (0.194) (0.192) (0.193) (0.193)
R&D_INT_CTRYj 0.352** 0.362** 0.331* 0.359** 0.363** 0.360**
(0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176)
Countryi FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Countryj FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Industry FE yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo LL -13039 -13041 -13042 -13044 -13044 -13040
Observations 57,148 57,148 57,148 57,148 57,148 57,148
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The rows “countryi FE”, “countryj FE”, “industry FE” and “year FE” report the
significance levels of the joint effect of these fixed effects.
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Chapter 5
Cost-benefit analysis of the EU patent
This chapter is based on a article co-authored with Bruno van Pottelsberghe that is published
as follows:
2 Danguy, J., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2011). Cost-benefit analysis of the
Community Patent. Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 2(2), Article 3.∗
Abstract
For more than 40 years, governments and professional associations have acted, voted or lob-
bied against the implementation of the unitary EU patent (formerly known as the Commu-
nity Patent). The econometric results and simulations presented in this chapter suggest that,
thanks to its attractiveness in terms of market size and a sound renewal fee structure, the EU
patent would drastically reduce the relative patenting costs for applicants while generating
more income for the European Patent Office and most national patent offices. The loss of eco-
nomic rents (€400 million would be lost by patent attorneys, translators and lawyers) and the
drop of controlling power by national patent offices elucidate further the observed resistance
to the EU patent.
∗The quantitative analysis presented in this paper is inspired by analysis performed in the study “Economic
cost-benefit analysis of the Community patent” (07.04.2009) authored by J. Danguy and B. van Pottelsberghe on
behalf of the European Commission. The paper was presented at two conferences: the 5th EPIP Annual Conference
(Bologna) and the OECD-EPO conference on “Patent Statistics for Decision Makers” (Vienna, 2009). It was also
presented in internal seminars/meetings organized by Bruegel, the European Council, the European Commission
and several patent offices, including the EPO and the national patent offices of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, The
Netherlands and the UK. The authors would like to thank these institutions and their representatives for their
useful comments and remarks. Finally, we are grateful to G. de Rassenfosse, D. Guellec, D. Harhoff, K. Hoisl, A.
Sapir, S. Farrow (the editor) and two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions and comments.
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5.1 The consequences of a fragmented European patent system
From a “European Union” perspective, the European patent system is highly fragmented. It
has actually been a sum of 27 national patent systems, for more than 30 years. The only cen-
tralized dimension corresponds to the patent-granting procedure, composed of performing
search reports, ensuring publication in due time, and performing substantive examinations
and processing operations, which are all performed by the European Patent Office (EPO) on
behalf of the 38 member states of the European Patent Convention (EPC), created in 1978.
Once a patent is granted, it must be upheld, managed and kept in force at the national level.
This ‘national’ stage includes several validation and maintenance costs (frequent compulsory
intermediation of local patent attorneys, validation fees, translation costs, renewal fees, litiga-
tion costs) that are essentially country-specific.1
This fragmentation, which does not occur in other large economies like China, Japan or the
USA, reduces the effectiveness and attractiveness of the European patent system, particularly
through its prohibitive costs and the economic incongruities it generates. The simulations de-
veloped by van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Mejer (2010), for instance, show that the drop
in cumulated cost due to the London Agreement (which reduced the translation requirements
of a patent’s “description” section in 14 signatory countries) should not overshadow the still
prohibitive costs of patenting in Europe, in both absolute and relative terms. Indeed, a patent
enforced in ‘only’ six countries costs at least four times more than a patent filed in any other
large economies. With renewal fees and translation costs that increase linearly with the geo-
graphical scope for protection, a patent targeting a large number of European countries can be
up to 15 times more expensive than a US patent. These prohibitive costs indubitably affect the
demand for patenting and reduce the accessibility to the system for small- and medium-size
firms (SMEs).2
The negative effect of the fragmented system actually goes far beyond the prohibitive cost of
patenting. Mejer and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2012) show that heterogeneous national
litigation expenses and practices induce a high level of uncertainty, easier ‘parallel imports’,
and a de facto paradox of having an EU-level competition policy and examination process
(performed by the EPO), while having national jurisdiction supremacies on patent issues. In
this respect, the implementation of the EU patent would not only reduce costs but would also
improve the attractiveness and the effectiveness of the system, especially if it is associated
with a unified European and EU Patents Court system (EEUPC).3
A natural question that therefore arises is why the EU patent has not been implemented so
far? Why is it still under heavy negotiation despite all of the expected positive impact it
would have on the European patent system? For more than 40 years, many influential actors
1See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) or van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) for more
details on the patenting process within the EU, as compared with Japan or the USA.
2See de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007); de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie (2009); Harhoff, Hoisl, Reichl, and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009); Harhoff, Hoisl, and van Pottels-
berghe de la Potterie (2009); de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2012) for empirical evidence on
the fee elasticity of demand for patents.
3See Harhoff (2009) for a cost-benefit analysis of the implementation of a unified European litigation system
for patent issues.
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or lobby groups have been effective in barring the way to the EU patent. Among them are
lawyers specialized in patent litigations, patent attorneys, and translators.4 In addition, some
countries would like to see more languages than the three official ones (English, German and
French).
Last but not least is the position of National Patent Offices (NPOs) and the EPO, which nat-
urally strive to survive and tend to resist a project that may drastically change their working
environment, and especially their budget and business model. The current system offers a
win-win situation between the EPO and all NPOs, as half of the renewal fees on European
patents received by NPOs are redirected towards the EPO, and accounts for about 25% of its
budget. One could logically wonder, therefore, how the EU patent would affect the renewal
fees’ income of the NPOs and of the EPO. This budgetary issue has operational consequences
and hence must be properly addressed.
The objective of this chapter is precisely to answer this question by addressing three main
issues associated with the potential consequences of the implementation of the EU patent: (i)
what would be the budgetary consequences in terms of renewal fees’ income for the EPO and
NPOs; (ii) what would be the implications for applicants in terms of absolute and relative
fees; (iii) what would be the direct impact on major actors, including translators, attorneys,
lawyers and the business sector.
The econometric results and simulations suggest that with a sound renewal fee structure,
the EU patent could generate more income for EPO and for nearly all NPOs than under the
current status quo. It would at the same time substantially reduce the relative patenting costs
for applicants. The loss of economic rents (€400 million would be lost by patent attorneys,
translators and lawyers) and the drop of controlling power by national patent offices elucidate
further the observed resistance to the EU patent over the past 40 years.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the econometric model that aims
at understanding the determinants of the maintenance rate of patents and performs the sim-
ulations of renewal fees’ income. The implications for the patent offices and on the patenting
costs of the EU patent are analysed in sections 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. Section 5.5 presents the
direct economic effects of the EU patent for the most important actors of the system. Section
5.6 concludes, discusses the limitations of the results and underlines their policy implications.
5.2 Simulations of renewal fees’ income
With the current system, the NPOs retrocede 50% of their renewal fee income generated by
European patents to the EPO and keep the other half for themselves. Unfortunately NPOs
rarely publish the importance of European patents for their yearly income, probably because
4Multiple parallel litigations and the monitoring of translation requirements secure real ‘business’ opportunities
for patent attorneys and lawyers. For translators, the EU patent would be associated with far less translation
requirements comparative to the current situation which requires a translation (of the claims section or the whole
patent) in every country where the patent is enforced.
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it accounts for the lion’s share, the rest being generated by national patents.5 With the EU
patent there would be a centralized collection of renewal fees, most probably at the EPO. The
EPO would then have to ‘share’ (assuming a status quo in the sharing of renewal fee income)
the revenue generated by the EU patent with the NPOs, with an appropriate distribution key
between NPOs.
The natural resistance of (some) NPOs is related to the belief that they would see a drop in
their revenue: this ‘share’ might be smaller than the amounts currently collected as ‘inde-
pendent offices’, with the maintenance of European patents in each chosen (six on average)
national jurisdiction. Whether this ‘shared’ revenue would be larger or smaller than the local
revenue generated today with the traditional European patent is an issue that can be ana-
lyzed with simulations. The answer is not straightforward, as the total renewal fees’ income
generated by the forthcoming EU patent depends on three broad factors:
2 the renewal fee structure of the EU patent (what level of renewal fees? It is clear that
with very high fees there would be relatively small use of it, and vice versa);
2 the maintenance rate over time (which depends on the level of renewal fees and on other
factors);
2 the distribution key (how would the total renewal fees’ income generated by the EU
patent be shared between NPOs?)
The methodological approach adopted to simulate the impact of the EU patent on the renewal
fees’ income of each NPO and of the EPO is composed of five main stages:
S1. Compute the total renewal fees’ income generated by a current ‘average’ European
patent in the 27 EU NPOs;
S2. Understand the factors that influence the maintenance rate of patents in national
jurisdictions;
S3. Select an ‘acceptable’ renewal fee structure for the EU patent;
S4. From the results of (S2) and the chosen fee structure of (S3), simulate the mainte-
nance rate of the EU patent;
S5. From (S4) and (S3), compute the renewal fees’ income generated by the EU patent.
The simulations are performed “at the patent level” to make the conclusions independent from
the relative substitution between the European patent and the EU patent, and independent
from any hypothesis on the total number of patents granted by the EPO. Questions such as
5According to the EPO 2008 financial statements (p.34), € 654 Million was generated by renewal fees (€327
Million for the EPO and the same amount for the NPOs). Relying on the actual distribution key (cf. Appendix
Table 5.A.4), the German patent office earned about €103 Million, and the French and UK patent offices had
revenues of about €40 Million. As the 2008 annual report of the UKPO claims that the revenues generated by
patents are of €49 Million (£39 Million), it can easily be deducted that national patents generate about €9 Million,
or ‘only’ 23% of their total income.
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“what will be the share of patents granted by the EPO that follow the EU patent route?”
would therefore not affect the results (if all the patents granted by the EPO opt for the current
European patent, there would be no change to the current situation). What matters is therefore
the difference in the renewal fees revenues generated by an average European patent and by an
average EU patent. The cumulated renewal fees’ income generated by one current European
patent over its entire life span depends on the number of countries it has been validated in,
on the duration of the patent renewals in each of these countries – or its maintenance rate –
and on the level of renewal fees. The total renewal fees’ income generated by all the NPOs
of the EU27 member states and of the EPO is VNPO (as defined in equations (5.1) and (5.2)
below, it measures the income generated by one European patent “on average” over its entire
lifecycle). For an average patent under the EU patent, the main dimensions that matters are
its maintenance rate and its renewal fees (as there is only one choice, the validation rate is
automatically 100%). The distribution key will then define the income for each NPO.6
Three assumptions must be set before entering into the analysis. They are fairly acceptable
and allow reducing the number of alternative dimensions that could be taken into account for
the simulations. First is the assumption of “run-in period”, which suggests that the renewal
fees’ income simulations are run “at equilibrium.” The early changes in patenting behavior,
and the required adaptation time to the new system are therefore not accounted for. This
assumption is equivalent to the practice that consists in considering the long run equilibrium
of incoming flows of renewal fees, over the entire lifetime of patents.
The second assumption is that any patent starts to generate renewal fees’ income for NPOs
from its 6th year onwards (up to its 20th year, depending on its maintenance rate). Before
that, it is considered as a ‘pending’ application at the EPO. This assumption corresponds to
the observed average delay before the decision to grant a patent at the EPO.7
The third assumption is the irreversibility choice that must be made by the applicant (remem-
ber that the two systems would co-exist). Once a patent is granted by the EPO, the applicant
must choose between the current European patent format and the EU patent. If an appli-
cant opts for the latter it is not possible to later switch back towards the current European
patent system, and vice versa. Allowing such a ‘switching’ system would simply induce a
high complexity in both the simulation exercise and the tracking of what is actually going on
in Europe.
These three assumptions (run-in period, 6th year grant, irreversible choice) and the patent-
level methodological choice aim at assessing whether an average EU patent would generate
more or less revenue than a current average European patent (EP) over its entire life span.
Whatever the substitution degree between these two patents is, an actor (national patent office
or the EPO) will be better off if the revenue it gets from one average EU patent is higher than
what he gets from one average European patent.
6See Appendix Table 5.A.1 for a synthesis of the main factors explaining the renewal fees’ income under the
two regimes (European patent and the EU patent).
7Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) and van Zeebroeck (2011), among others, have provided
evidence on this average duration.
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5.2.1 Compute the total renewal fees’ income generated by an ‘average’ European
patent in the 27 EU NPOs
For the national patent office of a country i, the renewal fees’ income generated by a European
patent depends on three main factors:
2 The validation rate: the probability that the patent is validated in country i;
2 The maintenance rate: the probability that it is maintained each year t for a maximum
of 20 years;
2 The level of renewal fees.
Equation (5.1) shows the total renewal fees’ income (VNPOi)8 generated by an average Euro-
pean patent in the national patent office of country i:
VNPOi =
20
∑
t=6
pii(1− δit)Fit (5.1)
where pii is the share of patents granted by the EPO which are validated in country i; δit
is the drop-out (or depreciation) rate of the average patent in country i and year t (i.e. the
percentage of patents which are not renewed in the country); and Fit is the renewal fees in
country i and year t.
According to equation (5.1), the budgetary value of an average European patent for country
i is the sum from year 6 to year 20 (the maximum duration period) of the product of the
validation rate (or validation probability), the maintenance rate (1− d) and the level of the
renewal fees. This amount can be divided by 2, as half of the revenue generated by an NPO
is going back to the EPO and the other half is for the NPO itself (this 50/50 split will be
accounted for in individual NPOs revenue simulations). Year 6 of the patent is taken into
account for the start of the renewal fees’ income computation.
Adding the cumulated renewal fees’ income generated by the 27 member states of the Eu-
ropean Union, as in equation (5.2), gives the total income (VNPO) generated by an average
European patent over its life in the national patent offices of the European Union (and for the
EPO).
VNPO =
27
∑
i=1
VNPOi (5.2)
The value of a patent under the EU patent can be measured with a similar formula, with
the exception that it is by definition associated with a validation rate equal to 100% (the EU
patent only has one ‘validation’ possibility, otherwise it is not a ‘EU patent’). The total income
generated by an average patent under the EU patent (VCOM) is presented in equation (5.3).
8To be more precise, equations (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) should normally take into account a discount rate. However,
since this discounting factor would impact in the same vein the revenues generated by a current European patent
and those generated by the EU patent, we decide – for the sake of simplicity – to ignore it.
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VCOM =
20
∑
t=6
(1− δct)Fct (5.3)
The major parameters are the maintenance rate of the EU patent (1− dc) and the structure of
its renewal fees. The former parameter obviously depends on the latter: very high fees would
reduce the maintenance rate (or increase the drop-out rate). The parameter (pi) related to the
probability of validation has disappeared because selecting the EU patent route does not lead
to any subsequent choice, there is only ‘one’ EU patent route, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. It
compares the procedural routes followed by a European Patent (EP) and the EU patent. First
of all, it should be noticed that a small part of the current patents granted by the EPO are
never validated in any country and fall into public domain as soon as the decision to grant is
made by the EPO (Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007 estimated this share at
10%). These ‘lapsed’ patents do not generate any revenue in terms of validation or renewal
fees, and are therefore not taken into account. As we work at the patent level (how much
renewal fee revenue would be generated by one European patent or one EU patent), early
lapses do not affect the current simulations.
Figure 5.1: Procedural routes of European patent (EP) and EU patent
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Once a patent is granted, the inventor would choose between the European patent and the EU
patent. In the former case, he would have to validate the patent in all desired NPOs and pay
the translation costs and validation fees. In the latter case, the translations would be taken in
charge by the EPO (with an intense use of machine translations). After the grant, patents are
maintained through the payment of yearly renewal fees (domestic renewal fees at NPOs for
the European patent and a new fee schedule for the EU patent route).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the differences observed across countries in the validation/maintenance
rates of European patents over their lifetime.9 Japan, with a large homogenous economy
and relatively low renewal fees has the highest maintenance rate all along the life span of
9For European countries the product of validation and maintenance rates is represented. The maintenance rates
taken separately are pictured for a few European countries in Appendix Figure 5.A.1.
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a patent. Within Europe, Germany, by far the largest and the richest country, has high val-
idation/maintenance rates, similar to US or Japanese rates. After six years, 85 per cent of
the patents granted by the EPO are enforced in Germany. This rate falls to 18 per cent for
the patents with an age of 20 years. Finland, a smaller country, has much smaller valida-
tion/maintenance rates, about 5 per cent of the granted patents, which falls to about 1 per
cent after 20 years.
Figure 5.2: Validation/Maintenance rates of patents in selected countries
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Sources: own calculation from data provided by the EPO and NPOs and trilateral statistical report, see
5.B Appendix and Appendix Table 5.A.2 for data source and computation.
The fact that Finland has a much smaller validation and maintenance rate than Belgium might
as well be due to its particularly high renewal fees, which are nearly twice as high as in Bel-
gium (cf. Appendix Table 5.A.3). The simultaneous role of economic size and fees, amongst
other variables, is evaluated in the next subsection. The maintenance rate for the US is dented
because renewal fees must only be paid at three different stages in the life of a patent, con-
firming somewhat the important role played by renewal fees. From Figure 5.2 it is important
to bear in mind that strong variations in maintenance/validation rates are observed across
countries, and that the share of active patents continuously drops over time.
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5.2.2 Understand the factors that influence the maintenance rate of patents in
NPOs
The maintenance rates presented in Figure 5.2 are a key factor for the calculation of the total
revenue generated by one patent (for a given NPO or for Europe as a whole). Therefore, in
order to simulate the revenue generated by an average patent under the EU patent, the factors
that affect the observed maintenance rates must be understood and measured.
The model adopted to grasp the determinants of maintenance rate is designed according
to the existing literature, logical considerations and intense interactions with national patent
offices and patent professionals.10 The earliest paper that focuses on renewal data of European
patents is probably the one by Schankerman and Pakes (1986), who relied on renewal data to
approximate the distribution of patent value and its depreciation rate. Several other studies
(Cornelli and Schankerman, 1999; Baudry and Dumont, 2009) argued and provided evidence
that renewal fees have an impact on the decision to patent and to maintain a patent in force.
Harhoff, Hoisl, Reichl, and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) and Harhoff, Hoisl, and
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) assessed the determinants of validation behavior (at
the aggregate country level and at the patent level) within the European patent system, with a
particular focus on market size, distance between countries, validation fees, early renewal fees
and translation costs. van Zeebroeck (2009, 2011) investigated the strategic factors that affect
the duration (or maintenance rate) of patents within Europe, with a patent-based approach.
The author showed that European patents are validated in fewer countries over time but for a
longer time frame. This duration is partly influenced by strategic factors, including the filing
strategies adopted by applicants.
The model adopted in the present chapter contributes to the literature by providing a first
evaluation of the impact of renewal fees and other country-specific factors on the aggregate
maintenance rate of patents across countries. The model is performed with a database com-
posed of 15 European countries, the USA and Japan. The empirical model is presented in
equation (5.4):
(1− δit) = C + βGDPi + θ NPOAGEi + γ IPIi + σ PATAGEt + α Fit + ε it (5.4)
The dependent variable corresponds to the average maintenance rate of granted patents ((1−
d), or one minus the drop-out rate) enforced in country i at year t (t=6,. . . , 20). In other
words, it is the share of granted patents that are renewed as a percentage of the total number
of granted patents of the same cohort that were validated in the country. Fifteen years of
renewals are therefore taken into account for each country. This variable is computed from
the most recent information for each age-year of a patent (see 5.B Appendix for a description
of the methodology). For instance, the maintenance rate for the 20th year is taken for the
patent cohort of 1987 (i.e., all patents filed in 1987 by the EPO) as the information for more
10One should keep in mind that a structural model could also be used to understand precisely the mechanism
through which all variables are related to each other. This is, however, outside the scope of this chapter, and the
reduced-form model is preferred for its convenience.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of the database
Variable Min Mean Max SE
Maintenance rates (%) t=6 39 63 100 21
t=10 28 49 90 19
t=15 14 28 65 14
t=20 8 13 33 7
GDP (in billions €) 34 1463 10496 2526
Age of membershipa 12 26 31 7
Fees (€)b t=6 59 115 188 40
t=10 118 285 902 195
t=15 190 512 1060 273
t=20 270 770 1940 442
IPI 4.14 4.55 4.88 0.19
Notes: a. For Japan and USA, we assumed the same age of membership as the oldest EPC member
states. b. The US fees must only be paid at three different stages in the life of the patent (€776 at 9th
year, €1,964 at 13th year and €3,256 at 17th year).
Sources: raw data provided by the EPO and NPOs, trilateral statistical report, Eurostat and Park (2008);
see Appendix Tables 5.A.2 and 5.A.3 for further details.
recent cohorts is not yet available. The maintenance rate for the 10th year is taken from the
cohort of 1997, and so on. This 20 year ‘lag’ for the 20th year of maintenance rate will probably
change over time but is the only available and reliable information.
The country-level explanatory variables include the gross domestic product (GDP)11 in 2006,
expressed in €; an indicator of the strength of the national patent system (IPI, which is com-
puted by Ginarte and Park, 1997 and updated by Park, 2008); and the age of membership
of the country in the EPC (NPOAGE, going up to a maximum of 31 years for the founding
members). This latter variable aims at testing whether the countries that have been part of the
EPC for a longer period also have higher maintenance rates, thanks to a learning and adaptive
process. The age of a patent (PATAGE) is a variable that is constant across countries but varies
over time to capture the life cycle of the patented technology. It is expected that the older a
patent (hence the technology) is, the lower is its maintenance rate. Finally, one variable varies
across countries and over the life cycle of a patent: the renewal fees (F). They are expected to
have a negative impact on the maintenance rate. Table 5.1 provides summary statistics of the
database. The sample of 17 countries was chosen over a larger sample because of data avail-
ability (there are currently 27 countries within the EU). As many countries have only recently
joined the EPC, only small periods were available, with high standard deviations over time.
Taking the 15 oldest EU member countries, added to Japan and the USA, allows us to assess
the long term determinants of relatively ‘stable’ maintenance rate. It is worth noticing that
including more countries in the panel did not change the results (results are available upon
request). The maintenance rates are presented in Appendix Table 5.A.2.
The econometric results are presented in Table 5.2; they can be interpreted as follows. First,
11As indicator of the size of countries, population was also tested and the econometric results were similar.
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GDP, which reflects the market attractiveness or the wealth of a country, has a positive and
highly significant impact on the maintenance rate. The countries with a higher GDP enjoy a
higher maintenance rate. Looking at the standard errors, one may conclude that GDP is one
of the two most important factors that influence the maintenance rate of European patents in
a country. The second variable that plays a very significant role is the age of the patent. Its
level of significance is as high as the level of significance of the GDP variable. The older a
patent is, the lower its maintenance rate. This is true for all countries and follows the natural
life cycle of a patented technology.
Table 5.2: Estimated parameters of the “maintenance rate” model
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.229 *** 0.536 *** -0.256
(0.041) (0.038) (0.207)
GDP (’000 billion €) 0.104 *** 0.072 *** 0.064 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Fees (’000 €) -0.350 *** -0.112 *** -0.119 ***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Age of membership 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of the patent -0.030 *** -0.029 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Intellectual Property Index 0.172 ***
(0.044)
Adjusted R-squared 53.9 74.1 75.6
Number of observations 243 243 243
Notes: cf. equation (5.4) in main text. The parameters are estimated with a heteroscedastic consistent
estimator, over 17 countries and 15 years (unbalanced panel). The dependent variable is the mainte-
nance rate, GDP is the 2006 gross domestic product; Fees stands for the national annual renewal fees
(expressed in ‘000 €); Age of membership corresponds to the country’s date of signature for the EPC
membership, Intellectual property index comes from Ginarte and Park (1997)’s updated results for
2005, Park (2008). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; standard
errors are in parentheses.
Then comes a country’s age as a member of the EPC. The estimated parameter suggests that
the longer the EPC membership, the higher the maintenance rate of a patent. This is the
illustration of an adaptation phase to an advanced European system. de Rassenfosse and
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) also found that the ‘older’ EPC member states transfer
a higher number of their national patent applications to the EPO. The Intellectual Property
Index plays a positive and significant impact, suggesting that the countries with a stronger
patent system (in terms of subject matter, enforcement quality, and reliability) will logically
see higher maintenance rates than the countries with weaker patent systems.
Finally, a country’s renewal fees have a negative and significant impact on the maintenance
rate of patents. The higher the renewal fees, the lower are the maintenance rates in a country.
This variable is highly significant, but less than the patent life cycle and GDP variables. A
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comparison of column (2) with column (1) shows that a sharp drop in the impact of patent fees
occurs when the patent age is included simultaneously with the fee variable. This is due to the
correlation between the two variables. Most NPOs have fee schedules which systematically
increase with patents’ age, witnessing the two forces that push a patent towards the public
domain: time and costs.
According to the adjusted R-squared, the four variables explain 76 per cent of the variance in
maintenance rates over time and across countries, which is a fairly good approximation.12
Two methodological caveats, or implicit hypotheses, are worth noticing. The first one is related
to the reliance on observed (past) maintenance rates. The 20-year maintenance rate of the
patents granted today will most probably adapt to a different environment and might be
smaller or higher than the ones observed today for the patents granted 20 years ago. This
issue is clearly embodied into the degree of quality of the system (quality of applications and
rigor of the examination process). If a patent office grants many patents of dubious quality
one may expect a smaller maintenance rate, and vice versa. In this respect, van Pottelsberghe
de la Potterie and van Zeebroeck (2008) showed that the average quality or value of patents
granted by the EPO has constantly dropped over the past 20 years, which is synonymous to
validations in less countries for smaller period of time. The second implicit assumption is that
the system is stable and therefore the determinants of maintenance rates and validation rates
observed nowadays would be the same for the EU patent, which actually consists in setting up
a new system where the factors listed in Table 5.2 might actually have a differentiated impact.
5.2.3 Select an ‘acceptable’ renewal fee structure for the EU patent13
The renewal fees structure functions as an important policy leverage in practice – more than a
simple way to cover the operating costs of patent offices.14 Scotchmer (1999) argued that the
renewal fees mechanism works as a direct revelation mechanism of the private information
owned by the applicant about his invention. For Baudry and Dumont (2006), renewal fees
can be used as a policy tool to discourage low-value patents and to promote the diffusion of
innovation at the end of patent life.
Different structures of renewal fees can be considered for the EU patent. Four alternatives
are presented in Figure 5.3. One approach consists in summing up the renewals fee of the
12Two alternative methodologies have been used to assess the robustness of these estimates. First, the US
and Japan were withdrawn from the sample. The estimates run on 15 European countries lead to very similar
parameters and significance levels (results are available upon request). An important change is the parameter
associated with GDP, which was much higher with this reduced sample (0.15 instead of 0.07). Since GDP is a key
economic variable influencing the maintenance rate we decided to rely on the full sample for the simulations of
the maintenance rate under the EU patent, which is a conservative practice. The second test consisted in correcting
the potential bias due to the fact that the dependent variable fluctuates between 0 and 1. A model was run with a
transformed dependent variable (y*=log(y/(1-y)) that fluctuates between minus infinite and plus infinite. All the
estimated parameters were of the same sign and significance.
13While this chapter focuses on the renewal fees for the EU patent, see Danguy and van Pottelsberghe de
la Potterie (2011) for a broader discussion about the pre-grant and post-grant fees for a sustainable EU patent
system.
14In particular, Gans et al. (2004) examined how imposing a self-funding constraint to a patent office can create
distortions in fees. See also de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2013) for a discussion about the
role of fees in patent systems.
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2 or 4 countries that are the most frequently designated under the current European patent
system. They are respectively called VCOM(2) and VCOM(4). Such an additive fee structure
was proposed in the European Council working document (EC, 2008, DG Internal Market).
The document also suggests that the EU patent renewal fees could correspond to the sum of
up to eight countries’ current renewal fees.
An alternative and somewhat simpler renewal fees schedule can be put forward. It would be
composed of a starting fee of €600 on year 6 of the patent age and then a constant increment
of €200 or €300 (or more) each additional year in the patent age. These fee schedules are
respectively named VCOM(200) and VCOM(300). The proposed VCOM(200) is actually close
to the sum of four countries’ renewal fees, or VCOM(4). These two fee schedules seem to be
the most appropriate. Indeed, van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008) have shown that
the average geographical scope of protection for a 15 year old patent is of about 4 countries.
Therefore the VCOM(200) or VCOM(4) fee structure corresponds to what the business sector
is currently paying. With VCOM(200), the applicant would pay a fee of about €3,300 to keep a
patent enforced on its 20th year, against about €900 in Japan and the US.15 With VCOM(300)
the amount would be close to €5,000. The cumulated fees over time with VCOM(200) would
be of €5,000 for 10 years and €30,000 for 20 years. An exponential version of the VCOM(200)
fee schedule is also considered. This fee structure – called VCOM(200+) – is the same as
VCOM(200) until the 15th year and then imposes a stronger increasing of fees (with €3,000 at
year 16, €4,000 at year 17, €5,000 at year 18, €6,000 at year 19 and €8,000 at year 20).
A comparison of these EU patent renewal fee schedules with the fees of the current European
patent system can be done in absolute and relative terms (cf. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
and François, 2009). Indeed, renewal fees might be twice as high in country A as in country
B, but if the former is four times larger than in the latter (i.e., with a much larger market
potential), the relative fee is actually cheaper in country A than in country B. For instance, if
the EU patent would apply the ‘relative’ fee structure of the German patent office to the whole
EU economic area, the renewal fees would be much higher. In fact, the German fees start very
low and end up at about €2,000 at the end of the patent life cycle. If the same ‘relative’ fee
(i.e., same fee per capita or fee per GDP) is applied for the EU patent, the renewal fee schedule
would be quite prohibitive and reach €10,000 to €12,000 for the 20th year of protection. The
renewal fee structure proposed with the VCOM(300) solution would end under €5,000, which
is more affordable, but still more than twice as high as the absolute fee in Germany for the
20th year. Keeping in mind that the whole economic area covered by the EU patent would
be more than six times larger than the one currently covered by Germany, a VCOM(200) or
VCOM(300) solution seems acceptable and corresponds to a good compromise between an
absolute and a relative fee schedule. Probably a more convincing argument is related to what
the business sector seems to be ready to pay. As mentioned here above, 15 year old patents
are on average maintained in four countries, which corresponds to VCOM(200). International
comparisons of absolute and relative fees will be addressed in section 5.4.
15In the US a renewal fee of €3,256 must be paid on year 17 of the patent, which makes approximately a €800
per year from year 17 to year 20 (cf. Appendix Table 5.A.3).
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Figure 5.3: Possible fee structure for the EU patent
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Notes: VCOM(2) and VCOM(4) correspond to the sum of the renewal fee structure of 2 and 4 countries,
respectively. VCOM(200) and VCOM(300) characterize a fee structure that would start at €600 at year
6 and then add each year €200 and €300, respectively. VCOM(200+) is the same as VCOM(200) till year
15 and then increases exponentially to reach €8,000 at year 20.
5.2.4 Simulate the maintenance rate of the EU patent
With the estimated parameters presented in column (3) of Table 5.2, and the potential fee
schedules presented above, it is now possible to simulate maintenance rates for the future EU
patent (cf. equation (5.4)). The GDP of the EU27 economic area is straightforward to compute,
the patent age is available as such, and the age of membership is supposed to be of 0 year (i.e.
no experience, because it is a new system). It could be argued that an age of 30 years could be
taken into account, because the 11 founding fathers account for a large economic area within
the EU27. But this assumption would not substantially affect the simulations, and we opted
for a conservative approach (so that the risk is to underestimate the revenues generated by
the EU patent). The only variable that might vary substantially, and is subject to ‘political’
negotiations, is the renewal fees structure of the EU patent.
The simulated maintenance rates under the EU patent16 are pictured in Figure 5.4. They vary
according to the chosen renewal fee structure. Most simulations fluctuate between the actual
Japanese and German maintenance rates, and are above the latter all along the patent life
cycle. This high maintenance rate of the EU patent is primarily due to the large geographical
scope that would be covered by a single patent, which is more than five times larger than
16The represented maintenance rates are for an average EU patent; they would be obviously higher for higher
value patents. In the same vein, these simulations correspond to the scenario of patents of an average company. In
reality, it is clear that some companies (electronic industry for example) actually validate their patent in only 2-3
countries whereas other industries validate their patents in all countries (pharmaceuticals, for instance; see van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and van Zeebroeck, 2008).
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Figure 5.4: Simulated maintenance rate with the EU patent
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Notes: The simulated maintenance rates for the EU patent were normalized to 1 at the 6th year. The
series for the Japan and Germany are actual series. The curve labeled ‘worst’ corresponds to a worst
case scenario, with a high and fast drop-out rate.
Sources: own calculation from EPO data and the Trilateral statistical report for the US and Japan, and
from the estimated parameters presented in Table 5.2 (column 3) and in equation (5.4).
the German economy. Lower renewal fees, like VCOM(200) would logically induce a higher
maintenance rate. The negative impact of fees is illustrated by the VCOM(200+) curve which
decreases significantly from year 16 (corresponding to the exponential increase of renewal fees
comparatively to the VCOM(200)).17 In addition, a worst case-scenario is also considered. It
is arbitrarily chosen with a higher drop-out rate – particularly in the first years of the patent
life – than the simulated EU patent ones.
5.2.5 Compute the renewal fees’ income generated by the EU patent
With the simulated ‘maintenance rates’ of the EU patent, it is now possible to calculate the
renewal fees’ income that would be generated by an average patent under the EU patent and
compare it with the renewal fees’ income generated by an average European patent. Figure 5.5
presents the average total renewal fees’ income generated by one patent over its life time. The
renewal fee income (VNPO) is calculated as in equation (5.2) and depends on the number of
17The simulated maintenance rate of VCOM(200+) was restricted at 10% for the last two years since it is generally
accepted that at least 10% of patents stay in force for 20 years, whatever the level of fees.
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countries in which the patent has been validated in and on the number of years it is maintained
in each of these countries. The higher the number of countries (amongst 27 possible countries
within the EU) and the longer the maintenance of the patent (with a maximum of 20 years
from the priority date), the higher is the total amount of renewal fees’ income generated by the
patent. The first bar presented in Figure 5.5 corresponds to the actual fees’ income generated
by a current European patent granted by the EPO, a bit more than €11,000. This ‘simulated’
number is actually close to the observed renewal fees’ income observed in the NPOs and the
EPO, which validates somewhat the approach adopted in this analysis.18
The total renewal fees’ income generated by the EU patent would obviously vary with the
level of fees, as illustrated in equation (5.3). According to the estimated parameters presented
in Table 5.2 (column 3) (and hence the simulated maintenance rate of the EU patent depicted
in Figure 5.4), the revenue generated by the EU patent would vary from nearly €10,000 with
the VCOM(2) renewal fees schedule up to €13,600 with the VCOM(4) renewal fees schedule.
With the simpler fee schedule put forward in this chapter, it would vary around €16,000 (with
the VCOM(200) and VCOM(300) fee schedules). Higher fees do not necessarily correlate with
a higher revenue, due to the negative and significant fee elasticity of patents. This is illustrated
by the VCOM(200+) renewal fees schedule, which generates less revenues than VCOM(200):
too high fees decrease the maintenance rate to such an extent that they do not compensate
for the increase in the drop-out rate. Renewal fees have a real ‘dual’ impact on the revenues
generated by patents for the EPO and the NPOs.
The worst case-scenario maintenance rate was chosen arbitrarily as being lower than any
observed maintenance rate in large countries (like Japan or Germany) and lower than the
simulations based on the quantitative analysis. The VCOM(200+) renewal fee schedule paired
with this ‘worst’ case maintenance rate generate about the same revenue as a current European
patent.
In other words, the EU patent would generate at least the same amount of cumulated fees’
income than the current European patent, and probably substantially more, thanks to higher
fees and higher maintenance rates. With our preferred VCOM(200) or VCOM(300) fee struc-
ture, the total income generated by one patent would be 150% higher than the current total
income generated with the European patent. It is quite reassuring to reach the conclusion that
the total renewal fees’ income generated by a patent under the EU patent could be substan-
tially higher than the current cumulated renewal fees’ income generated by a European patent
in all NPOs. The key issue is now to assess to what extent the EU patent would actually affect
each NPO’s income. This obviously depends on the adopted distribution key between NPOs,
which is tackled in the following section.
18Over the past 10 years the EPO has granted about 50,000 patents a year. Therefore, multiplying this number
by the average renewal fee income generated by one patent (for the EPO it would be €5,600 or half €11,168 for
VNPO in Figure 5.5) would yield a total revenue for the EPO of about €280 Million. According to the EPO 2008
financial statements (p. 34), the EPO had revenues from national renewal fees from previously granted patents of
about €327 Million, which is not too far from the simulated revenues.
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Figure 5.5: Simulated total renewal fees’ income under the EU patent
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Sources: own calculation from the estimated parameters presented in Table 5.2, observed data on
maintenance rates in national patent offices (see Appendix Table 5.A.2 and Appendix Figure 5.A.1),
different structures of fees illustrated in Figure 5.3 and simulated maintenance rates of Figure 5.4.
GERMAN(200+) corresponds to the observed German maintenance rate with the VCOM(200+) renewal
fees schedule.
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5.3 Implications for patent offices
Five distribution keys can be considered for the sharing of the total renewal fees’ income
generated under the EU patent; they are presented in Table 5.3, with their strengths and
weaknesses. The actual distribution key (which is the share of each NPO in the total in-
come generated by all NPOs) would actually correspond to a skewed distribution, because
it is highly biased in favor of large countries, and especially Germany. Applicants gradually
reduce the number of countries for enforcement, and when they keep the patent ‘alive’ it is
generally in the largest countries. Germany is frequently the last country in which a patent
is kept enforced (see van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and van Zeebroeck, 2008 and van Zee-
broeck, 2011). Thanks to its large market Germany currently enjoys a large and more than
proportional share of renewal fees’ income generated by the average European patent, about
32%, whereas its population, GDP and R&D shares in the EU are ‘only’ 17%, 20% and 27%,
respectively.
Table 5.3: PROS and CONS of four alternative distributiion keys
Distribution keys Assessment
Actual distribution of NPOs’ renewal fees’
income
Skewed, large bias in favor of large countries,
especially the largest one (Germany)
“Council proposal” weighting scheme Complex, not easy to compute and to
communicate, takes into account the linguistic
specificities.
Population weighting scheme Bias in favor of large countries, unrelated to
innovative efforts, easy to compute.
GDP weighting scheme Fair, easy to compute and communicate,
favors countries with a high economic
performance
R&D weighting scheme Fair, easy to compute and communicate,
favors innovative countries
The ‘council proposal’ weighting scheme (see EC, 2008) reflects the outcome of political ne-
gotiations and is quite complex, as it takes into account the countries’ size, their languages
and their innovation potentials. It is so complex that it is not easy to compute (especially
ten years from now, should the criterion used still be the same?), and probably not a good
communication pitch if the EU patent is created.
The GDP or R&D weighting schemes are the simplest, fairest and most effective distribution
keys. They are easy to compute and communicate, and actually reward countries with a high
economic performance, which originates from innovative efforts. Catching up countries and
dynamic economies would actually be rewarded by this scheme. An alternative weighting
scheme would be related to the population size of countries. This would reward large coun-
tries, but not their innovation or economic performances and is therefore less appropriate.
The relative differences observed between the five weighting schemes for a given level of
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revenue are illustrated in Appendix Table 5.A.4. The choice of the distribution key has im-
plications for the actual revenue sharing related to the renewal fees’ income generated by the
EU patent. Some countries could lose and others could win, depending on the chosen key.
Instead of analyzing cross country differences in distribution keys it is more relevant to con-
sider the total revenue generated by an average patent, and then derive the revenue for each
NPO, because a distribution key might be lower for a country, but the actual revenue higher
due to a much higher total revenue generated by renewal fees.
This is illustrated in Table 5.4 (for the VCOM(200+) renewal fee schedule), and in Appendix
Tables 5.A.5 and 5.A.6 (for the VCOM(200) and VCOM(300) renewal fees schedules, respec-
tively), which show the renewal fees’ income generated by an average patent under the cur-
rent European patent system (where the income is generated by each NPO) and under the EU
patent, with a distribution key based on alternative weighting schemes.
It clearly appears that with the three renewal fees schedules, most of the NPOs would have
a higher income with the EU patent than with the European patent. This is due to the much
higher total income generated by one patent (cf. Figure 5.4). Smaller countries would actually
largely benefit from the EU patent, because they have a relatively low revenue with the current
European patent, due to the very low validation rate.
Table 5.4 suggests that with the VCOM(200+) fee structure, the EPO would earn nearly €7,500
per patent granted, on average. Germany would have an income that fluctuates between
€1,240 and €2,000; depending on the adopted distribution key, against a current revenue per
patent of about €2,400. All other countries would benefit from an increase in their revenue
thanks to the EU patent. Appendix Tables 5.A.5 and 5.A.6 present similar figures but with
alternative fee schedules (VCOM(200) and VCOM(300)). The conclusions remain the same,
except that the revenues are even higher than with the VCOM(200+) fee schedule.
The relative differences between the renewal fee revenues generated by the European patent
(VNPO) and those generated by the EU patent (with VCOM(200+)) are presented in the last
four columns of Table 5.4. The relative differences with the VCOM(200) and VCOM(300)
renewal fees schedules are presented in Appendix Tables 5.A.5 and 5.A.6, respectively. For
instance, with the VCOM(200+) and the GDP distribution key, only Germany, Austria and
Cyprus would have a lower revenue per patent. For Germany this is due to the loss of its
leading position within the European patent system in terms of market size, whereas for
Austria and Cyprus this is due to very high national renewal fees that generate a higher
income than the EU patent would generate with the VCOM(200+).
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Table 5.4: NPO’s renewal fees’ income under EP and EU patent with the VCOM(200+) renewal
fee schedule
VNPO Level (€) Relative net difference (%)
€ Proposed GDP Pop. R&D Proposed GDP Pop. R&D
EPO 5686 7441 7441 7441 7441 31 31 31 31
Germany 2386 1957 1483 1236 2032 -18 -38 -48 -15
France 802 819 1155 953 1309 2 44 19 63
United Kingdom 597 729 1222 915 1175 22 105 53 97
Netherlands 332 551 345 246 320 66 4 -26 -4
Austria 227 424 164 125 218 87 -27 -45 -4
Italy 576 677 946 888 581 18 64 54 1
Spain 230 454 628 669 408 97 173 190 77
Sweden 111 260 200 137 405 135 81 23 265
Denmark 71 193 141 81 187 173 98 14 164
Belgium 88 201 202 159 206 129 130 81 135
Ireland 55 104 113 65 80 88 104 17 44
Finland 70 104 107 80 199 49 52 14 184
Portugal 31 127 99 159 54 302 216 406 71
Greece 21 112 136 168 42 424 539 690 98
Luxembourg 13 37 22 8 19 193 70 -41 53
Hungary 15 67 58 152 31 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Cyprus 10 45 9 12 2 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Estonia 5 52 8 20 5 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Czech Republic 17 60 73 155 61 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Romania 6 89 62 325 15 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Slovakia 8 52 28 81 7 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Bulgaria 6 60 16 116 4 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Slovenia 4 30 20 30 17 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Lithuania 1 52 15 51 7 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Latvia 0 45 10 35 4 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Poland 3 119 174 572 52 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Malta 0 37 3 6 1 - - - -
Note: ∆ represents a large and positive difference due to recent EPC membership and/or small size.
Sources: own calculation based on total renewal fees’ income presented in Figure 5.5 and on distribu-
tion keys presented in Appendix Table 5.A.4.
5.4 Implications for relative patenting costs
The first section underlines two types of failures induced by the currently fragmented patent
system in Europe. First is the prohibitive cost of patenting, due to the cumulated national
renewal fees that applicants must pay to keep their patent in force. Second are the incon-
gruities generated by a system where national systems have the ultimate power to grant or
unvalidate a patent and the high uncertainty that occurs when several parallel litigations take
place. These two types of failure would vanish with the EU patent.
Figure 5.6 shows that 10 years of protection with the EU patent (with the VCOM(200+) fee
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schedule) would cost about €11,400 against €16,000 nowadays for a protection in 6 countries
and nearly €30,000 for a protection in 13 countries. This must be compared with a total cost
lower than €4,000 in all other large economic areas. It is worth noticing that the translation
costs have disappeared for the cost of a EU patent. This is due to the language arrangements
put forward for the potential EU patent.19 Of the €4,600 reduction from the protection in
6 countries to the EU patent, €2,600 comes from the drop in translation requirements, €200
is due to the drop in validation fees, and €1,800 comes from changes in the renewal fees
structure.
Figure 5.6: International comparison of patenting costs with the EU patent
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Sources: van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Mejer (2010) and own calculations for the EU patent
figures.
These absolute numbers do not account for the market size covered by the patents. Doing
so would logically put Europe in a much better situation, thanks to its market of about 500
million inhabitants. Figure 5.7 shows that 10 years of protection with the EU patent (with
the VCOM(200+) fee schedule) would cost about €23 per million capita (it is close to €28 in
Japan), against €55 per million capita nowadays for a protection in 6 countries and €76 for a
protection in 13 countries. In the USA one patent costs only €12 per million capita.
Finally, accounting for the size of patents (number of claims per patent) leads to less biased
comparisons because applications at the USPTO are much larger (about 24 claims per patent)
19The envisaged language arrangements, as of February 2011 were: 1) the possibility to file patents in one of
the three official languages of the EPO (French, German or English); 2) Then, if granted, the claims section must
be translated into the other two languages; 3) a central (at the EPO) automated machine translation into all EU
languages at no extra cost for applicants, for information purposes only, and with no legal effect; 4) For granted
patents, and in case of litigation, official translations have to be secured by the patent holder (see Article 24a,
Revised Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community patent, Council Working Document 8588/09).
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Figure 5.7: International comparison of patenting costs per million capita
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Sources: van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Mejer (2010) and own calculations for the EU patent
figures.
than their EPO counterparts (about 18 claims per patent). In Japan there are ‘only’ about 10
claims per patent.20 The cost per claim per capita indicator put forward by van Pottelsberghe
de la Potterie and François (2009) would place Europe (US purchasing power parity 1.2) be-
tween Japan (1.7) and the USA (0.4). Figure 5.8 suggests that the demand for patents (the
millions of claims that were filed) in 2006 seems to be related to the relative fees, along a
traditional demand curve.
Existing studies aiming at evaluating the fee elasticity of demand for patents converge towards
a value of about -0.3 (cf. de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007; de Rassen-
fosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2009; de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie, 2012). Therefore, the 45% decrease in relative prices due to the implementation of
the EU patent would induce a 14% increase (illustrated by the blank circle in Figure 5.8) in
the demand for patents at the EPO, everything else being equal otherwise. In a nutshell, the
EU patent with a unified jurisdiction would reduce both the costs and uncertainty currently
associated with the fragmented European patent system, while quality in the examination
process would be held stable thanks to relatively high absolute renewal fees. The beneficial
effects of the EU patent (cost savings, construction of the single market, lower complexity)
would make the patent system more accessible for SMEs and for universities in Europe. At
the same time it would make the European market much more attractive for both domestic
and foreign companies.
20See Archontopoulos et al. (2007), van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) and de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie (2012) for evidence on the evolution of the size of patent applications in the three offices.
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Figure 5.8: Relative patenting costs and the demand for patents
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Sources: own calculation from data presented in this chapter and from van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
and Mejer (2010). The cost per claim per million capita is expressed in US PPPs, and includes the
cumulated costs for up to 10 years of protection.
5.5 Discussion of total impact
The cost consequences in absolute term – for 10 years of protection – are a drop of about € 4,600
per patent, due to the end of translation requirements (€ 2,600 per patent), the disappearance
of validation fees (€ 200 per patent) and the change in renewal fees (as compared to a current
protection in six countries, see Figure 5.5). In relative terms, a drop of 45% in the cost per
claim per capita (because the market protection would jump from about 6 countries to a
market of 500 million inhabitants) and an increase of about 14% in the demand for patent
protection would be observed, everything else being equal. This increase in the attractiveness
of the European patent system could generate additional new revenues for patent offices (on
top of the simulations above): each patent under the EU patent would generate more revenue
than a current European patent, and there would be an increase in the number of patent
applications.21 But the financial impact goes far beyond the budgetary constraints of patent
offices.
In his landmark “Rational Ignorance” paper, Lemley (2001) adopted a simple analytical ap-
21Two forces could explain this increase in patent filings: (1) more attractiveness of the patent system and (2)
longer maintenance rates due to higher expected returns for applicants (as a much wider market is covered by the
patent).
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Table 5.5: Total impact by type of actors considering 50,000 patents (in € millions)
EPO NPOs
Business Attorn. &
Lawyers
sector transl.
Renewal feese +88 +88 -176
Designation fees EPOα -25 +40 -15
Validation fees NPOsχ -10 +10
Translation costsδ -20 +149 -129
Filing patent translationα +60 -60
Taking over representationα +46 -46
Intermediary cost for maintenanceα +20 -20
Drop in parallel litigation (Harhoff, 2009)φ +121 -121
Total +43 +78 +270 -270 -121
Notes: α. Based on the median cost corresponding to several patent attorney’s fees (according to
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Mejer, 2010, cf. Appendix Table 5.A.7; ‘designated states’ and
‘filing patent translation’ were assumed to disappear completely while two third of ‘taking over rep-
resentation’ and the ‘intermediation costs for maintenance‘ were dropped; for the latter, the simulated
maintenance rate of the EU patent (VCOM(200+)) was taken into account); β. €500 paid to EPO for
designation of 6 countries; χ. €200 per patent (own calculation, see Figure 5.5); δ €400 per patent for
machine translation under EPO’s budget and own calculation (see Figure 5.6); ε. own calculation (see
Figure 5.5 and Table 5.4); φ. The amount reported corresponds to the lower bound of the estimates
performed by Harhoff (2009).
proach (an arithmetic model) to assess the cost-benefit of improving the quality of examination
at the US patent office (USPTO). This section relies on a similar approach to draw a broad pic-
ture of the impact of the EU patent on the financial flows associated with the main actors of
the system. Based on the simulations results, it is indeed possible to assess the extent to which
each major economic actor would be affected by the EU patent.
Let us assume that 50,000 patents are granted each year by the EPO under the EU patent and
under the current European Patent system.22 The impact of the EU patent can therefore be
assessed by comparing the situation before (with the current European Patents) and after the
EU patent – for each actor. The changes due to the EU patent are illustrated in Table 5.5; they
include changes in renewal fees, translation costs, intermediation costs and litigation costs.
Thanks to the EU patent, the sharp reduction of several intermediation costs, patent fees and
translation expenses would more than compensate for the increase in renewal fees (due to
a higher maintenance rate). First, on average, a patent granted under the EU patent would
generate additional renewal fees of about €3,600 more than one average European patent,
which leads – for 50,000 patents – to an additional revenue of €88 million for the NPOs and
€88 million for EPO (see Table 5.4). Although this increase will be paid by the applicants (the
22This number is taken for the exercise that consists in estimating the total savings and/or losses induced by
the EU patent. Remember that all of the simulations are done at the patent level. The total impact corresponds
therefore to the multiplication of the cost/benefit figures by 50,000. This number could of course be smaller (i.e.
due to the current financial crisis) or higher (due to the drop in relative costs and the improved attractiveness of
the EU patent) but the main message would be exactly the same. We are convinced that 50,000 is a conservative
hypothesis, because the EU patent would be much more attractive than the current system (in 2008 the EPO
granted 59,819 patents).
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business sector), one must keep in mind that it provides protection for a considerably larger
market (cf. Figure 5.7 for a comparison of relative patenting costs, which are significantly
lower for the EU patent than for the EP). Second, designation fees at the EPO and validation
fees at NPOs would disappear, which corresponds to a gain of €500 and €200 (see Figure 5.5)
per patent, respectively. Third, there would be a loss for translators corresponding to a cost
reduction of about € 2,600 (see Figure 5.6) on average per patent. On the other hand, the
EPO would have to bear the cost of processing the translations of incoming applications. This
centralized approach, combined with the continuous improvement of machine translations,
would probably cost a few hundred € per patent (say €400).23 Fourth, patent attorneys would
also lose their income for interacting with several NPOs. Based on the survey performed by
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Mejer (2010), we can evaluate this drop in intermediary
costs at about €2,500 per patent, which is composed of different types of costs (designation,
filing patent translation, taking over representation, and intermediary costs for maintenance).
Finally, Harhoff (2009) has evaluated the total savings from having a unified and integrated
European Patent Litigation System and the drop of parallel litigation at €148 million (lower
bound of his estimation) compared to the operating cost of a European Court of €27 million,
which means a gain for the business sector of €121 million. In a nutshell, the EU patent would
lead to net savings of €270 million for the business sector. The EPO and the NPOs would
earn, respectively, €43 million and €78 million, whereas attorneys and translators would lose
€270 million and the drop in parallel litigation costs would be of about €121 million. In other
words, nearly €400 million would switch from patent attorneys, translators and lawyers to
patent offices and the business sector, while the relative cost of a patent would drop by about
45%.
5.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter essentially aims at evaluating the main economic consequences of setting up the
EU patent within the European Union. First, it simulates the renewal fees’ income conse-
quences for the European Patent Office (EPO) and the national patent offices (NPOs). Second,
it measures the consequences for the business sector in terms of absolute and relative fees,
and the budgetary impact for the major actors of the patent system.
Besides the simulation exercise, the present chapter contributes to the economic literature on
the patenting behavior of applicants. An econometric model explaining the observed mainte-
nance rates of European patents in 17 countries over the past 20 years shows that five main
factors play a significant role: the GDP size of a country, the age of the patent, the level of
renewal fees, the strength of a country’s patent system, and the length of time that a coun-
try has been a member of the European Patent Convention. The estimated impacts of these
five variables allow us in turn to derive the maintenance rate of the EU patent and hence the
renewal fees’ income it would generate for patent offices.
23It is assumed that the €400 would be paid to the business sector for securing machine translation services and
solutions.
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The simulations show that the EPO and most NPOs would actually gain from each patent
granted under the EU patent if an ‘appropriate’ fee schedule is adopted. This is mainly due to
a price effect (higher absolute fees) combined with a size effect (a new market for technology
of about 500 million inhabitants) which would lead to a longer duration of patents. The
main office that might see a significant drop in its renewal fees’ income is the German Patent
Office, which has historically benefited from its ‘largest economy’ status in Europe and hence
generates above the expected validation and maintenance rates (Germany is the country where
most patents are validated at grant, and where they currently remain valid for the longest
period of time).
The broad budgetary or financial impact of the EU patent goes far beyond the mere changes
in the renewal fees’ structure. The new centralized system would sharply reduce translation
and intermediation costs, and the costs induced by parallel litigations with heterogeneous
outcomes. Under the very conservative assumption of 50,000 patents being granted each year
by the EPO (and the VCOM(200+) renewal fee schedule put forward in this chapter), the EU
patent would result in total financial surpluses of €270 million for the business sector, €43
million for the EPO and €78 million for NPOs, compared to total losses of €270 million for
patent attorneys and translators and at least €121 million for lawyers, due to a sharp fall in
parallel litigations.
This exercise should obviously be taken with a touch of caution, both for its reliance on an
econometric model that leads to a simulated maintenance rate and its voluntary failure to take
stock of other positive or negative effects of the EU patent. It is worth noticing that no – or
very few – patent offices had foreseen the sharp drop in revenue due to the 2008 crisis, pro-
viding evidence of the actual complexity of performing budgetary planning in this field. The
methodology adopted in the present chapter does not grasp the whole set of factors that might
influence the revenue of a patent office, especially regarding the future quality of applications
and/or granted patents. In addition, a normative approach is missing. We do not tackle the
question of what kind of EU patent would be best for Europe; the simulations were indeed
performed under the constraints of the current patent systems and under the conditions set
by political negotiations related to fees and translations. One important condition relates to
the 50/50 split between national patent offices and the EPO. Nothing, however, precludes the
reader to dream of an alternative redistribution scheme of the EPO ‘surplus’. It could, for
instance, be used to reduce entry fees (renewal fees would contribute to cover examination
costs), or to fund basic research projects in universities (igniting a virtuous cycle whereby mo-
nopolistic rents would support the creation of new ideas), or to further improve the quality
and accessibility of patent information, or a mix of these three proposals.
One cannot deny that the EU patent is implicitly associated with a potential loss of power and
control by NPOs, a risk which might well be more influential than the budgetary surpluses
that are to be made through its implementation. Despite a potentially strong increase in their
revenue, NPOs might still tilt towards anti-EU patent lobbies. The same argument can also be
put forward with the EPO under the EU patent regime, which would sooner or later fall under
more stringent control by the European Parliament or the European Commission. Would
higher revenues compensate for a reduction in its ‘freedom to operate’? These budget-and-
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control balances, jointly with the substantial financial losses of patent attorneys, translators
and lawyers, are key factors that somewhat elucidate the observed successful resistance to the
EU patent over the past 50 years. These institutions or lobbies benefit to a large extent from
the currently fragmented system and from controlling it.
Despite the fact that nearly €400 million would switch from patent attorneys, translators and
lawyers towards patent offices and the business sector, policy makers should strategize far
beyond a mere budgetary/economic analysis. If innovation is the ultimate target, and if one
believes in the stimulating role played by patent systems, we must be aware that, in its current
set up, the European patent system does not meet its own agenda, but rather the ones of
those who control it. What matters first and foremost is that the EU patent would drastically
simplify the system, reduce the uncertainty currently associated with the fragmented system
and make it attractive for companies (domestic and foreign), and less incongruous for SMEs
and universities; it would give some motion to the invisible hand, with undoubtedly large
benefits for the business sector in general, and for high-tech entrepreneurs in particular.
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5.A Appendix: Additional tables and figure
Table 5.A.1: Main factors explaining the fees-related income of patents offices
European patent EU patent
Validation Validation rate in each NPO
Maintenance Maintenance rate in each NPO Maintenance rate of EU patent
Fees Renewal fees of each NPO Renewal fees of the EU patent
Distribution key towards NPOs
Table 5.A.2: Maintenance rates and validation rates for the entire database
Maintenance rates (%) Validation
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 rates (%)
Germany 94 90 87 83 78 70 64 57 50 44 39 33 29 24 19 90
France 90 85 80 75 69 62 55 48 42 37 32 27 25 21 17 78
United Kingdom 87 82 78 74 69 62 55 49 42 38 33 27 25 21 17 73
Netherlands 56 51 51 50 46 42 37 33 28 25 22 19 16 14 11 24
Austria 50 43 42 43 38 34 30 26 22 19 16 14 12 10 8 17
Italy 75 70 67 64 60 54 49 43 37 33 29 24 24 20 17 48
Spain 67 59 57 55 49 44 39 34 28 25 22 18 17 14 12 32
Sweden 52 44 43 43 39 35 31 28 23 20 17 14 13 11 9 19
Denmark 43 35 33 36 33 30 27 23 19 18 15 13 12 11 9 11
Belgium 53 46 45 46 41 37 33 29 23 21 18 15 14 12 10 19
Ireland 47 37 35 40 36 33 29 25 21 19 19 16 13 11 9 11
Finland 39 31 31 34 31 29 25 24 21 18 16 14 12 11 9 10
Portugal 46 35 32 34 30 28 25 22 18 16 14 12 11 9 9 8
Greece 40 30 29 32 28 26 24 21 17 15 12 11 11 9 9 6
Luxembourg 44 32 27 32 28 26 22 20 15 14 12 11 11 9 9 6
USA 86 85 85 67 66 65 64 46 44 43 42 - - - - 100
Japan 100 98 94 91 90 87 83 78 71 65 59 52 47 41 33 100
Note: The maintenance rate corresponds to the share of patents still in force at the end of the patent
year and the validation rate is the share of granted EPO patents validated in EPC contracting states in
2006.
Source: data provided by the EPO and National Patent Offices, own calculation.
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Figure 5.A.1: Maintenance rates over the entire patent’s lifetime
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Table 5.A.3: Other variables in the database
GDP (in Age of
IPI
Renewal fees (€)
billion €) membership 6* 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Germany 2322 31 4.50 130 180 240 290 350 470 620 760 910 1060 1230 1410 1590 1760 1940
France 1807 31 4.67 150 150 150 150 150 300 300 300 300 300 600 600 600 600 600
United Kingdom 1913 31 4.54 86 111 136 160 185 210 234 259 284 308 333 370 407 444 494
Netherlands 540 31 4.67 185 220 280 340 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400
Austria 257 29 4.33 675 270 270 270 500 500 500 850 850 850 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400
Italy 1480 30 4.67 190 120 170 200 230 310 410 530 600 650 650 650 650 650 650
Spain 982 22 4.33 328 103 129 154 179 217 255 292 330 368 420 469 520 570 620
Sweden 313 30 4.54 413 143 169 201 238 238 285 301 322 349 375 402 428 455 476
Denmark 220 18 4.67 328 215 241 275 308 342 375 409 443 483 523 563 603 644 684
Belgium 317 31 4.67 85 100 125 145 170 195 220 250 290 330 370 410 455 500 545
Ireland 177 16 4.67 184 150 176 194 220 242 265 285 311 335 356 382 408 438 468
Finland 167 12 4.67 465 200 235 265 300 350 400 450 500 535 585 645 705 755 805
Portugal 155 16 4.38 135 98 114 137 172 201 228 275 321 366 412 458 504 549 595
Greece 213 22 4.30 370 84 98 114 134 154 184 214 242 272 322 358 392 430 472
Luxembourg 34 31 4.14 59 74 89 104 118 130 145 160 175 190 205 220 235 250 270
USA 10496 31 4.88 - - - 776 - - - 1964 - - - 3256 - - -
Japan 3485 31 4.67 88 269 269 269 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902
Note: * for European countries, the validation fees (Harhoff, Hoisl, and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2009, p 14) are included in the renewal fees for year 6.
Sources: Eurostat, data provided by the EPO and Park (2008), and National patent offices websites.
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Table 5.A.4: Four potential ’Distribution Keys’
Actual* Proposed* GDP** Population* R&D**
Germany 31.60% 26.30% 19.90% 16.60% 27.30%
France 13.10% 11.00% 15.50% 12.80% 17.60%
United Kingdom 11.60% 9.80% 16.40% 12.30% 15.80%
Netherlands 8.00% 7.40% 4.60% 3.30% 4.30%
Austria 6.70% 5.70% 2.20% 1.70% 2.90%
Italy 8.60% 9.10% 12.70% 11.90% 7.80%
Spain 5.40% 6.10% 8.40% 9.00% 5.50%
Sweden 3.60% 3.50% 2.70% 1.80% 5.40%
Denmark 2.60% 2.60% 1.90% 1.10% 2.50%
Belgium 2.50% 2.70% 2.70% 2.10% 2.80%
Ireland 1.40% 1.40% 1.50% 0.90% 1.10%
Finland 1.30% 1.40% 1.40% 1.10% 2.70%
Portugal 1.10% 1.70% 1.30% 2.10% 0.70%
Greece 0.90% 1.50% 1.80% 2.30% 0.60%
Luxembourg 0.50% 0.50% 0.30% 0.10% 0.30%
Hungary 0.20% 0.90% 0.80% 2.00% 0.40%
Cyprus 0.20% 0.60% 0.10% 0.20% 0.00%
Estonia 0.10% 0.70% 0.10% 0.30% 0.10%
Czech Republic 0.10% 0.80% 1.00% 2.10% 0.80%
Romania 0.10% 1.20% 0.80% 4.40% 0.20%
Slovakia 0.10% 0.70% 0.40% 1.10% 0.10%
Bulgaria 0.10% 0.80% 0.20% 1.60% 0.10%
Slovenia 0.10% 0.40% 0.30% 0.40% 0.20%
Lithuania 0.00% 0.70% 0.20% 0.70% 0.10%
Latvia 0.00% 0.60% 0.10% 0.50% 0.10%
Poland 0.10% 1.60% 2.30% 7.70% 0.70%
Malta 0.00% 0.50% 0.00% 0.10% 0.00%
Note: These four alternative distribution keys could be used to redistribute the revenues generated by
the EU patent renewal fees towards the national patent offices.
Sources: *EC (2008), ** Eurostat 2006 (million €), and own calculation.
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Table 5.A.5: NPO’S renewal fees’ income under EP and EU patent with the VCOM(200) re-
newal fee schedule
VNPO Level (€) Relative net difference (%)
€ Proposed GDP Pop. R&D Proposed GDP Pop. R&D
EPO 5686 7916 7916 7916 7916 39 39 39 39
Germany 2386 2082 1578 1315 2162 -13 -34 -45 -9
France 802 871 1229 1013 1392 9 53 26 74
United Kingdom 597 776 1300 973 1250 30 118 63 110
Netherlands 332 586 367 262 340 77 11 -21 2
Austria 227 451 175 133 232 99 -23 -42 2
Italy 576 720 1006 945 618 25 75 64 7
Spain 230 483 668 711 434 110 190 209 88
Sweden 111 277 213 145 430 150 92 31 288
Denmark 71 206 150 86 199 190 111 22 180
Belgium 88 214 215 169 219 143 145 93 150
Ireland 55 111 121 69 85 100 117 24 53
Finland 70 111 114 85 212 58 62 21 202
Portugal 31 135 106 169 57 327 236 438 82
Greece 21 119 145 179 45 457 580 740 111
Luxembourg 13 40 23 8 21 211 81 -37 63
Hungary 15 71 61 161 33 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Cyprus 10 47 10 13 2 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Estonia 5 55 9 21 6 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Czech Republic 17 63 77 165 65 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Romania 6 95 66 345 16 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Slovakia 8 55 30 86 8 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Bulgaria 6 63 17 123 4 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Slovenia 4 32 21 32 18 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Lithuania 1 55 16 54 7 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Latvia 0 47 11 37 4 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Poland 3 127 185 609 56 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Malta 0 40 3 6 1 - - - -
Note: ∆ represents a large and positive difference due to recent EPC membership and/or small size.
Source: own calculation based on total renewal fees’ income presented in Figure 5.5 and on distribution
keys presented in Appendix Table 5.A.4.
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Table 5.A.6: NPO’S renewal fees’ income under EP and EU patent with the VCOM(300) re-
newal fee schedule
VNPO Level (€) Relative net difference (%)
€ Proposed GDP Pop. R&D Proposed GDP Pop. R&D
EPO 5686 8274 8274 8274 8274 46 46 46 46
Germany 2386 2176 1649 1375 2260 -9 -31 -42 -5
France 802 910 1284 1059 1455 14 60 32 81
United Kingdom 597 811 1359 1017 1306 36 128 71 119
Netherlands 332 612 384 274 355 85 16 -17 7
Austria 227 472 183 139 243 108 -19 -39 7
Italy 576 753 1052 987 646 31 83 71 12
Spain 230 505 698 743 454 119 203 223 97
Sweden 111 290 223 152 450 161 101 37 306
Denmark 71 215 156 90 208 203 120 27 193
Belgium 88 223 225 177 229 154 156 102 161
Ireland 55 116 126 72 89 109 127 30 60
Finland 70 116 119 89 221 65 69 26 216
Portugal 31 141 110 177 60 347 251 462 90
Greece 21 124 151 187 47 482 611 778 120
Luxembourg 13 41 24 8 22 225 89 -34 70
Hungary 15 74 64 169 35 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Cyprus 10 50 10 13 2 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Estonia 5 58 9 22 6 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Czech Republic 17 66 81 172 68 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Romania 6 99 69 361 17 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Slovakia 8 58 32 90 8 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Bulgaria 6 66 18 129 5 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Slovenia 4 33 22 33 19 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Lithuania 1 58 17 57 7 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Latvia 0 50 11 38 4 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Poland 3 132 193 636 58 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Malta 0 41 4 7 1 - - - -
Note: ∆ represents a large and positive difference due to recent EPC membership and/or small size.
Source: own calculation based on total renewal fees’ income presented in Figure 5.5 and on distribution
keys presented in Appendix Table 5.A.4.
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Table 5.A.7: Value of external (patent attorneys) expenses associated with a patent application,
its prosecution and its validation and maintenance in six countries, as of August 2008
Average Median Min Max
PRE-FILING
Prior art search and draft 8 125 8 125 5 000 11 250
PROCEDURAL (up to grant)
Designation states 363 300 190 520
Representation 2 325 2 200 1 740 3 500
+ 10h of attorney’s work 5 056 5 000 4 240 6 000
+ 20h of attorney’s work 7 556 7 500 6 740 8 500
POST-GRANT
Taking over representation 1 884 1 380 840 3 600
Filing patent translation 1 275 1 200 900 1 800
Maintenance (6th-10th year) 2 560 2 520 2 400 2 880
Note: The cost of translation is not accounted for, as it constitutes a separate cost category in our
analysis.
Source: van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Mejer (2010), from raw data provided by 11 patent law
firms.
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5.B Appendix: Computation of maintenance rates
The dependent variable, of the model analyzed in this chapter (equation 5.4), corresponds to
the maintenance rate of granted patents ((1− d), or one minus the drop-out rate) enforced in
country i at year t (t=6,. . . , 20). 15 years of renewals are therefore taken into account for each
country. As it is illustrated in the following tables (representing the cases of Germany and
Belgium), these maintenance rates were computed as the share of patents still in force at the
end of each patent year, the denominator being the total number of granted patents validated
in the country.
Table 5.B.1: Maintenance rates computation - Germany
Filing
Grant
Patents still in force at the end of the patent year
year 6 7 8 9 10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1996 44663 · · · 43228 41376 39055 36431 33943 · · ·
1997 47147 · · · 45557 43721 41439 39032 36613 · · ·
1998 49313 · · · 47336 45470 43266 40931 38658 · · ·
1999 49466 · · · 47071 45289 43139 40895 0 · · ·
2000 50655 · · · 47724 45753 43609 0 0 · · ·
2001 45829 · · · 43114 41373 0 0 0 · · ·
2002 38298 · · · 35556 0 0 0 0 · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Maintenance rates (%) 94 90 87 83 78
Source : Raw data provided by the EPO and National Patent Offices, own computation.
Table 5.B.2: Maintenance rates computation - Belgium
Filing
Grant
Patents still in force at the end of the patent year
year 6 7 8 9 10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1996 18539 · · · 14993 12909 10678 8998 7783 · · ·
1997 19371 · · · 15534 12917 10678 9158 7982 · · ·
1998 20553 · · · 15614 12996 10961 9365 8280 · · ·
1999 24340 · · · 16139 13252 10862 9307 0 · · ·
2000 29909 · · · 17585 13705 11080 0 0 · · ·
2001 27972 · · · 14902 11270 0 0 0 · · ·
2002 23885 · · · 10868 0 0 0 0 · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Maintenance rates (%) 53 46 45 46 41
Source : Raw data provided by the EPO and National Patent Offices, own computation.
In other words, maintenance rates were measured as the number of patents still in force at
the end of the patent year divided by the number of granted patents of the same cohort that
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were validated in the country. It can be noticed that ‘diagonal-1’ data (highlighted in bold and
italic on the above tables) were preferred because the more recent data seem to be biased due
to the lack of the most recent information.
Chapter 6
General conclusions and perspectives
In a world where the production of goods and services, and scientific research are more and
more carried out across borders, this thesis aims at providing new evidence on the globaliza-
tion of innovation.
Main findings
Chapter 2 has studied the production function of patents at the industry level – this patent
data is at the core of three chapters of this dissertation – for a unique panel dataset that
includes 5 patent indicators computed for 18 industrial sectors in 19 countries over 19 years.
The main findings of this analysis of the R&D-patent relationship are threefold.
First, although R&D does not fully explain the variance in patent filings, the long-term elas-
ticity of patents with respect to R&D stock remains significantly positive (about 0.12) and
remarkably stable across patent indicators. Second, the econometric analysis confirmed that
variations in patent applications reflect not only variations in research productivity but also
variations in the appropriability and filing strategies adopted by firms. These two components
of the propensity to patent shed light on the high variability in the use of patent across coun-
tries and across industries. Last, the decomposition of the regression results across countries,
industries and over time has provided interesting insights into the origins of the worldwide
growth in patenting. On the one hand, some industries, which are related to ICT technologies
and use strategic patenting intensively, and some other countries (South Korea, Spain, and
Poland) have experienced a drastic increase in patent applications. On the other hand, the
ratio of priority patent applications to R&D expenditures has generally been constant. This
result suggests that there has been no growth in research productivity. By contrast, regional
applications (filings at the USPTO or at the EPO) have been increasing since the early 1990s,
suggesting that the “patent warming” observed in major patent offices is driven by the greater
globalization of innovation protection rather than a surge in inventiveness. Innovative firms
are increasingly targeting global markets and hence have a higher tendency to seek protection
in key markets abroad.
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Using aggregate internationalization patent-based indicators, Chapters 3 and 4 have provided
new evidence on the globalization of innovation production. A strong growth in the inten-
sity of globalization of innovation has been confirmed – for priority filings and EPO patent
applications – not only in terms of cross-border ownership of innovation, but also in terms
of international collaborations. Nevertheless, heterogeneity across countries and industries
has been observed in Chapter 3. More innovative countries (or industries) do not present
a more globalized innovation footprint. The ownership of international innovation is still
strongly concentrated in a few countries, although its location is increasingly dispersed across
the world. The dyadic analysis performed in Chapter 4 has underlined that the globalized
world of innovation is composed of a growing number of partner countries, which collabo-
rate together intensively. Even though the globalization of innovation has strongly increased
(with annual growth rate superior to 5% on average between 1980 and 20051), the descriptive
results of both chapters have also indicated that its amplitude remained quite limited since
less than one fifth of my sample of country-industry pairs collaborated across borders in their
innovative activities in 2005.
Based on a unique panel dataset composed of 21 industries in 29 countries between 1980
and 2005, Chapter 3 has confirmed that home-base augmenting motives matter more than
home-base exploiting motives. This empirical investigation has shown that the degree of in-
ternationalization of innovation is negatively related to the revealed technological advantage
of countries across industries. Countries tend to be relatively more globalized in industrial
sectors in which they are technologically weak. In the same vein, countries with smaller tech-
nological base (low R&D intensity and small economic size) are more likely to see their inven-
tions controlled by foreign applicants. By contrast, the more a country is intensive in R&D, the
less it enters into international co-invention and the more it owns foreign inventions. These
results suggest that globalization of innovation is a means to acquire competences abroad that
are lacking at home.
The industry-level analysis performed in Chapter 4 has allowed us to reconcile the opposing
forces usually related to the role of technological distance in explaining dyadic international
collaborative innovation. Indeed, the empirical findings have shown that two countries col-
laborate more intensively in the globalized production of innovation if, on the one hand,
their industry-specific technological knowledge is closely related and, on the other hand, their
non-industry-specific technological knowledge is different. This suggests that bilateral innova-
tive relationships at the industry level are jointly determined by the overlapping of partners’
knowledge within the industry and the non-overlapping of partners’ expertise outside the
scope of the industry. The former dimension guarantees the relative absorptive capacity and
the exchange of intra-industry spillovers between partners, whereas the latter one reflects a
higher potential for inter-industry spillovers and is driven by the search for novel and comple-
mentary competences. Furthermore, the bilateral model estimation has highlighted that the
intensity of international innovation is higher not only for country-industry pairs that present
1By contrast, the world development indicators indicate that the intensity of international trade – measured by
the ratio of the exports (or the imports) of goods and services divided by the GDP – has known a annual growth
of about 1% on average between 1980 and 2005 for the OECD countries (for which the globalization of innovation
was investigated in this thesis).
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more multidisciplinary patenting activities – across a larger number of different technologies –
(as suggested in Chapter 3), but also if these innovative activities are non-overlapping among
collaborative partners.
Three chapters have examined the relationship between international trade and international
patenting. In Chapter 2, the estimates of the patent production function have indicated a
strong positive impact of the international competiveness of countries on their international
patent applications (i.e. patent filings at regional patent offices) across industrial sectors.
At the same time, countries that compete internationally in trade are also more involved in
international collaborative innovation and in cross-border ownership of patents (see Chapters
3 and 4). Nevertheless, the results of those two chapters have suggested that globalization of
innovation does not follow the direction of the trade flows, illustrating that the cross-border
innovation is not totally market-driven. Chapter 4 has also underlined that overall economic
ties matter more than the direction of trade or investment flows between countries.
The simulation exercise carried out in Chapter 5 was focused on the implementation of the
new unitary patent in Europe. In particular, this study has addressed two issues which are
still subject to political negotiations (since they were not solved by the agreement between 25
member states and the European Parliament on the “unitary patent package” in December
2012): the level of fees and the revenue for national patent offices.
The main findings of this cost-benefit analysis of the EU patent are twofold. First, nearly all
patent offices would be better off – in terms of renewal fees’ income – with the EU patent
than with the current European patent system. This is mainly due to a price effect (higher
absolute fees) and a size effect (larger market of protection which leads to higher maintenance
of patents). Second, if an ’appropriate’ fee schedule is adopted, the business sector would
largely benefit from a lower relative cost of patenting in Europe, and lower translation and
intermediation costs.
Beyond those findings of particular relevance for policy makers, this chapter has also con-
tributed to the literature on the patenting behavior of applicants. The econometric model has
explained the observed maintenance rates of patents in 17 countries over the past 20 years in
order to simulate the maintenance rate of the EU patent. The estimation results have shown
that the size of the country, the age of the patent, the level of renewal fees, the strength of
a country’s patent system and the membership to the European Patent Convention are key
determinants of the drop-out rate of patents along their lifecycle.
Policy implications
Several policy implications can be drawn from the empirical results of this dissertation. The
empirical findings have confirmed that the globalization is reshaping, not only the way goods
and services are produced and sell across the world, but also the way innovative activities are
organized. First, patent-based evidence presented in Chapter 2 has illustrated that companies
are extensively protecting their innovation by filing patent application on a larger geograph-
ical scope (i.e. by targeting regional patent offices: EPO, USPTO and triadic). Second, the
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production of innovation is becoming more globalized with country-industry pairs that are
increasingly involved in international co-invention of new products and in cross-border own-
ership of innovation. In fact, Chapter 3 has shown that the extent to which country-industry
pairs collaborate in innovation with the rest of the world has seen a rather strong growth.
Moreover, Chapter 4 has highlighted that it involves an increasing number of international
collaborative partners which tend to collaborate more intensively together.
The effects of stronger globalization of innovation are often at the center of the policy makers’
concerns. Even though additional studies are required to better understand the impact on
the home country, the results of this thesis suggest that globalization should not be seen as a
threat but rather as an opportunity for innovation. For instance, Chapter 3 has underlined that
internationalization of technology is a means for firms to augment the knowledge base of the
home country and to compensate domestic weaknesses by finding novel and complementary
competences abroad.
Moreover, there is room for policy intervention to accomodate potential issues from global-
ization. First, Chapters 2 and 5 have shown that policy makers may improve the innovative
performance of their countries. These two chapters have underlined that the design of patent
systems (e.g. quality, applicant friendliness, level of fees, and membership to the EPC) has a
significant impact on patent applicants’ behavior. An appropriate patent system would im-
prove the patenting performance with a larger number of patent applications by domestic
inventors (see Chapter 2) and higher maintenance rates of patents (see Chapter 5). It would
also make the domestic market more attractive for foreigners, thereby increasing the chance to
be involved in globalized innovative projects. Second, Chapter 4 has suggested that govern-
ments that would like to play an active role in the globalized production of technology should
jointly develop strong specialized hubs (with high potential for intra-industry spillovers) and
stimulate interdisciplinary projects (creating diversity externalities). Both dimensions matter
for the attractiveness of the country to foreign inventors and for the intensity of R&D activities
located in foreign locations.
While innovative activities are increasingly performed at the international level, innovation
policy is still predominantly national in scope. In the same vein, the decomposition of the
growth in patenting (see Chapter 2) has confirmed the predominance of country-level deter-
minants. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that “the challenge for governments is to adjust
national policies in light of increasingly international innovation networks” (as recognized by
OECD, 2008, p 8).
In this respect, the case of the fragmented European patent system is particularly instructive.
Chapter 5 has illustrated the difficulties for patent offices and policy makers to set up a simple
policy instrument harmonized across countries – a unitary patent for all EU member states.
Beyond the advantages in terms of costs for patent applicants, the implementation of the EU
patent would simplify the system, reinforce the knowledge-based integration within the EU
(illustrated for the 15 “old” member states in Chapter 4), and make the EU more attractive
to foreign firms and less incongruous for entrepreneurs and universities. Therefore, it would
create a more efficient European market for technology within the globalized world of inno-
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vation. This would help to build a real knowledge-based European economy, recognized as a
source of competences for international innovative projects, as well as a place for developing
new innovative products. The recent agreement of the “patent package” is a first step in the
right direction, but the success of the harmonized European patent system would also depend
on the level of fees, the coherence with respect to parallel patenting routes in Europe and the
quality of the system.
The call for more policy harmonization and stronger worldwide collaborative innovation is
also appealing to face issues which are increasingly global. Climate change is only one of the
examples that cannot be tackled by an individual country in isolation from the others.
Limitations and further research
The empirical analyses performed in this thesis present some limitations offering avenues for
further research since the globalization of innovation remains a question of high relevance in
the research and policy agenda.
The industry-level approach, taken in three chapters of this dissertation, has enabled us to
address original research questions. However, the computation of patent counts per industrial
sector is not straightforward since patents are classified by technological field rather than by
economic sector. It requires matching technological with industrial classifications. In this
research, the concordance table proposed by Schmoch et al. (2003) was used for that purpose.
Despite some limitations, concordance tables are the only techniques which allow us to refine
the empirical investigation of innovation across the technological spectrum. Indeed, other
economic variables are usually available at the country, regional or industry levels but never at
the technological level. Although it is still challenging to find explanatory variables available
at the industry level, it would be worthwile to pay more attention to the computation of
patent-based indicators at the industry level.
First, the matching procedure could be improved by a better understanding of the techno-
logical classification (i.e. the IPC classes listed on patents). Measuring the links between IPC
classes would help to build more accurate clusters of IPC classes, which can then be associated
with industrial sectors. Currently, most of the IPC-based patent indicators used in the liter-
ature are built on the assumption that each IPC class is equally distant from any other. This
assumption is probably too restrictive. The creation of large technological maps, based on
all patent information contained in PATSTAT, would enhance the accuracy of both the counts
per technological field and the proximity between each technological field. The analysis of
the co-occurrence of IPC classes listed per patent or the analysis of citations between patents
of different IPC classes are examples of further research that would definitely improve our
understanding of industrial dynamics in innovation.
Second, refined industry classification and technological distance between IPC classes could
also make other patent-based indicators used in this thesis more accurate. The indicator
of multidisciplinary technological knowledge (used in Chapters 3 and 4 for each country-
industry pair) could be modified by integrating not only the number of distinct technological
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classes but also the technological distance between each class. The multidisciplinarity of an
individual would be higher if he patents in a larger number of different classes that are less
related in the global technological space (i.e. rarely listed on the same patents or few citations
between them). The same reasoning is valid for both measures of technological distance used
in Chapter 4: proximity of industry-specific technological knowledge and diversity of non-
industry-specific technological knowledge. Nevertheless, this IPC-based weighting scheme is
challenging since multiple IPC classes may be associated with one patent application. Tech-
nological distance between IPC classes is thus much more than a simple dyadic relationship,
as is usually the case when measuring distance between pairs of individuals.
Beyond the industry matching of patent data, additional good-quality data would help to
deepen the empirical findings of this dissertation. Chapter 2 has highlighted two components
explaining the propensity to patent. However, the empirical investigation of both dimensions
has been limited by the lack of high-quality measures of appropriability strategy and filing
strategy. It would thus imply collecting, via large-scale surveys for instance, additional ev-
idence to assess the share of inventions that are patented as well as the average number of
patents that are used to protect an innovation.
The understanding of the filing strategy also requires additional evidence on the geograph-
ical scope of protection. The results of Chapter 2 have indicated a greater globalization of
innovation protection due to a stronger propensity to file patents at the regional (e.g. EPO,
UPSTO) and international (e.g. triadic) levels. However, the protection of innovation does
not concern only the decision to apply for a patent, but also the decision to validate granted
patents in various countries and the decision to renew granted patents over the entire lifetime
(van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and van Zeebroeck, 2008; Harhoff, Hoisl, Reichl, and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2009). In this respect, the results of Chapter 5 may be extended
to better explain the patents holders’ behaviour after grant. The study of the globalization of
innovation protection is particularly appealing to better understand the relationships between
the globalized production of innovation (underlined in Chapters 3 and 4) and the modes of
worldwide protection of innovation. In that context, the case of Europe would offer great
research opportunities since one can expect that the forthcoming unitary patent system (see
Chapter 5) would considerably impact the way firms (European and international) protect
their innovative activities within the European market.
The worldwide production and protection of innovation encourage further quantitative stud-
ies on the international knowledge spillovers. In this respect, the analysis of the R&D-patent
relationship performed in Chapter 2 might be extended by including foreign R&D activities.
Beyond comparing different type of patent counts, it is appealing to distinguish the sources
of R&D: R&D activities at home performed by domestic or foreign firms, as well as R&D
activities performed abroad by foreign affiliates of domestic firms. It would help to identify
clearly the impact of international R&D activities on domestic patenting performance. In the
same vein, understanding the impact of the stronger globalization of innovation on the home
country has a large interest for policy makers. Although globalization might be driven by
home-base replacing motives (Lewin et al., 2009), international openness can be beneficial for
the home economy in terms of access to new and more diverse technological competences,
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which can then stimulate domestic innovative activities (Abramovsky et al., 2012). Moreover,
the links between international innovation and international trade might be explored in more
details. While this thesis shows a positive relationship between international competitive-
ness in trade and international innovative activities, it does not inform on the exact causality
between both cross-border activities. In particular, the differences observed in Chapter 3 be-
tween the comparative advantage of countries across industries in terms of trade and the one
in terms of technology development highlight the need for further research in this field.
The increasing globalization of innovation also calls for further empirical investigations based
on a larger sample of countries than the one used in this thesis (mainly restricted to OECD
economies to guarantee enough data availability of explanatory variables). Emerging and
developing countries will undeniably take a larger place in the globalized world of innovation.
Beyond their attractiveness for performing low-cost activities, these countries are also new
sources of competences and talented human capital required to innovate (Lewin et al., 2009;
Manning et al., 2012). These new dynamics require collecting patent-data of high quality
and internationally comparable for more countries of inventors and applicants, and for more
patent offices worldwide. For that purpose, the new inventiveness indicator introduced by
de Rassenfosse et al. (2013) is a promising patent count indicator since it encompasses a
comprehensive set of inventions for many countries without geographical bias. The empirical
challenge would thus be to find satisfactory aggregate explanatory variables which explain
the determinants of the globalization of innovation in these countries.
Finally, another avenue for further research consists in extending the aggregated approach
taken in this dissertation with micro-evidence. Even though aggregate patent-based indi-
cators offer an exhaustive overview of the globalization of patented innovation, their main
limitation is the lack of firm-level and implementation-level determinants (as recognized in
Chapter 1 and section 3.3.2). Further micro-level studies of globalization might thus perfectly
complement the empirical findings of this thesis by enriching them with firm-specific drivers
of globalization of innovation. While most existing papers have focused on a restricted sample
of firms, it would be worth matching rich innovation-related information contained in patent
databases with detailed firm-level information.2 The difficulty is not only to recover miss-
ing name information about the inventors and the applicants of patents3, but also to collect
reliable consolidated information across the different entities of a same institution located in
dispersed locations. Further research in that direction would improve our understanding of
the geographical and firm boundaries in globalized innovative activities. In particular, firm-
level information would allow us to enlarge the scope of the analysis of technological distance
performed in Chapter 4. Indeed, broader definitions of knowledge-based distance between
innovative partners could be considered in addition to patent-based indicators. For instance,
smaller managerial knowledge distance (Schulze and Brojerdi, 2012), common absorptive ca-
pacity routines (Lewin et al., 2011), and scientific similarities or complementarities (Makri
et al., 2010) are likely to impact firm-level international collaborative innovation.
2See for instance the matching performed by Abramovsky et al. (2012) between patent information contained
in PATSTAT and firm accounts information contained in Bureau Van Dijk’s databases.
3In addition to the recovering of country information proposed by de Rassenfosse et al. (2013) and performed
in Chapters 3 and 4.
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